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DESIGNATION OF THE PARTIES 
Cross-Petitioner B.A.M. DEVELOPMENT, L.L.C. is a Utah 
limited liability company. Its principal is Scott M 
McCleary, a natural person. The entity name is derived from 
the first letters of the first names of Mr McCleary's three 
adult children: Ben, Ashley and Matt. 
Cross-Petitioner SALT LAKE COUNTY is a Utah body 
politic and political subdivision of the State of Utah. 
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IN THE UTAH SUPREME COURT 
B.A.M. DEVELOPMENT, L.L.C., 
a Utah limited liability 
company, 
Cross-Petitioner 
vs 
SALT LAKE COUNTY, a Utah 
body politic and political 
subdivision of the State 
of Utah, 
Cross-Petitioner 
OPENING BRIEF 
OF 
CROSS-PETITIONER 
B.A.M. DEVELOPMENT 
ON WRIT OF 
CERTIORARI 
[ORAL ARGUMENT 
REQUESTED] 
Case No. 20040365-SC 
CITATION TO COURT OF APPEALS DECISION 
The Court of Appeals decision for which certiorari 
review has been granted is B.A.M. Development, L.L.C. vs 
Salt Lake County, 2004 UT App 34, 87 P. 3d 710 (Utah App 
2004), decided 20 February 2004, Appellate Case No. 
20010840-CA [hereinafter "the Decision"] . A photocopy of the 
Decision is included herein at APPENDIX #1 of this BRIEF. 
STATEMENT OF SUPREME COURT JURISDICTION 
Jurisdiction over the "appeal" originally was exercised 
pursuant to the provisions of Section 78-2-2(3) (j) , Utah 
Code [Supreme Court has original appellate jurisdiction for 
appeals of civil cases from the District Court]. The Utah 
Supreme Court "poured over" the case to the Court of 
Appeals, which issued its opinion on 20 February 2004, 2004 
UT App 34, 87 P.3d 710 (Utah App 2004). The Utah Supreme 
Court granted the parties' cross-petitions for writ of 
certiorari in August 2004. 
ISSUES AND STANDARD OF REVIEW 
This is an "inverse condemnation" case to obtain "just 
compensation" for "physical takings" of private property, 
"taken" as development exactions by a government entity as 
a condition of subdivision development approval. The three 
issues specified for certiorari review by the Utah Supreme 
Court of the Court of Appeals Decision are contained with 
the Utah Supreme Court's August 2 0 04 order, thus: 
Issue #1: Whether the Nollan/Dolan "rough 
proportionality" test applies where an alleged 
taking results from a uniform land-use scheme 
rather than an ad hoc site-specific adjudicative 
decision. [Hereinafter "Issue #1"] 
Issue #2: Whether the Court of Appeals erred in 
holding the district court's review was limited to 
the administrative record. [Hereinafter "Issue 
#2"] 
Issue #3: Whether Section 63-90a-4 of the Utah 
Code permits review regardless of the state of the 
administrative record. [Hereinafter "Issue #3"] 
On certiorari review, the Supreme Court reviews the Decision 
of the Utah Court of Appeals not of the trial court for 
correctness; the conclusions of law of the Court of Appeals 
are afforded no deference. Bear River Mutual Insurance 
Company vs Wall, 978 P.2d 460 at 461 (Utah Supreme Court 
1999) . 
Cross-Petitioner B.A.M. DEVELOPMENT strenuously 
disputes the COUNTY'S intentional mischaracterization [p. 2 
of its OPENING BRIEF: under the heading "STANDARD OF 
REVIEW"] of the case as being a "facial challenge" to the 
Ordinance.1 This case is an "inverse condemnation" case to 
obtain "just compensation" (e.g. monetary payment) for 
unconstitutionally excessive exactions (land dedication and 
required improvements). In response to the COUNTY'S claim 
that the "standard of review" for the "facial challenge" 
which this case primarily isn' t B.A.M. DEVELOPMENT asserts 
the intentional avoidance of the constitutional 
proscriptions of the Just Compensation Clause is never a 
"legitimate state interest". 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
In 1997 B.A.M. DEVELOPMENT, as owner of a 15-acre 
parcel located immediately adjacent to 3500 South Street 
actually a "state highway" subject to the jurisdiction of 
the Utah Department of Transportation [UDOT] applied to 
SALT LAKE COUNTY for development approval of the "Westridge 
Meadows" subdivision development. The proposed subdivision 
presented no unique or difficult geologic, topographic or 
similar engineering or other considerations. The proposed 
lot configuration and other improvements readily conformed 
to existing zoning requirements. What should have been a 
xThe COUNTY'S evaluation of the case from page 3 of its 
OPENING BRIEF, namely, "This case involves claims [that] . 
. . the County violated BAM's constitutional guarantees of 
just compensation for "takings" of private property . . ." 
is much more accurately and fairly stated. 
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relatively simple administrative procedure requiring three 
or four months actually took two years (until August 1999) 
to complete. 
In August 1998 the COUNTY Board of Commissioners 
summarily refused to hear B.A.M. DEVELOPMENT'S appeal of 
County Planning and Zoning Commission's requirements as 
per the COUNTY'S "highway-abutting" Ordinance that B.A.M. 
DEVELOPMENT, as a condition of development approval, 
dedicate and improve a 53-foot "half-width" of the 3500 
South state highway. This litigation was filed in August 
1998. In August 1999 one year AFTER the litigation was 
filed the COUNTY finally granted development approval and 
required the dedication and installation of the roadway and 
other improvements to the 3500 South state highway, which 
previously had a "half-width" of asphalt for eastbound 
traffic of approximately 17 feet, with a then-current 
"traffic load" of slightly less than 13,000 vehicles per day 
(both directions). In addition to the "internal" 
improvements (interior streets, sidewalks, etc.) as 
regularly required for the building lots directly served by 
those public improvements, B.A.M. DEVELOPMENT installed the 
"excessive" improvements mandated by the COUNTY for the 3 500 
South state roadway. 
The litigation was tried in the Third District Court in 
April 2001 before Judge Timothy R Hansen, who ruled in favor 
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of the COUNTY: to the effect that there was a "rational 
basis" for the COUNTY'S dedication and improvement 
requirements. The judgment of the District Court was 
appealed to the Utah Supreme Court, which "poured over" the 
appeal to the Utah Court of Appeals. In October 2002 the 
Court of Appeals heard oral arguments and took the case 
"under advisement". In February 2004 the Court of Appeals 
issued its Decision, joined by a 2-member majority and with 
one Judge dissenting. The three judges, however, were 
unanimous in concluding that the so-called Nollan-Dolan 
standard was the correct analytical standard to be applied, 
thus overruling the District Court on that legal issue. 
However, the Court of Appeals majority without the issue 
having been raised or briefed sua sponte raised the 
"administrative remand" issue. B.A.M. DEVELOPMENT sought for 
a "petition for rehearing" on the "administrative remand" 
issue, but after full consideration of the "petition for 
rehearing" request, the "rehearing" was denied. 
Thereafter, both parties filed cross-petitions for writ 
of certiorari. The cross-petitions were granted and the 
cases consolidated, with the Supreme Court specifying the 
three issues reserved for review. 
SUMMARY OF B.A.M. DEVELOPMENT ARGUMENTS 
Herein B.A.M. DEVELOPMENT asserts the following 
arguments, summarized thus: 
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1. The Nollan-Dolan standards of "essential nexus", 
"reasonable relationship", "individualized determination" 
and "rough proportionality" are, as a matter of federal 
constitutional law, directly and dispositively applicable to 
the excessive dedications and improvements identified in 
this litigation. 
2 . The excessive dedication and installed improvements 
for the 3500 South state roadway also violate the Utah 
"constitutional standard of reasonableness", as previously 
developed by the Utah Supreme Court in the Banberry 
Development (1981) decision interpreting the Utah 
Constitution. 
3. The excessive dedications and installed 
improvements required by the COUNTY pursuant to the 
"highway-abutting" Ordinance also violate national and state 
constitutional law principles of "equal protection" and 
"uniform operation of laws". 
4. The "administrative remand" provisions and 
disposition of the Utah Court of Appeals, raised sua sponte 
and without the benefit of any briefing, is improvident and 
misguided, and must be affirmatively addressed, overruled 
and clarified by the Supreme Court. 
5. The provisions of Section 63-90a-4, Utah Code, 
expressly directing that no "administrative hearing" is 
needed as a pre-condition to bringing an "inverse 
fi 
condemnation" claim for a "physical taking" or an "exaction 
by a political subdivision" is applicable and controlling: 
to override the "administrative remand" portions of the 
Court of Appeals Decision. 
ARGUMENT 
I 
THE CONSTITUTIONAL PRINCIPLES EMBODIED IN THE DECISIONS 
OF THE UNITED STATE SUPREME COURT IN THE CASES OF 
NOLLAN VS CALIFORNIA COASTAL COMMISSION (1987) AND OF 
DOLAN VS CITY OF TIGARD (1994) AND THE DECISIONS 
OF THE UTAH SUPREME COURT IN THE CASES OF 
CALL VS CITY OF WEST JORDAN (1980) AND OF 
BANBERRY DEVELOPMENT VS SOUTH JORDAN CITY (1981) ARE 
APPLICABLE TO THE GEOGRAPHY-BASED "HIGHWAY-ABUTTING" 
ORDINANCE AND ENTITLE THE ADVERSELY AFFECTED 
DEVELOPER TO AN AWARD OF JUST COMPENSATION 
FOR SUCH EXCESSIVE DEDICATIONS AND EXACTIONS 
TAKEN FOR PUBLIC USE IN CONTRADICTION OF THOSE 
CONSTITUTIONAL PRINCIPLES 
This is a case of "inverse condemnation" brought by a 
propertyowner [B.A.M. DEVELOPMENT] against a local 
government [SALT LAKE COUNTY] for excessive development 
"exactions": excessive real estate dedications AND required 
improvement of that real estate, beyond that "reasonably" 
required (created) by the development. The "taking" claims 
arise from the admitted, straight-up physical occupation of 
real estate AND from the required expenditure of private 
monies for the development of roadway-related improvements 
thereof. The "takings" claims of B.A.M. DEVELOPMENT are 
brought under the national Constitution and under the 
Constitution of the State of Utah. 
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A 
THE NOLLAN-DOLAN STANDARDS OF 
"ESSENTIAL NEXUS", "REASONABLE RELATIONSHIP" 
"INDIVIDUALIZED DETERMINATION" AND 
"ROUGH PROPORTIONALITY" ARE DIRECTLY 
AND EXPRESSLY APPLICABLE TO THE 
"UNCONSTITUTIONAL TAKING" CLAIMS RAISED IN 
THIS "INVERSE CONDEMNATION" ACTION 
TO RECOVER JUST COMPENSATION 
FOR THE EXCESSIVE IN-KIND EXACTIONS 
("PHYSICAL TAKINGS") EFFECTED PURSUANT TO 
THE COUNTY'S "HIGHWAY-ABUTTING" ORDINANCE 
The decisions of the United States Supreme Court in the 
cases of Nollan vs California Coastal Commission 483 US 825, 
97 LEd2d 677, 107 SCt 3141 (1987) [hereinafter "Nollan" and 
attached hereto at APPENDIX #2] , and of Dolan vs City of 
Tigard (1994), 512 US 374, 129 Led2d 304, 114 Set 2309 
(1994) , [hereinafter "Dolan" and attached hereto as APPENDIX 
#3], speak for themselves. The applicability of Nollan and 
Dolan and the constitutional principles those decisions 
identify and require will be readily apparent to the Court 
upon its reading thereof. The B.A.M. Development "Westridge 
Meadows" situation and the applicability of Nollan and of 
Dolan thereto is predicated upon a relatively-finite, 
small set of core facts, encapsulated in but two sentences, 
thus: 
1. As a condition of development approval for a 
routine 44-lot residential subdivision and 
pursuant to the provisions of the "highway-
abutting" Ordinance [hereinafter the "highway-
a 
abutting" Ordinance]2, Defendant COUNTY required 
the Developer Plaintiff B.A.M. DEVELOPMENT to 
dedicate (fee simple conveyance effect) for 
permanent and irrevocable "public use" and to 
improve (as a "half-width" of a 7-lane highway) 
approximately 38,000 square feet of previously 
held "private property" to become public roadway 
within the 3500 South Street area and to 
undertake, at its own private expense, 
"improvements" (pavement, curbing, sidewalk, 
adjacent barrier fencing, storm-drain line 
upsizing, and power pole relocation). 
2The "highway abutting" Ordinance as codified within 
the County's ordinances and as included in the COUNTY'S 
OPENING BRIEF [Appendix "2"] provides: 
15.28. 010 Dedication and improvement required. 
Except as otherwise provided in Section 15.28.020, 
no building or structure shall be erected, 
reconstructed, structurally altered or enlarged, 
and no building permit shall be issued therefor, 
on any lot or parcel which abuts a major or 
secondary highway, as shown on the map entitled 
"The County Transportation Improvement Plan," on 
file with the planning and development services 
division and made part of this chapter by 
reference, unless the portion of such lot or 
parcel within the right-of-way of the highway to 
be widened or additional required street width has 
been dedicated to the county and improved. This 
dedication and improvements shall meet the 
standards for such highway or street improvement 
as provided in Section 15.28.060. 
Emphasis added. 
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2. The "highway-abutting" dedication and 
improvement requirements of the COUNTY'S Ordinance 
are enforced against ONLY those parcels which are 
"highway-abutting"; other developments, creating 
equal or even greater demands (i.e. "impact") for 
roadway improvement are exempt from the dedication 
and improvement requirements if they are not 
"highway-abutting". 
The Nollan-Dolan analytical framework is relevant and 
applicable in adjudicating the case-at-hand, for at least 
the following reasons: 
1. The Nollan-Dolan analytical framework presents 
a factual and legal setting which is, legally and 
constitutionally, essentially "on-all-fours" with 
the instant factual situation: the "ocean-
abutting" easement at issue in Nollan and the 
"creek-abutting" easement at issue in Dolan are 
not materially distinguishable, in a 
constitutional sense, from the "highway-abutting" 
situation presented in the instant case. 
2. The Nollan-Dolan analytical framework and 
result are applicable to the case-at-hand, because 
the "essential nexus" and "rough proportionality" 
standards are essentially the same constitutional 
standards as have been previously developed and 
i n 
adopted by the Utah Supreme Court in the earlier 
cases of Call vs City of West Jordan, 606 P. 2d 217 
(Utah 1979), on rehearing 614 P.2d 1257 (Utah 
1980) [holding the dedication must bear a 
"reasonable relationship to the needs created by 
the development"] and Banberry Development 
Corporation vs South Jordan City, 631 P. 2d 8 99 
(Utah 1981) [establishing the "constitutional 
standard of reasonableness" criteria for 
development exactions]. The decisions of the Utah 
Supreme Court in Call II and in Banberry 
Development are binding precedent and clearly 
establish the "state constitutional" basis and 
minimum threshold to which the COUNTY government 
must adhere. 
3. There is nothing in the Nollan or the Dolan 
decisions which would support the COUNTY'S self-
serving claim that the Nollan-Dolan framework 
should not apply to the "highway abutting" 
Ordinance, and the exactions thereunder, whether 
or not legislatively or administratively imposed: 
the result upon the propertyowner is still the 
same. In fact, the "highway-abutting" Ordinance 
with its result that the unfortunate few "highway-
abutting" parcels are "singled out" and forced to 
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bear the entire burden, created by all 
developments, which burden should be borne by the 
public at large (or at least by those other 
developers contributing their share to that 
burden) carries with it the Nollan-identified 
"heightened risk" that the "building prohibition" 
imposed only against "highway-abutting" parcels is 
merely an "out-and-out plan of extortion" [107 SCt 
at 3149] to obtain the sought-for "easement" 
without making the "just compensation" payment. 
That the "highway-abutting" Ordinance is so 
written and applied, so as to obtain real estate 
and improvements in contravention of the Just 
Compensation Clause, should be readily apparent to 
the Court. 
B 
THE EXACTIONS REQUIRED UNDER THE COUNTY'S 
"HIGHWAY-ABUTTING" ORDINANCE FAIL TO SATISFY 
THE CONSTITUTIONAL PRINCIPLES AND STANDARDS 
OF THE NOLLAN-DOLAN ANALYTICAL FRAMEWORK 
AND THE PROPERTYOWNER IS ENTITLED TO JUST COMPENSATION 
The Just Compensation Clause sometimes referred to as 
"the Takings Clause" or "the Property Clause" of the Fifth 
Amendment to the national Constitution provides: 
. . . private property shall not be taken for 
public use without just compensation; . . . 
In 1960 the United States Supreme Court in Armstrong vs 
United States, 364 US 40, 4 LEd2d 1554, 80 SCt 1563 (1960), 
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observed: 
The Fifth Amendment's guarantee that private 
property shall not be taken for a public use 
without just compensation was designed to bar 
Government from forcing some people to bear public 
burdens which, in all fairness, should be borne by 
the public as a whole• 
364 US at 49, 80 SCt at 1569. Emphasis added. 
In 1980 the United States Supreme Court, in its 
decision of in the case of Webb's Fabulous Pharmacies, 
Incorporated vs Beckwith, 449 US 155, 66 LEd2d 358, 101 SCt 
446 (1980), had written: 
To put it another way: a State, by ipse dixit, may 
not transform private property into public 
property without compensation, even for the 
limited duration of the deposit in court. This is 
the very kind of thing that the Takings Clause of 
the Fifth Amendment was meant to prevent. That 
Clause stands as a shield against the arbitrary 
use of governmental power. 
449 US at 164, 101 SCt at 452. Emphasis added. 
In 1922 Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes Jr, writing the 
majority opinion in Pennsylvania Coal Company vs Mahon, 26 0 
US 393, 67 LEd 322, 43 SCt 158 (1922), warned and observed: 
When th[e] seemingly absolute protection [of the 
Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments] is found to be 
qualified by the police power, the natural 
tendency of human nature is to extend the 
qualification more and more until at last private 
property disappears. But that cannot be 
accomplished in this way under the Constitution of 
the United States. 
. . . We are in danger of forgetting that a strong 
public desire to improve the public condition is 
not enough to warrant achieving the desire by a 
shorter cut than the constitutional way of paying 
for the change. 
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260 US at 415-416. Emphasis added. Bracketed material added 
for clarity. 
In 1992 the United States Supreme Court in Lucas vs 
South Carolina Coastal Council, 505 US 1003, 120 L.Ed 3d 
798, 112 SCt 2886 (1992), wrote: 
" [A] t least with regard to permanent invasions, no 
matter how minute the intrusions, and no matter 
how weighty the public purpose behind it, we have 
required compensation." 
505 US at 1015, 112 SCt at 2893. Emphasis added. 
In 2001 the United States Supreme Court again had 
opportunity to revisit the "Just Compensation Clause" in the 
case of Palazzolo vs Rhode Island, 533 US 606, 150 LEd2d 
592, 121 SCt 2448 (2001), wherein the Court wrote: 
The clearest sort of taking occurs when the 
government encroaches upon or occupies private 
land for its own proposed use. Our cases establish 
that even a minimal "permanent physical occupation 
of real property" requires compensation under the 
Clause. 
533 US at 617, 121 SCt at 2457. Emphasis added. Citation to 
cases omitted. 
Although the federal "takings" jurisprudence has had a 
seemingly-convoluted history, in the spring of 1987 the 
United States Supreme Court issued two truly "landmark" 
decisions which had an explosive impact upon local 
governments nationwide. The first of these decisions First 
English Evangelical Lutheran Church of Glendale vs Los 
Angeles County, 482 US 304, 107 SCt 2378 (1987), decided 9 
1 4 
June 1987 held that a county may be liable for a "taking" 
effected pursuant to temporary building moratorium imposed 
for public safety purpose]. The second "landmark" decision 
from 1987 was Nollan vs California Coastal Commission, 483 
US 825, 97 LEd2d 677, 107 SCt 3141 (1987) [hereinafter 
referred to as "Nollan"] , decided two weeks later. The 
majority opinion in Nollan is relatively short and to-the-
point; the decision "speaks for itself". The Court will be 
familiar with its analytical method and conclusion. 
In Nollan the governmental entity [the California 
Coastal Commission] had required, as a condition of 
development (demolition of an existing residential structure 
and replacement thereof with a larger residential structure) 
approval, that the propertyowner dedicate a "public 
easement" across privately-held beachfront property 
immediately adjacent to the Pacific Ocean. The United States 
Supreme Court analyzed that the required "easement" would be 
a "permanent physical occupation", 107 SCt at 3146, entitled 
to compensation, and wrote: 
Given, then, that requiring uncompensated 
conveyance of the easement outright would violate 
the Fourteenth Amendment, the question becomes 
whether requiring it to be a conveyance as a 
condition for issuing a land-use permit alters the 
outcome. 
107 SCt at 3147. Emphasis added. The Court further observed: 
But the right to build on one's own property 
even though its exercise can be subjected to 
legitimate permitting requirements cannot 
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remotely be described as a "governmental benefit." 
And thus the announcement that the application for 
(or granting of) the permit will entail the 
yielding of a property interest cannot be regarded 
as establishing a voluntary "exchange" . . . 
107 SCt at 3147. Footnote 2. Emphasis added. Citations to 
cases omitted. 
The Supreme Court observed a factual setting which is 
exactly-on-point in the 3500 South Street dedication 
situation. The Supreme Court wrote: 
If the Nollans were being singled out to bear the 
burden of California's attempt to remedy these 
problems, although they had not contributed to it 
more than other coastal landowners, the State's 
actions, even if otherwise valid, might violate 
either the incorporated Takings Clause or the 
Equal Protection Clause. One of the principal 
purposes of the Takings Clause is "to bar 
Government from forcing some people alone to bear 
public burdens which, in all fairness and justice, 
should be borne by the public as a whole•" 
107 SCt at 3148. Footnote 4. Emphasis added. Citation to 
cases omitted. 
After reviewing the previous history of the issue, the 
Supreme Court focused on the "imposition of the condition" 
(i.e. the mandated dedication of the easement to the 
government) in the context of the "development prohibition" 
(i.e. the exercise of the government's 'police power' to 
prohibit the development outright). The Court observed such 
a required "dedication" would be constitutional if it 
"serves the same end" as the prohibition. 107 SCt at 3148. 
The Nollan Court, however, went on to say: 
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The evident constitutional propriety disappears, 
however, if the condition substituted for the 
prohibition utterly fails to further the end 
advanced as the justification for the prohibition. 
When that essential nexus is eliminated, the 
situation . . . [lengthy discussion about 
prohibition against shouting fire in a theater, 
but authorized were a monetary fee paid to the 
State] . . . would not pass constitutional muster. 
107 SCt at 3148-3149. Emphasis added. [Bracketed material 
added for clarity: please refer to original text.] The Court 
then continued: 
Similarly here, the lack of nexus between the 
condition and the original purpose of the building 
restriction converts that purpose to something 
other than what it was. The purpose then becomes, 
quite simply, the obtaining of an easement to 
serve some valid governmental purpose, but without 
payment of compensation. Whatever may be the outer 
limits of "legitimate state interests" in the 
takings and land-use context, this is not one of 
them. In short, unless the permit condition serves 
the same governmental purpose as the development 
ban, the building restriction is not a valid 
regulation of land use but "an out-and-out plan of 
extortion." 
107 SCt at 3149. Emphasis added. Citation to cases omitted. 
The COUNTY argues [Page 19 of COUNTY'S brief] that the 
"highway-abutting" Ordinance is needed to further "sensible 
long-range transportation planning". That claimed 
justification (i.e. "long-range . . . planning") is 
FUTURISTIC and ipso facto confirms the violation of the 
Nollan-Dolan standard, which requires a PRESENT impact and 
an "individualized determination" of that PRESENT impact. 
Thus, that sub-part of the "nexus" test fails. The COUNTY, 
on the basis of "long-range . . . planning" cannot justify 
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the PRESENT installation of the improvements for 3500 South. 
The "Achilles' heel" which the COUNTY self-servingly 
overlooks is the simple fact that there simply is NO 
"building restriction" which is uniformly imposed against 
ALL development which may be causing the traffic congestion. 
[See APPENDIX #7 showing the area location and the 
immediately adjoining developments: "Elusive Estates", 
"Chaparral" and "Centennial" subdivisions. Against those 
adjacent developments, which (on a "per lot" basis) arguably 
put an equal amount of traffic (vehicles per day) onto 3500 
South Street, NO "exactions" (dedication or improvements) 
were required.] The "building restriction" selectively-
imposed against ONLY the "highway-abutting" parcels, is 
for these constitutional purposes not a valid "permit 
condition"; the restriction is simply a pretext to avoid the 
Just Compensation Clause and for that reason there can be no 
"nexus" established. The COUNTY'S "purpose" (of the "permit 
condition": dedication required) has been "converted" into 
"something other than what it was." Id. at 3149. Concerning 
the "purpose" (of the "permit condition": dedication 
required) the Supreme Court in Nollan continued: 
The purpose then becomes, quite simply, the 
obtaining of an easement to serve some valid 
governmental purpose, but without payment of 
compensation. 
Id. at 3149. Emphasis added. The Ordinance fails the Nollan 
standard. The result of the Ordinance, with its "building 
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restriction" imposed, however, against ONLY "highway-
abutting" parcels is readily observable to even the most 
casual observer. The Supreme Court in Nollan continued: 
We therefore find that the Commission's imposition 
of the permit condition cannot be treated as an 
exercise of its land-use power for any of these 
purposes. Our conclusion on this point is 
consistent with the approach taken by every other 
court that has considered the question, with the 
exception of the California state courts. 
107 SCt at 3149-3150. Citations to numerous cases omitted. 
In that listing the Supreme Court cited to the decision of 
Call vs West Jordan, 614 P.2d 1257 (Utah 1980) ["Call II"] . 
The United States Supreme Court continued: 
We view the Fifth Amendment's property clause to 
be more than a pleading requirement, and 
compliance with it more than an exercise in 
cleverness and imagination. As indicated earlier, 
our cases describe the condition for abridgement 
of property rights through the police power as a 
"substantial advancing" of a legitimate State 
interest. We are inclined to be particularly 
careful about the objective where the actual 
conveyance of property is made a condition to the 
lifting of a land use restriction, since in that 
context there is a heightened risk that the 
purpose is avoidance of the compensation 
requirement, rather than the stated police power 
objective. 
107 SCt at 3150-51. Emphasis added. In the instant setting, 
the "heightened risk" that the TRUE "purpose" behind the 
COUNTY'S arbitrarily-applied "highway- abutting" dedication 
requirement (but non-existent "building ban") IS readily and 
unavoidably apparent and transparent: the "avoidance of the 
compensation requirement", as the foregoing text identifies. 
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The COUNTY'S claim that the stated police power objective 
(of "long-range transportation planning" and acquiring 
right-of-way) is disingenuous, as well as being 
unconstitutionally applied. This is exactly the setting 
which is/creates "a heightened risk" that the development 
exaction (i.e. the roadway dedication and improvements) is 
for the "avoidance of the compensation requirement". Such is 
transparently clear from even the most casual reading of the 
COUNTY'S "highway-abutting Ordinance". As the Supreme Court 
warned against, the COUNTY has in disregard of the Court's 
mandate engaged in the "exercise of cleverness and 
imagination"; that "cleverness and imagination" nevertheless 
does not satisfy the demands of the Constitution. 
In examining the Coastal Commission's "comprehensive 
program" which is, arguably, the functional equivalent to 
the COUNTY'S assertedly "uniform and comprehensive plan" of 
requiring "highway-abutting" parcels to effect the 
dedication and improvements the Nollan opinion concluded: 
. . . The Commission may well be right that it is 
a good idea, but that does not establish that the 
Nollans (and other coastal residents) alone can be 
compelled do contribute to its realization. 
Rather, California is free to advance its 
"comprehensive program," if it wishes, by using 
its power of eminent domain for this "public 
purpose" see U.S. Const. Amdt. 5; but if it wants 
an easement across Nollan's property, it must pay 
for it. 
107 SCt at 3151. Emphasis added. That constitutional 
principle and conclusion is self-evidently applicable to the 
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"highway-abutting" exaction requirements at issue here. 
The Nollan decision would not have been materially 
different in its result had the California Legislature, by 
statute, declared that all owners of "ocean-abutting" 
parcels needing building permits are required to dedicate a 
"public easement" across their parcels at water's edge. 
Nollan was decided and constitutes "the law of the land"--
-on the basis of substantive, "constitutional" principles, 
not on some procedural technicality (i.e. how the "taking" 
decision was made and/or by whom). 
In Dolan vs City of Tigard, 512 US 374, 129 LEd2d 304, 
114 SCt 2309 (1994), the United States Supreme Court had 
occasion to revisit and further explain the constitutional 
principles discussed in Nollan seven years earlier. In Dolan 
the propertyowner had sought development approval 
enlargement of an existing retail store upon property 
directly abutting "Fanno Creek". As a condition of 
development approval the municipality required the 
dedication of a "public easement" along the creek together 
with installation of a walkway and bicycle path within the 
dedicated easement. In Dolan the United States Supreme Court 
introduced the "takings" issue thus: 
We granted certiorari to resolve a question left 
open by our decision in Nollan v. California 
Coastal Comm'n, of what is the required degree of 
connection between the exactions imposed by the 
city and the projected impacts of the proposed 
development. 
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Id. at 377, 114 SCt at 2312. Emphasis added. Citation 
omitted. 
The Dolan majority then proceeded to discuss the 
relevant "constitutional" issues, including a review of the 
pertinent case law "standards" (and phrasing of those 
"standards"), as developed by the state courts. The Supreme 
Court again cited to this Court's 1979 decision in the case 
of Call vs West Jordan, 606 P.2d 217 (Utah 1979), as 
"authority" for the "reasonable relationship" test, as 
adopted by the majority of state courts which had adopted 
judicial tests for exactions. The Supreme Court also 
described two other tests a very "lax" standard followed 
by a couple states (Montana and New York) and the "specific 
and uniquely attributable" standard followed by Illinois. 
The Supreme Court observed that the great majority of state 
courts which had ruled on the issue followed the "reasonable 
relationship" standard. In holding against the municipality, 
the United States Supreme Court in Dolan wrote: 
One of the principal purposes of the Takings 
Clause is "to bar Government from forcing some 
people to bear public burdens which, in all 
fairness, should be borne by the public as a 
whole." 
Under the well-settled doctrine of 
"unconstitutional conditions", the government may 
not require a person to give up a constitutional 
right here the right to receive just 
compensation when property is taken for public 
use in exchange for a discretionary benefit 
conferred by the government where the property has 
little or no relationship to the benefit. 
114 SCt at 2316-2317. Emphasis added. 
In attempting to define the "degree of the exactions 
demanded by the city's permit conditions bears to the 
projected impact of petitioner's proposed development" [114 
SCt at 2318], the Court, initially quoting a Nebraska 
Supreme Court decision, wrote: 
"The distinction, therefore, which must 
be made between an appropriate exercise 
of the police power and an improper 
exercise of eminent domain is whether the 
requirement has some reasonable 
relationship or nexus to the use to which 
the property is being made or is merely 
being used as an excuse for taking 
property simply because at that 
particular moment the landowner is asking 
the city for some license or permit." 
Thus, the court held a city may not require a 
property owner to dedicate property for some 
future public use as a condition for obtaining a 
building permit when such future use is not 
"occasioned by the construction sought to be 
permitted." 
Some form of the reasonable relationship test 
has been adopted in many other jurisdictions. 
[Citations to cases omitted.] Despite any semantic 
differences, general agreement exists among the 
courts "that the dedication should have some 
reasonable relationship to the needs created by 
the [development]." 
We think the "reasonable relationship" test 
adopted by a majority of the states courts is 
closer to the federal constitutional norm than 
either of those previously discussed. But we do 
not adopt it as such, partly because the term 
"reasonable relationship" seems confusingly 
similar to the term "rational basis" which 
describes the minimal level of scrutiny under the 
Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth 
Amendment. 
We think a term such as "rough 
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proportionality" best encapsulates what we hold to 
be the requirement of the Fifth Amendment. No 
precise mathematical calculation is required, but 
the city must make some sort of individualized 
determination that the required dedication is 
related both in nature and extent to the impact of 
the proposed development. 
114 SCt at 2319-2320. Emphasis added. Citations to cases and 
other authorities cited in original Supreme Court text 
have been omitted.] 
In response to "pre-trial discovery11 requests, the 
COUNTY provided the "individualized determination" 
calculations, made in January 2001 almost THREE YEARS 
AFTER the COUNTY first imposed the exactions. The single-
page, hand-written "individualized determination" document 
[attached hereto as APPENDIX #8] states, in its entirety: 
January 24 2001 
Bam Development EXHIBIT 11 
822' frontage 
1997 adt 3500 S 12910 ) 
) 4% increase 
1998 " " 13385 ) 
2015 adt projected 17000 vpd 
2020 adt projected 23000 vpd 
if current 4% keeps up 2020 = 29000 vpd 
typically design for level of service C (LOS) 
development traffic 487 vpd 
current roadway = 3 lanes 
LOS D 
LOS E = 15952 vpd (3 lanes) 
LOS C = 29000 vpd (7 lanes) 
on cusp of failing--requires widening to 7 lanes 
by year 2020 
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The abbreviations "vpd" and "adt" apparently refer to 
"vehicles per day" and to "average daily trips" 
respectively. "LOS" refers to "level of service": a somewhat 
subjective determination as to the carrying capacity of the 
roadway, as characterized by waiting times. The FUTURISTIC 
analysis contained within the "individualized determination" 
underscores the COUNTY'S failure to identify the PRESENT 
needs allegedly generated by the Westridge Meadows 
development. If the existing 17-foot roadway was at "level 
of service D" , B.A.M. shouldn't have been required to 
construct the "half-width" to the "level of service C" 
standard, thus "remedying pre-existing deficiencies". If 
the 487 vehicles per day is compared against the existing 
(approximately) 13385 vehicles per day, on an "buy-in" 
basis, then approximately l/25th of the existing "roadway" 
(i.e. paved asphalt) is needed: against the 17 feet of pre-
existing asphalt, that's another seven or eight inches, but 
that's all. If the 487 vehicles generated by Westridge 
Meadows is compared against the 27,000 vehicles per day of 
the 7-lane roadway after full installation (i.e. B.A.M.'s 
"half-width"), as calculated to be needed in "year 2020", 
for which B.A.M. was PRESENTLY required to build the 
"eastbound half-width", the "Westridge" share is 487/27000, 
or about l/55ths: 1.8 percent. B.A.M. DEVELOPMENT ought to 
be paying 1.8% of the 3500 South improvement costs. Having 
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paid 100% of the costs, B.A.M. DEVELOPMENT "overpaid" by 
approximately 55 TIMES TOO MUCH; such is hardly "roughly 
proportional". The COUNTY fails another element of Dolan. 
The COUNTY asserts [p. 34 of its OPENING BRIEF] that 
Nollan and Dolan are two "discrete", separate "analytical 
models" which can be "readily separated". The COUNTY'S self-
serving analysis and statement are obviously incorrect and 
misguided. Nollan and Dolan are expressly and logically 
intertwined: the two decisions represent the Supreme Court's 
identification and application of constitutional principles 
which are applicable in the case-at-hand. As can be seen, 
the two decisions must obviously be read together. As is 
readily apparent Dolan constitutes the Court's more-recent 
pronouncement and continuing development of the long-line of 
cases, for which Nollan was merely the culminating (i.e. 
"landmark") decision most clearly and decidedly bringing the 
constitutional principles into focus. As such, Nollan and 
Dolan are essentially inseparable; the two decisions must, 
as intended, be read together. In the same vein, the local 
government the COUNTY must satisfy the stated 
"constitutional" restrictions and prerequisites specified in 
BOTH decisions. Satisfaction of one element the COUNTY 
incorrectly asserts that the Nollan "nexus" test was 
satisfied and. thus Dolan doesn't even apply, with the result 
that the COUNTY goes free is not enough: the COUNTY must 
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satisfy ALL the criteria of the 4-element Nollan-Dolan 
standard. 
Correctly understood, the legislatively-determined, 
geography-based exaction imposed pursuant to the COUNTY 
Ordinance with seeming (i.e. claimed) no administrative 
discretion allowed for site-specific issues or impacts 
fails the Nollan-Dolan test: 
1. There is no "essential nexus" and certainly no 
"legitimate" governmental purpose (in evading the 
Just Compensation Clause). 
2- There is no meaningful or relevant 
"individualized determination" that the exactions 
required of B.A.M. were related in "nature and 
extent" between the conditions and the impact. 
There was (and continues to be, under the 
"highway-abutting" Ordinance, for which the 
COUNTY claims no discretion is allowed) no 
"quantification" of findings. 
3. There is (was and has been) no demonstration 
of "rough proportionality".3 This is particularly 
3The January 2001 calculations made the COUNTY on the 
eve of trial and only in response to the Plaintiff's pre-
trial discovery request, fail to satisfy the "individualized 
determination" requirement. First, such was not done at the 
time (i.e. BEFORE) the dedication, as Dolan requires. 
Secondly, because the actual calculations which are 
actually more estimates of the future roadway capacity for 
decades into the future are not "individualized" for the 
Westridge Meadows subdivision (44 lots). 
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critical, given the fact that Dolan imposes upon 
the local government the "burden" of establishing 
the constitutionality of the dedication 
requirement, in context of the "rough 
proportionality" of the "taking"! 
On that basis, it is readily apparent that Plaintiff's 
assertion but not necessarily Plaintiff's allegation 
that the COUNTY'S "dedication" requirement, if not the 
Ordinance in particular was "facially" unconstitutional 
was and is directly on point. 
If the "Elusive Estates" subdivision, a couple hundred 
feet further to the south and which paid no "de facto impact 
fee" because that development did not "abut" onto 3500 South 
Street, is considered, B.A.M. DEVELOPMENT paid a "de facto 
traffic impact fee" INFINITELY TIMES MORE than the 
similarly-situated "Elusive Estates" subdivision "didn't 
pay" . 
The applicability of the Nollan-Dolan framework was 
correctly recognized and properly accepted by all three 
judges of the Court of Appeals in the Decision. [In 
contrast, hardly any of the argument and none of the 
obviously-inapplicable case-law "authority" cited by the 
COUNTY to the contrary was accepted by the Court of 
Appeals.] In light of the foregoing analysis, the dedication 
and improvement exactions required under the COUNTY'S 
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"highway-abutting" Ordinance fail under the Nollan-Dolan 
analytical framework. The propertyowner is entitled to just 
compensation. The Court of Appeals Decision recognizing the 
applicability of the Nollan-Dolan standard should be upheld. 
C 
THE "ESSENTIAL NEXUS" AND "ROUGH PROPORTIONALITY" 
STANDARDS OF NOLLAN-DOLAN FRAMEWORK ARE THE 
FUNCTIONAL EQUIVALENT OF THE UTAH 
"CONSTITUTIONAL STANDARD OF REASONABLENESS" 
AS DEVELOPED BY THE UTAH SUPREME COURT 
In addition to approaching and deciding the case on 
"national" constitutional grounds (ala Nollan-Dolan), the 
Court is requested to examine the claims on independent 
"state" constitutional grounds.4 Cross-Petitioner B.A.M. 
DEVELOPMENT asserts that these "state" standards are 
4The Supreme Court is requested to examine and 
concurrently decide this case on "independent state 
constitutional grounds", aside from and outside of the 
Nollan-Dolan framework. This jurisprudential approach, 
sometimes called "primacy", was identified if not 
developed by scholarly jurists, regionally including 
Associate Justice Hans A Linde of the Oregon Supreme Court. 
See Linde, "First Things First: Rediscovering the States' 
Bills of Rights", 9 University of Baltimore Law Review 379, 
(1980). See also Carson, "Last Things Last: A Methodological 
Approach to Legal Arguments in State Courts", 19 Willamette 
Law Review 641 (1983), as prepared by Associate Justice 
Wallace P Carson Jr of the Oregon Supreme Court. 
In years past individual members of this Court in 
judicial decisions and/or in public forums have invited 
and suggested practitioners assert "independent state 
constitutional grounds" as a basis for judicial relief. The 
instant case represents such an opportunity, in which 
governmental interests clash with constitutionally-
guaranteed "individual" rights (ala to receive "just 
compensation" for "private property taken for public use"). 
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functionally equivalent to the "national" standard [of 
Nollan-Dolan] , although their application may perhaps result 
in an differing result. [For example, even if Nollan-Dolan 
were found to be inapplicable, the "state" standards might 
still justify an award of "just compensation" to the 
propertyowner. ] However, this Court may view the well-
developed body of "Utah constitutional law" on this subject 
to be different from the national standard. If so, then the 
suggestion (by the COUNTY) that the Court examine only the 
national standard should not be followed; on the contrary, 
the Court is requested to adjudicate all claims national 
and state each of which have been pleaded and litigated 
from the very inception of this litigation. 
The "Just Compensation Clause" of the Utah Constitution 
is found in Article I, Section 22, which provides: 
Private property shall not be taken or damaged for 
public use without just compensation. 
Emphasis added. 
Utah case law decisions, interpreting and applying the 
Just Compensation Clause of the Utah Constitution, are 
equally explicit and consistent in awarding compensation. 
See, for example, Three D Corporation vs Salt Lake City, 752 
P. 2d 1321 (Utah App. 1988) [propertyowner entitled to 
compensation when municipality installed curb which 
interfered with access and parking on parcel, even though no 
property was actually "taken" by government] ; Hampton vs 
State Road Commission, 21 Utah 2d 342, 445 P.2d 708 (1968) 
[compensable taking occurred when Road Commission 
substantially interfered with owners only means of ingress 
and egress (private driveway), even though there was no 
actual taking of propertyowners real property]5; and Utah 
State Road Commission vs Miya, 526 P. 2d 926 (Utah 1974) 
[compensable taking occurred when government constructed 
viaduct obstructing owner's view, thus decreasing property 
value, and which interfered with privacy]. 
In 1979 the Utah Supreme Court rendered its decision in 
the case of Call vs City of West Jordan, 606 P. 2d 187 (Utah 
1979) [hereinafter "Call l»], on rehearing 614 P.2d 1280 
(Utah 1980) [hereinafter "Call II"] . In Call I the Utah 
Supreme Court was faced with and resolved a situation which 
was to become perhaps not a "landmark" decision but 
certainly at the time one of but a literal "handful" of 
cases which at that time had addressed the issues of 
development exactions and impact fees, as quoted by the 
United States Supreme Court in Nollan in 1987 and thereafter 
in Dolan in 1994. In Call I the subdivision developer had 
5The COUNTY will undoubtedly assert that the 
propertyowners of the lots across the northern end of 
Westridge Meadows have "public street" access by the street 
frontage to the south. Thus, the impassible fencing adjacent 
to 3500 South Street does not raise Three D-type or Hampton-
type issues. Arguably so, but the flip-side to that argument 
is the fact then that the 3500 South fencing (and the other 
roadway improvements) should not have been required at all. 
The COUNTY loses. 
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challenged the in-kind exaction (i.e. dedication of real 
estate) and the in-lieu-of "impact fee". The Call I Court 
upholding the validity of the dedication ordinance wrote: 
. . . the ordinance should be applied fairly, and 
without favoritism or discrimination 
606 P. 2d 221. In Call I the unconstitutionality of the 
municipal ordinance was not specifically alleged by the 
challengers. Consequently, as a matter of "constitutional 
law", Call I is essentially void of any "constitutional" 
reference. On "petition for rehearing", the Court wrote: 
the dedication should have some reasonable 
relationship to the need created by the 
subdivision. 
Call II. 614 P.2d at 1258. Emphasis added. Citations to 
footnotes omitted. 
Any jurisprudential narrowness in the Call I and the 
Call II decisions from a "constitutional" sense was brushed 
aside by the opinion of the Supreme Court in Banberry 
Development Corporation vs South Jordan City, 631 P.2d 899 
(Utah 1981) [hereinafter "Banberry Development"] decided a 
year later. [Banberry Development is contained herein as 
APPENDIX #4 to this OPENING BRIEF.] In Banberry Development 
the Utah Supreme Court, referring to an earlier Utah Supreme 
Court decision and quoting a decision of the Missouri 
Supreme Court, wrote: 
. . . if the burden cast upon the subdivider is 
reasonably attributable to his activity, then the 
requirement [of dedication or fees in lieu 
thereof! is permissible; if not, it is forbidden 
and amounts to a confiscation of private property 
in contravention of the constitutional 
prohibitions rather than reasonable regulation 
under the police power. 
631 P.2d at 905. Emphasis added. Bracketed material in 
original text. In Banberry Development the Utah Supreme 
Court identified and described "the constitutional standard 
of reasonableness" [531 P. 2d at 904.] applicable to the 
situation (i.e. "the validity of subdivision charges"). The 
Banberry Development opinion noted that the impact fee 
should "fall equitably upon those who are similarly 
situated" [631 P. 2d at 905. Emphasis added.] and that 
between various developers contributing to development 
needs, the exactions must be imposed in an "equality of 
treatment" manner [631 P.2d 904] . The Banberry Development 
opinion also noted that "[t]he 'fair contribution' of the 
connecting party should not exceed 'the expense thereof met 
by others' [631 P.2d at 903] and that to comply with the 
standard of "reasonableness" the fees and dedications must 
" . . . not require newly developed properties to 
bear more than their equitable share of the 
capital costs in relation to benefits conferred". 
631 P.2d at 903. Emphasis added. Accord, Home Builders 
Association vs City of American Fork, 1999 UT 7, 973 P.2d 
425 (Utah Supreme Court 1999), Ul4. As previously noted, 
B.A.M. DEVELOPMENT was required to pay 55 TIMES more than 
its "share of the capital costs"; such is hardly "equitable" 
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or "reasonable". In Banberry the Supreme Court also noted: 
Reasonableness obviously holds the municipality to 
a higher standard of rationality than the 
requirement that its actions not be arbitrary or 
capricious. 
631 P.2d at 905. Emphasis added. Citations to cases omitted. 
The COUNTY'S geography-based dedication requirement 
imposed against Westridge Meadows but not imposed at all 
against the nearby Elusive Estates, Chaparral and Centennial 
subdivisions or any of the other "similarly-situated" 
residential subdivisions which were not "highway-abutting" --
-hardly qualifies under the "constitutional standard of 
reasonableness" or under the mandatory "equality of 
treatment" standard, which the Court said "must be done". 
631 P. 2d at 904. It is readily apparent that the provisions 
and application of the COUNTY'S "highway-abutting" Ordinance 
fail the Banberry Development "constitutional standard of 
reasonableness" test. 
D 
THE COUNTY'S DEDICATION AND IMPROVEMENT REQUIREMENTS 
EFFECTED PURSUANT TO THE "HIGHWAY-ABUTTING" ORDINANCE 
ARE NOT A "UNIFORM" LAND-USE SCHEME, 
BUT VIOLATE "EQUAL PROTECTION" AND 
"UNIFORM OPERATION OF LAW" PRINCIPLES 
The COUNTY mischaracterizes the "highway-abutting" 
Ordinance as being "uniform" and the exactions derived 
therefrom as not being "site-specific". Such could not be 
further from the truth! The "highway-abutting" Ordinance is 
far from "uniform" in its sweep, application and 
1 A 
justification. Similarly, its dedication and improvement 
requirements are extremely "site-specific": namely, those 
parcels which are "highway-abutting" are "extorted" (Nollan 
term) into dedicating and improving the roadway. The 
"building restriction" contained within the Ordinance is not 
applied in a "uniform" manner against all developers and 
builders which ostensibly create the demand (impact) for 
additional roadways; the "building restriction" is applied 
against ONLY "highway-abutting" parcels, and only for the 
most transparent of purposes: a pretext to evade the Just 
Compensation Clause requirements. A "building restriction" 
(or ban) might be justified if there were inadequate roadway 
infrastructure in the area and the "restriction" were 
applied "uniformly": that is, nobody gets to build unless 
and until government improves the roadway situation, or 
everyone does their fair share. That's not the case here. 
The Section 1 of the Equal Protection Clause of the 
Fourteenth Amendment provides, in relevant part: 
. . . nor shall any State deprive any person of 
life, liberty, or property, without due process of 
law; nor deny to any person within its 
jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws. 
Emphasis added. 
Article I, Section 24, of the Utah Constitution 
provides: 
"All laws of a general nature shall have uniform 
operation." 
Emphasis added. 
35 
In Liedtke vs Schettler, 649 P.2d 80 (Utah 1982), the 
Utah Supreme Court stated that Article I, §24 is "generally 
considered the equivalent of the Equal Protection Clause of 
the 14th Amendment, U.S. Constitution." 649 P.2d at 81n.l. 
Although their language is dissimilar, Article I, §24 and 
the Equal Protection Clause embody the same general 
principle: persons similarly situated should be treated 
similarly, and persons in different circumstances should not 
be treated as if their circumstances were the same. 
In Leetham vs McGinn, 524 P.2d 323 (Utah 1974), the 
Utah Supreme Court stated: 
A legislative classification is never arbitrary or 
unreasonable so long as the basis for 
differentiation bears a reasonable relation to the 
purposes or objectives to be accomplished by the 
act. If some persons or transactions/ excluded 
from the operation of the law, were it to the 
subject matter of the law in no differentiable 
class from those included within its operation, 
the law is discriminatory in the sense of being 
arbitrary and unconstitutional. 
524 P. 2d at 325. Emphasis added. Citation to footnotes 
omitted. 
In Malan vs Lewis, 693 P. 2d 661 (Utah Supreme Court 
1984), the Utah Supreme Court invalidating the Utah 
"automobile guest statute" illuminated and articulated the 
purposes and application of the "uniform operation of laws" 
and the "equal protection" provisions of the constitutions. 
The Court wrote: 
Whether a statute meets equal protection 
^6 
standards depends in the first instance upon the 
objectives of the statute and whether the 
classifications established provide a reasonable 
basis for promoting those objectives. 
Article 1, §24 protects against two types of 
discrimination. First, a law must apply equally to 
all persons within a class. Second, the 
statutory classifications and the different 
treatment given the classes must be based on 
differences that have a reasonable tendency to 
further the objectives of the statute. If the 
relationship of the classification to the 
statutory objectives is unreasonable or fanciful, 
the discrimination is unreasonable. Equal 
protection of the law, both state and federal, 
"requires more of a state law than 
nondiscriminatory application within the class it 
establishes . " The classification must rest upon 
some difference which "'bears a reasonable and 
just relation to the act in respect to which the 
classification is proposed, and can never be made 
arbitrarily and without any such basis . . . . 
[A]rbitrary selection can never be justified by 
calling it classification." "The Courts must 
reach and determine the question whether the 
classifications drawn in a statute are reasonable 
in light of its purpose. The law under Article I, 
§24 is not different. 
693 P.2d at 670-72. Emphasis added. Citations to cases and 
footnotes omitted. 
In Malan the Utah Supreme Court continued: 
For a law to be constitutional under Article I, 
section 24, it is not enough that it be uniform on 
its face. What is critical is that the operation 
of the law be uniform. A law does not operate 
uniformly if "persons similarly situated are not 
"treated similarly" or if "persons in different 
circumstances" are "treated as if their 
circumstances were the same." 
693 P.2d at 669 (Utah 1984). Emphasis added. 
In the instant situation, the "highway-abutting" 
Ordinance is not "uniform" in its operation: the developer 
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of the Elusive Meadows subdivision, creating the "exact same 
impact" (sic) as the B.A.M. development of Westridge 
Meadows, is required to dedicate or improve nothing! The law 
simply is not uniform in its operation, although "facially" 
it may appear to be so. The "highway-abutting" criteria is 
itself its fatal "Achilles' heel". 
In Malan the Supreme Court stated that Article I, 
Section 24 requires that a law must apply equally to all 
persons within a class and that statutory classifications 
must have a "reasonable tendency to further the objectives 
of the statute." 693 P. 2d at 670. In the instant situation, 
the only "objective" which can be identified and advanced in 
furtherance of the COUNTY'S policy of requiring the coerced 
"dedication" and improvement to the 53-foot "half-width" is 
to avoid the payment of the "just compensation" required by 
the constitutions. [If the "highway-abutting Ordinance" had 
as its "objective" the enhanced traffic flow, and so forth, 
on the roadways, then the "building restriction" would be 
enforced against ALL developers. That's not the situation 
here.] The required dedication/improvement, required from 
B.A.M. DEVELOPMENT when the similarly-situated, "side-by-
side" developer of "Elusive Meadows" immediately to the 
south PAYS NOTHING, is not the "uniform operation" the 
Constitution requires! The "abutting-highway" criterion for 
the "classification" is a blatant, straight-forward attempt 
to avoid the constitutional requirement of paying for the 
"taking"I 
In State Tax Commission vs Department of Finance, 576 
P.2d 1297 (Utah 1978), the Utah Supreme Court stated: 
Equal protection protects against 
discrimination within a class. The legislature has 
considerable discretion in the designation of 
classifications but the court must determine 
whether such classifications operate equally on 
all persons similarly situated. 
Thus, whether a classification operates 
uniformly on all persons situated within 
constitutional parameters is an issue that must 
ultimately be decided by the judiciary. 
576 P.2d at 1298. Emphasis added. 
The "highway-abutting" Ordinance is no more "uniform" 
in its operation than a statute which, hypothetically, 
singled out for income tax payment ONLY those citizens 
having naturally-occurring "red hair": those citizens with 
"red hair" had to pay income taxes and those not having "red 
hair" did not. Such a legislative scheme could not be 
successfully defended against "uniform operation of law" or 
"equal protection" attack by the government's assertion that 
the classification is "legislatively adopted", that it 
advances a legitimate governmental interest (i.e. government 
needs the money), and/or that it is "uniformly applied" 
(i.e. within and against all taxpayers having "red hair"). 
The same result occurs in the "highway-abutting" Ordinance 
which "singles out" a small class of developers and forces 
them to make dedications and incur improvement expenses for 
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costs which should be borne by the public at large. 
The COUNTY asserts [p. 29 of its OPENING BRIEF, 
Footnote #18] that 
"BAM's remedy for what it perceives as unfair 
County subdivision development conditions (if any 
remedy is appropriate) is a legislative remedy/ 
not a judicial one." 
Emphasis added. Such is an incredible statement. To think 
that B.A.M. DEVELOPMENT has any political or legislative 
influence with the COUNTY'S governing body which adopted 
the "highway-abutting" Ordinance in the first instance and 
which financially "gains" each time the Ordinance is 
enforced against a propertyowner unlucky enough to want to 
develop "highway-abutting" property is unreasonable and 
unrealistic: so much so as to border on the absurd. It is 
against that type of self-serving governmental arrogance and 
constitutional insensitivity that B.A.M. DEVELOPMENT has 
filed for "judicial" remedy: the Court should expressly 
address this sub-issue. See Tax Commission [it is a 
judicial not legislative determination whether the 
classification operates "uniformly"] and Malan [courts must 
determine if the classification operates uniformly]. 
The COUNTY previously argued at trial that B.A.M. 
DEVELOPMENT, having acquired the real estate for development 
ostensibly knowing about the "highway-abutting" 
requirements, should be deemed to have waived all claims 
against enforcement of the Ordinance. To this type of 
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argument the Supreme Court in Nollan responded: 
Nor are the Nollans' rights altered because they 
acquired the land well after the Commission had 
begun to implement its policy. So long as the 
Commission could not have deprived the prior 
owners of the easement without compensating them, 
the prior owners must be understood to have 
transferred their full property right in conveying 
the lot. 
483 US at 833, 107 SCt at 3147. Footnote 2. Emphasis added. 
This same issue was also expressly revisited and similarly 
decided, even more expressly so, in Palazzolo vs Rhode 
Island, 533 US 606, 150 LEd2d 592, 121 SCt 2448 (2001). 
The COUNTY characterizes the "dissenting" opinion of 
Judge ORME as being "lengthy and vociferous" [COUNTY Opening 
Brief, page 34]. Judge ORME's well-reasoned and scholarly 
opinion even if in "dissent" on the "administrative 
remand" issue is anything but "vociferous". Those portions 
of the dissenting opinion of Judge ORME dealing with the 
applicability of the Nollan-Dolan framework represent and 
constitute an extraordinary judicial and scholarly effort 
(successfully so in result) to identify the correct 
analytical framework for the case. [Except for the 
"administrative remand" issue which the COUNTY concedes 
NOW was incorrectly approached and decided by the other two 
judges of the Court of Appeals panel, the Court of Appeals 
unanimously found Nollan-Dolan to be THE analytical standard 
for disposition of this case.] One cannot wonder that given 
the time the Court of Appeals took namely, sixteen months 
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following "oral argument" (October 2002) to issuance of its 
opinion in February 2004 and the extraordinary research 
and scholarliness exhibited by Judge ORME citing to cases 
and other authorities not even briefed by the parties that 
the Judge ORME opinion was intended to be the "lead opinion" 
and it was through some quirk of fate that the other two 
judges fixated improperly so, as the COUNTY implicitly now 
concedes on the unraised, unbriefed and unpresented 
"administrative remand" issue, identified and raised sua 
sponte by the two-judge majority notwithstanding the 
COUNTY'S position that the correct "appeal" procedures had 
been followed. See ORME, dissenting, Kl9 o f the Decision.] 
Judge ORME of the Court of Appeals albeit in dissent 
to the 2-judge majority "nailed it"! The Utah Supreme 
Court would be prudent to follow Judge ORME's well-reasoned 
"dissenting" opinion. 
II 
SECTION 63-903-4, EXPRESSLY APPLICABLE TO 
JUDICIAL CASES INVOLVING "PHYSICAL TAKINGS" 
OR "EXACTIONS BY A POLITICAL SUBDIVISION", 
CREATES AND CONSTITUTES AN EXCEPTION TO THE 
ADMINISTRATIVE HEARING/ADMINISTRATIVE RECORD ISSUE 
In discussing Issue #3 [applicability of Section 63-
90a-4, Utah Code], the COUNTY essentially and expressly 
concedes that Section 63-90a-4 creates an exception to the 
"administrative hearing" requirements, as a pre-condition to 
filing an action for "physical takings" (statutory term) 
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cases. That's exactly correct; see analysis and discussion 
herein at Point III, below. 
The COUNTY, however, does not go so far as conceding 
which logically it should that the obvious statutory and 
legal effect of the provisions of Section 63-90a-4 is to 
emasculate the "administrative remand" provisions [Issue #2] 
of the Court of Appeals' Decision, which the COUNTY 
inexplicably seems to continue to champion. 
If Section 63-90a-4 creates and constitutes the 
"exception" so noted by the COUNTY, then there can be no 
"administrative record" (for the District Court to review), 
because there was no "administrative appeal hearing" held. 
Thus, the Court of Appeals Decision in concluding that 
Section 17-27-1001 required the "administrative remand" 
was improvident and uninformed. The Supreme Court should 
affirmatively and authoritatively decide and declare this 
issue at least within the narrow exception for "physical 
takings" or "exactions by a political subdivision" 
(statutory terms) cases such as this lest citizens, 
practitioners, subordinate courts and others observe 
(incorrectly) that the Court of Appeals' Decision concerning 
the "administrative remand" was correct which it wasn't. 
In related context, governmental authorities may not 
burden property by the imposition of repetitive or unfair 
land-use procedures in order to avoid a final decision. See 
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City of Monterey vs Del Monte Dunes at Monterey/ Ltd., 52 6 
US 687, 143 LEd2d 882, 119 SCt 1624 (1999) [upholding jury 
verdict against government]. See also Palazollo, supra. 
Ill 
SECTION 63-90a-4, UTAH CODE, IS APPLICABLE 
TO EXEMPT CREATION OF AN ADMINISTRATIVE RECORD 
TO BE REVIEWED BY THE DISTRICT COURT 
IN A "PHYSICAL TAKING" OR "EXACTIONS" CASE 
Notwithstanding the COUNTY'S earlier (and inconsistent 
with its present) assertions6, the COUNTY now concedes the 
applicability of Section 63-90a-4, Utah Code, to the present 
situation. The COUNTY acknowledges that Section 63-90a-4 
creates an "exception" to the "administrative remand" 
6See, for example, COUNTY'S RESPONSE BRIEF TO 
APPELLANT'S PETITION FOR CERTIORARI, pp. 7-8 thereof, in 
which the COUNTY stated: 
Second, even if considered on the merits, Sec. 63-
90a-4 is wholly inapplicable in the context of 
this case, . . . While Sec. 63-90a-4 allows a 
citizen to seek judicial relief while bypassing 
the municipal takings relief review provided as 
an option by the statute, this does not place the 
statute in conflict, or as BAM suggests in a 
"controlling" position relative to Sec. 17-27-1001 
as interpreted by the Court of Appeals. 
Consequently, there is actually no "conflict" at 
all between Sec. 63-90a-4, and the interpretation 
of Sec. 17-27-1001 given by the Court of Appeals. 
Emphasis added. 
NOW after the Supreme Court has "certified" the issue 
for review the COUNTY has flip-flopped and "changed its 
tune": the COUNTY concedes the applicability and 
"controlling" effect of Section 63-90a-4. The COUNTY'S 
present language is: 
However, if considered on the merits, it appears 
that Sec. 63-90a-4 is applicable in the context of 
this case. 
OPENING BRIEF, page 39. Emphasis added. 
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provisions (ostensibly required under the Court of Appeals' 
Decision) for those "physical takings" or "exactions by a 
political subdivision" (i.e. inverse condemnation) claims. 
[The COUNTY'S conceding of this Issue #3 should, logically 
by extension, simultaneously concede although the COUNTY 
doesn't expressly say so the "administrative remand" 
[Issue #2] discussed above. The COUNTY'S continuing 
arguments with respect to Issue #2 make no logical or 
judicial sense: if Section 63-90a-4 is controlling and 
dispositive, then the "administrative remand" provisions of 
the Decision are moot. It does no good and makes no sense to 
continue to belabor those provisions.] 
The "administrative remand" (Issue #2) is directly and 
definitively controlled by the provisions of Section 63-90a-
4, Utah Code, which provides: 
(2) (a) (i) Any owner of private property whose 
interest is subject to a physical taking or 
exaction by a political subdivision may appeal the 
political subdivision's decision within 30 days 
after the decision is made. 
(b) The private property owner need not file the 
appeal authorized by this section before bringing 
an action in any court to adjudicate claims that 
are eligible for appeal, 
(c) A property owner's failure to appeal the 
action of a political subdivision does not 
constitute. and may not be interpreted as 
constituting, a failure to exhaust available 
administrative remedies or as a bar to bringing 
legal action. 
Emphasis added. The complete text of Section 63-90a-1 et 
seq, Utah Code, is included as APPENDIX #6 to this OPENING 
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BRIEF. 
The Court of Appeals Decision disposing of the appeal 
on the basis of the "lack of administrative record" issue, 
which issue was not raised by the pleadings, was not tried 
in the District Court, and was neither briefed nor argued on 
appeal overlooked the provisions of Section 63-90a-4 . Even 
when the obvious applicability of Section 63-90a-4 was 
brought to the Court of Appeals' attention (in the context 
of the "petition for rehearing"), the Court of Appeals 
ultimately declined to consider the same. Section 63-90a-4 
has controlling and dispositive significance not 
necessarily in a procedural setting, but as a matter of 
substantive law to the issues-at-hand. 
The COUNTY'S statements that Section 63-90a-4 was 
raised for the first time on appeal, is exactly correct; 
however, the COUNTY'S citation of DeBry vs Noble, 889 P. 2d 
428 at 444 (Utah 1995) to the apparent result that the 
statute (issue) did NOT arise by reason of the Court of 
Appeals Decision is disingenuous and intentionally 
misleading to the Supreme Court. The quoted text from DeBry, 
although correctly quoted, impliedly asserts that the 
applicability of Section 63-90a-4 was NOT the result of the 
Court of Appeals Decision. That is misleading and 
inaccurate. The entire "administrative remand" issue was 
never raised by the COUNTY, in its pleadings or at trial, or 
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on appeal. The "administrative remand" issue only existed, 
as a result of the Court of Appeals Decision, which sua 
sponte identified and developed the "administrative remand" 
issue. So, of course, the applicability of Section 63-90a-4-
--which the Court of Appeals did not consider became an 
issue, because Section 63-90a-4 is apparently so 
"controlling" and renders the Decision at least ^|6 
through 13 of the Decision incorrect. The Supreme Court 
should "fix" that problem. The "specific" statutory 
provisions of Section 63-90a-4 being facially "directly on 
point" with the "physical taking" and "exactions by a 
political subdivision" claims-at-hand would seem to be 
controlling over the more "general" statutory provisions of 
Section 17-27-1001 the Decision has construed to be 
dispositive. See Millett vs Clark Clinic Corporation, 609 
P. 2d 934 (Utah Supreme Court 1980), wherein the Court wrote: 
[W]here the operation of two statutory provisions 
is in conflict/ that provision which is more 
specific in its application will govern over that 
which is more general. 
609 P.2d at 936. Emphasis added. Obviously, Section 63-90a-4 
is exactly on-point and is exactly descriptive of what is to 
happen (or not happen: no request for hearing is required, 
as a condition precedent to a judicial action involving a 
"physical taking" or an "exaction"). The provisions of 
Section 17-27-1001 are certainly more "general" in nature. 
Thus, Section 63-90a-4 is controlling and dispositive. 
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The provisions of Section 17-27-1001 were originally 
adopted in 1991 but became first effective in 1992. Except 
for a minor stylistic change made in 1996 which is of no 
concern to us here the provisions of Section 17-27-1001 
have remained unchanged since 1992 (at least up to the time-
--1998 when this case began). The provisions of Section 
63-90a-4 were originally adopted in 1994. In 1998 the 
provisions of Subsections 63-90a-4(b) and 63-90a-4 (c) the 
very provisions of the statute which are material to this 
issue and its dispositive applicability were adopted: to 
provide the very text (i.e. no hearing need be requested or 
held) within the statute. It is a black-letter principle of 
statutory interpretation that where there is an 
irreconcilable conflict between new provisions and prior 
statutes relating to the same subject matter, the new 
provision is deemed controlling as it is the later 
expression of the Legislature. See Ellis vs Utah State 
Retirement Board, 757 P. 2d 882 (Utah Court of Appeals 1988), 
certiorari granted 765 P.2d 1277, affirmed 783 P.2d 540 
(Utah Supreme Court 1988) . See also S.S. vs State, 972 P.2d 
439. (Utah 1998) [recently enacted statute will supersede an 
existing statute] and Murray City vs Hall, 663 P.2d 1314 
(Utah 1983) [same]. 
4ft 
CONCLUSION 
The Nollan-Dolan analytical framework is directly and 
authoritatively applicable to this "physical takings" case. 
The "highway-abutting" Ordinance fails in the Nollan-Dolan 
analysis, in all elements of the 4-element test. 
Furthermore, the COUNTY likewise failed in its "burden of 
proof" (under the federal standard of Dolan) to show that 
the dedication and improvement of the 3 500 South roadway was 
"roughly proportional" in "scope and nature" to the needs 
created by the Westridge Meadows development of the 44 
building lots. The Supreme Court should affirmatively and 
authoritatively address and adjudicate the Nollan-Dolan 
issue and the COUNTY'S failure thereunder. 
The Court should ALSO separately adjudicate and rule 
upon B.A.M. DEVELOPMENT'S claims under the UTAH 
Constitution: the "constitutional standard of 
reasonableness" (per Banberry), as "independent state 
constitutional grounds", regardless of the Court's 
adjudication of the Nollan-Dolan issues. 
If appropriate, the Court should declare the "highway-
abutting" Ordinance unconstitutional, facially and/or as 
applied (it doesn't really matter), for any or all the 
foregoing reasons: violation of national Constitution (Just 
Compensation Clause and/or Equal Protection Clause) and/or 
violation of Utah Constitution (Just Compensation Clause, 
4Q 
"uniform operation of laws" clause). 
The Court should overturn the Court of Appeals Decision 
on the "administrative remand" issue, as being improvidently 
arrived at particularly in face of the obvious 
applicability of Section 63-90a-4, Utah Code. 
The Court should remand the case to the District Court 
for entry of judgment in favor of Cross-Petitioner B.A.M. 
DEVELOPMENT and against the COUNTY on B.A.M.'s "physical 
taking" and "exaction by a political subdivision" ("inverse 
condemnation") claims (national and state) and related 
issues, as prayed and established at trial. 
Respectfully submitted this 23rd day of December, 2004. 
CERTIFICATE OF DELIVERY 
I certify that I caused two copies of the foregoing OPENING 
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office of Mr Donald H Hansen, Deputy Salt Lake County 
District Attorney, S-3400 Salt Lake County Government 
Center, 2001 South State Street, Salt Lake City, Utah 
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Background: Developer sought license to 
develop subdivision, and county zoning and 
planning commission granted preliminary 
approval after developer agreed to dedicat-
ed certain portion of the property for fu-
ture road widening. Subsequently, howev-
er, board requested additional dedication 
of land, and, upon developer's objection to 
increase, denied its license application 
without receiving any evidence. Developer 
appealed to board of commissioners, claim-
ing request for additional dedication 
amounted to unconstitutional taking, and 
board of commissioners, without taking ev-
idence, upheld denial of license. Developer 
appealed. The Third District Court, Salt 
Lake Department, Timothy R. Hanson, J., 
found in favor of county. Developer appeal-
ed. 
Holding: The Court of Appeals, Thorne, 
J., held that it was reversible error for 
trial court to receive evidence. 
Reversed and remanded with directions. 
Orme, J., dissented and filed opinion. 
1. Statutes <$=>188, 212.6 
In context of statutory interpretation, 
courts presume that the legislature used each 
word advisedly and courts give effect to the 
term according to its ordinary and accepted 
meaning. 
2. Zoning and Planning <S=>745.1 
Court of Appeals reviews county's land 
use decision as if the appeal has come direct-
ly from the agency, rather than from district 
court; thus, the standard for Court of Ap-
peals' review is the same standard estab-
lished for district court's review. U.C.A. 
1953, 17-27-1001. 
3. Zoning and Planning <S=>744, 745.1, 747 
On appeal from district court's review of 
county's land use decision, Court of Appeals' 
review is limited to the record provided by 
the county board of commissioners; Court of 
Appeals may not accept or consider any evi-
dence outside the board's record and cannot 
weigh evidence anew, rather, Court of Ap-
peals must simply determine, in light of the 
evidence before the board, whether a reason-
able mind could reach the same conclusion as 
the board. U.C.A.1953, 17-27-1001. 
4. Eminent Domain ®=>307(2) 
Historically, takings determinations are 
mixed questions of law and fact. 
5. Zoning and Planning <s=>641, 748 
It was reversible error for trial court, on 
review of land use decision of county board of 
commissioners confirming denial of develop-
er's application for license to develop subdivi-
sion, which decision was reached without 
board receiving any evidence, to receive evi-
dence regarding developer's claim that predi-
cate for denial, county's requirement that 
developer dedicate additional land for pro-
spective street widening, amounted to uncon-
stitutional taking; court lacked statutory au-
thorization to receive evidence, and it could 
only determine whether board acted arbi-
trarily or capriciously, given the lack of rec-
ord. U.C.A.1953, 17-27-1001(3)(a). 
Stephen G. Homer, West Jordan, for Ap-
pellant. 
Donald H. Hansen, Salt Lake County At-
torney's Office, Salt Lake City, for Appellee. 
Before Judges BENCH, ORME, and 
THORNE, JJ. 
OPINION 
THORNE, Judge: 
HI B.A.M. Development, L.L.C. (BAM), 
appeals from a district court decision finding 
B.A.M. DEVELOPMENT v. SALT LAKE COUNTY Utah 71} 
Cite as 87 PJd 710 (UtahApp. 2004) 
that no unconstitutional taking occurred 
when Salt Lake County (the County) re-
quired BAM to dedicate additional land as a 
condition of subdivision approval. We re-
verse and remand. 
BACKGROUND 
112 In 1997, BAM sought to develop a 
subdivision located at 7755 West 3500 South 
in Salt Lake County, Utah. The Salt Lake 
County Planning and Zoning Commission 
(the Commission) granted preliminary ap-
proval for the proposed subdivision. In the 
original subdivision plat, BAM agreed to ded-
icate a forty-foot strip of land in anticipation 
of 3500 South being widened. In April 1998, 
the County informed BAM that after consult-
ing with the Utah Department of Transpor-
tation (UDOT), the County had determined 
that BAM must dedicate an additional thir-
teen-foot strip of land abutting 3500 South in 
anticipation of future road expansion. BAM 
objected to the increase because it had al-
ready drafted and divided the subdivision 
plots utilizing the forty-foot dedication.1 
BAM argued that increasing the dedication 
to fifty-three feet would alter several plots 
dramatically and would require reconfigura-
tion of the subdivision at great expense. 
Without receiving any evidence, the Commis-
sion denied BAM's license to develop their 
subdivision without the fifty-three-foot dedi-
cation. 
11 3 BAM appealed to the Salt Lake County 
Board of Commissioners (the Board), by fil-
ing a "Notice of Claim" with the Board. In 
this Notice of Claim, BAM claimed that 
"(t]he uncompensated dedication and im-
provement of the additional roadway consti-
tute[d] an unconstitutional 'taking/ not rea-
sonably justified by the actual impact created 
by the proposed development." Without 
conducting a hearing, taking evidence, or is-
1. Below, BAM argued that "[t]he uncompensated 
dedication and improvement of the additional 
roadway constitutes an unconstitutional 'taking/ 
not reasonably justified by the actual impact cre-
ated by the proposed development." (Emphasis 
added.) Thus, BAM did not challenge the dedi-
cation of the first forty feet of land and has 
waived review of that portion of the dedication. 
2. BAM also argued that the County violated 
Utah's constitutional protections of Equal Protec-
suing findings, the Board upheld the Com-
mission's decision. 
11 4 BAM then filed suit in district court 
claiming that the County's demand was un-
constitutional because it was not roughly pro-
portional, as required by Dolan v. City of 
Tigard, 512 U.S. 374, 391, 114 S.Ct. 2309, 
2319-20,129 L.Ed.2d 304 (1994). After trial, 
the district court found in favor of the Coun-
ty, concluding that the rough proportionality 
test did not apply. BAM objected to the 
district court's findings of fact and conclu-
sions of law and filed a motion for a new 
trial. The district court overruled BAM's 
objections and denied its motion for a new 
trial. BAM appeals. 
ISSUE AND STANDARD OF REVIEW 
1 5 BAM argues that the County's dedica-
tion requirement of thirteen additional feet 
constitutes a taking of its land without just 
compensation, in violation of the United 
States Constitution.2 However, we must 
first determine whether the district court 
acted properly when it received evidence and 
then ruled on the constitutionality of the 
land-dedication requirement. Resolution of 
this issue requires statutory interpretation, 
which we review for correctness. See Valley 
Colour Inc. v. Beuchert Builders Inc., 944 
P.2d 361, 363 (Utah 1997) (noting that " '|iln 
matters of pure statutory interpretation, an 
appellate court reviews a trial court's ruling 
for correctness and gives no deference to its 
legal conclusions' " (citations omitted)). 
ANALYSIS 
116 The County Land Use Development 
and Management Act, see Utah Code Ann. 
§ 17-27-101 to -1003 (2001), authorizes coun-
ties "to enact all ordinances, resolutions, and 
tion and Uniform Operation of Laws. However, 
because we find that the district court misinter-
preted Utah Code Annotated section 17-27-1001 
(2001) and received evidence in this case when it 
should have found the Board's treatment uf 
BAM's takings claim to be arbitrary and capri-
cious, and we remand on that basis, we need nut 
address the takings question or the other issues 
raised by BAM. 
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rules that they consider necessary for the 
use and development of land within the coun-
ty . . . unless . . . expressly prohibited by 
law." Id, § 17-27-102(1)? If a landowner 
disagrees with a county land use decision, 
that landowner can appeal the decision, pur-
suant to Utah Code Annotated section 17-
27-1001. Section 17-27-1001(3)(a) provides 
that when a county's land use decision is 
appealed to the district court, that court shall 
"presume that land use decisions and regula-
tions are valid; and . . . determine only 
whether or not the decision is arbitrary, 
capricious, or illegal." Id. (emphasis add-
ed).1 "A determination of illegality requires 
3. We cite to the most recent version of the statute 
for convenience. However, all amendments rele-
vant to this opinion will be noted. 
4. Utah Code Annotated section 17-27-1001 pro-
vides, in relevant part: 
(1) No person may challenge in district court a 
county's land use decisions made under this 
chapter or under the regulation made under 
authority of this chapter until that person 
has exhausted all administrative remedies. 
(2) (a) Any person adversely affected by any 
decision made in the exercise of the provi-
sions of this chapter may file a petition for 
review of the decision with the district court 
within 30 days after the local decision is 
rendered. 
(3) (a) The courts shall: 
(i) presume that land use decisions and 
regulations are valid: and 
(ii) determine only whether or not the de-
cision is arbitrary, capricious, or illegal, 
(b) A determination of illegality requires a 
determination that the decision violates a 
statute, ordinance, or existing law. 
Utah Code Ann. § 17-27-1001(1), (2)(a),-(3)(a)(b) 
(200!) 
5. Utah Code Annotated section 17-27-708 pro-
vides, in relevant pail: 
(I) Any person adversely affected by any deci-
sion of a board of adjustment may petition the 
district court for a review of the decision. 
(2)(a) The district court's review is limited to a 
determination of whether the board of adjust-
ment's decision is arbitrary, capricious, or ille-
gal. 
(b) A determination of illegality requires a 
determination that the board of adjustment's 
decision violates a statute, ordinance, or ex-
isting law. 
(4)(a) The board of adjustment shall transmit 
to the reviewing court the record of its pro-
ceedings including its minutes, findings, orders 
a determination that the decision violates a 
statute, ordinance, or existing law." Utah 
Code Ann. § 17-27-1001(3)(b). 
[1] 11 7 While no Utah Court has specifi-
cally addressed the standard of review appli-
cable to appeals brought pursuant to section 
17-27-1001, we have addressed the standard 
of review for appeals taken pursuant to Utah 
Code Annotated section 17-27-708 (2001), 
which contains language similar to that of 
section 17-27-1001.5 Compare Utah Code 
Ann. § 17-27-708, with id. § 17-27-1001. 
In the absence of any case law interpreting 
section 17-27-1001, we, by analogy, rely upon 
case law interpreting section 17-27-708.B 
and, if available, a true and correct transcript 
of its proceedings. 
(5)(a) . . . 
(i) // there is a record, the district conn's 
review is limited to the record provided bx the 
board of adjustment. 
(ii) The court may not accept or consider any 
evidence outside the board of adjustment's 
record unless that evidence was offered to the 
board of adjustment and the court determines 
that it was improperly excluded by the board 
of adjustment. 
(b) If there is no record, the court max call 
witnesses and take evidence. 
(6) The court shall affirm the decision of the 
board of adjustment if the decision is sup-
ported by substantial evidence in the record. 
Utah Code Ann. § 17-27-708, (I), (2)(a). (4)(a). 
(5)(a), (5)(b), (6) (2001) (emphasis added). 
6. Wc acknowledge that the analog) to section 
17-27-708 is not perfect. For example, section 
17-27-708(5)(b) authorizes the district court to 
call witnesses and receive evidence if no record 
was made below, see id. § 17-27-708(5)(b). or if 
on review the district court determines that the 
Commission erroneously excluded evidence. See 
id. § 17-27-708(5)(a)(ii). In contrast, section 
17-27-1001 does not authorize the district court 
to receive evidence or call witnesses. Howevei, 
this distinction merely strengthens our positior 
that the district court erred in receiving evi-
dence. In the case of section 17-27-1001, tht 
legislature did not authorize the district court tc 
receive evidence even though it had done so ii 
other situations. See Utah Code Ann. § 17-27 
708(5)(b). "|W]e ' "presume that the legislatiu 
used each word advisedly and |we] give effect t 
the term according to its ordinary and accepte 
meaning. Department of Natural Re*. \ 
Huntington-Cleveland Irrigation Co., 2002 li 
75,11 13, 52 P.3d 1257 (citations omitted) A« 
cordingly, we conclude that section 17-27 IOC 
does not authorize the district court to recei\ 
evidence. Instead, the district court can on 
review the record made before the County. 
B.A.M. DEVELOPMENT 
Cite as 87 P.3d 7! 
[2,3] 118 In Patterson v. Utah County 
Bd. of Adjustment, 893 P.2d 602 (Utah Ct 
App.1995), landowners sought a "special ex-
ception under a county zoning ordinance." 
Id. at 603. The county conducted a hearing, 
received evidence, and then granted the ex-
ception. See id. Pursuant to section 17-27-
708, another landowner appealed the decision 
to the district court, where the county's ac-
tions were found to be "arbitrary, capricious, 
and illegal." Patterson, 893 P.2d at 603. 
The matter was then appealed to this court. 
See id. On appeal, the parties attempted to 
introduce new evidence. See id. at 610-11. 
We concluded, because the board of adjust-
ments had conducted a hearing and received 
evidence, that we were limited to the existing 
record. See id. at 604. In reaching this 
conclusion, we stated: 
Since the district court's review of the 
Board's decision was limited to a review of 
the Board's record, we do not accord any 
particular deference to the district court's 
decision. Instead, we review the Board's 
Next, the dissent incorrectly claims that Sandy 
City v. Salt Lake County, 827 P.2d 212 (Utah 
1992), prohibits our analogy to section 17—27— 
708. In Sandy Citv, the Utah Supreme Court 
cautioned against the use of statutes relating to 
cities in county-land-use appeals. See id. at 220. 
The court noted that " 'the respective statutes 
dealing with cities and counties confer different 
powers.' " Id. (citations omitted). The court 
further noted, in a footnote, that in the earlier 
appeal to the Utah Court of Appeals, we had 
erroneously relied on a municipal statute, had 
applied an incorrect standard of review, and had 
limited our review to the administrative record. 
See id. n. 4. 
In Sandy City, no statute governed appeals 
from county land-use decisions. See id. In con-
trast, here, section 17-27-1001 sets forth this 
court's standard of review-whether the county's 
action was "arbitrary, capricious, or illegal." 
Utah Code Ann. § 17-27-1001(5)(b). Further-
more, in Sandy City, this court erroneously ap-
plied a municipal standard of review to a county 
land-use decision. See Sandy City, 827 P.2d at 
220 n. 4. Here, contrary to the dissent's claim, 
we do not substitute section 17-27-708 for sec-
tion 17-27-1001. Instead, we simply look to 
cases interpreting similar language to determine 
how the legislature intended courts to review 
county land use decisions. 
Next, the dissent implies that we apply the 
standard of review set forth in section 17-27-
708, while ignoiing section 17-27-1001. We do 
not substitute the standard of review in section 
17-27-708 for the one in section 17-27-1001. 
Instead, because of an absence of clear guidance 
v. SALT LAKE COUNTY Utah 713 
0 (UtahApp. 2004) 
decision as if the appeal had come directly 
from the agency. Thus, the standard for 
our review of the Board's decision is the 
same standard established in the Utah 
Code for the district court's review. 
In determining whether substantial evi-
dence supports the Board's decision we 
will consider all the evidence in the record, 
both favorable and contrary to the Board's 
decision. Nevertheless, our review, like 
the district court's review, "is limited to 
the record provided by the board of adjust-
ment . . . . The court may not accept or 
consider any evidence outside the board['s] 
record "We must simply determine, in 
light of the evidence before the Board, 
whether a reasonable mind could reach the 
same conclusion as the Board. It is not 
our prerogative to weigh the evidence 
anew. 
Id. at 603-04 (citations and footnotes omit-
ted.)7 
by the legislature, we merely refer to section 17-
27-708 by analogy because both statutes limit the 
district court's review to whether the county's 
decision is "arbitrary, capricious, oi illegal " 
Compare Utah Code Ann § 17-27-708(2)(a), 
with id. § !7-27-IOOl(3)(a). 
Finally, the dissent makes much of the "Coun-
ty's concession in its brief that 'BAM followed 
the appeal procedure outlined in the Utah Stat-
utes and corresponding Salt Lake County Ordi-
nance provisionfs].' " We agree. However, our 
focus is not on whether BAM followed the cor-
rect procedure, but whether the district court 
exceeded the scope of its authority pursuant to 
section 17-27-1001 when it received evidence in 
this case. Any "concession" made by BAM has 
no bearing on the propriety of the district court's 
actions. 
7. In Patterson v. Utah County Bd of Adjustment, 
893 P.2d 602 (Utah Ct.App. 1995). we detei mined 
that appellate courts were bound by the record 
before the board of adjustments. See id. at 604 
However, Patterson did not address the import of 
section l7-27-708(5)(b), which allows the dis-
trict court to receive evidence if no record was 
made below. See Utah Code Ann. § 17—27— 
708(5)0) (2001) Still, Patterson provides some 
guidance regarding how we should review ap-
peals pursuant to section 17-27-1001, because it 
addresses a situation, like the one here, when the 
appellate court cannot receive evidence and can 
only determine, on the record belore it, whether 
the administrative agency acted arbitrarily, ca-
paciously, or illegally. See Patterson, 893 P.2d at 
604. 
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11 9 Here, neither the Commission, nor the 
Board, received evidence on whether the 
County's requirement of an additional thir-
teen feet was a "taking." Instead, both ap-
proved the County's action without a hearing. 
Consequently, the district court had no rec-
ord to review. The lack of a record appar-
ently prompted the district court to receive 
evidence and determine for itself whether the 
County had unconstitutionally taken BAM's 
property. However, the plain language of 
section 17-27-1001 does not authorize the 
district court to receive evidence. See Utah 
Code Ann. § 17-27-1002(3)(a).8 Thus, we 
conclude that the district court is limited to 
the record made before the County and can 
determine only whether the County's deci-
sion was "arbitrary, capricious, or illegal." 
Id. § 17-27-1001(3)(a)(ii); see also Wilcox v. 
CSX Corp., 2003 UT 21,118, 70 P.3d 85 (not-
ing that courts first look to the plain lan-
guage of a statute and only look beyond the 
plain language if there is an ambiguity).9 
[4] <110 The absence of a record in this 
case is highly problematic, because historical-
ly, takings determinations are mixed ques-
tions of law and fact. See Lucas v South 
Carolina Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003, 
1071, 112 S.Ct. 2886, 2922, 120 L.Ed.2d 798 
(1992) (Blackmun, J., dissenting) (noting that 
whether government action has deprived a 
claimant of his property without just com-
pensation is an "essentially [an] ad hoc, fac-
tual inquirfy]"). Moreover, Utah courts also 
have acknowledged that evaluating the rea-
sonableness of an exaction is a fact-intensive 
inquiry. 
1111 In Home Builders Ass'n v. City of 
American Fork, 1999 UT 7, 973 P.2d 425, the 
Utah Supreme Court stated that "[exactions,] 
such [as] fees[,] are constitutionally permissi-
ble if the benefits derived from their exaction 
are 'of "demonstrable benefit" to the subdivi-
sion,' and if newly developed properties are 
8 The dissent aigues that even if we weie to 
apply section 17-27-708 to the instant appeal "it 
would not change the lesult " We do not advo-
cate the substitution of section 17-27-708 for 
section 17-27-1001. Instead, we simply refer to 
case law mterpieting section 17-27-708 to sup-
port our conclusion that the distnct court's role 
in this case is limited to determining whether the 
Board acted arbitrarily, capriciously, or illegally 
in summarily denying BAM's taking claim. 
not required to bear more than their equita-
ble share of the capital costs in relation to 
the benefits conferred." Id. at 1114 (quoting 
Banberry Dev. Corp. v. South Jordan City, 
631 P.2d 899, 905 (Utah 1981) (additional 
citation omitted)). In assessing the reason-
ableness of an exaction, a fact finder may 
consider, among other factors 
(1) the cost of existing capital facilities; (2) 
the manner of financing existing capital 
facilities (such as user charges, special as-
sessments, bonded indebtedness, general 
taxes, or federal grants); (3) the relative 
extent to which the newly developed prop-
erties and the other properties in the mu-
nicipality have already contributed to the 
cost of existing capital facilities (by such 
means as user charges, special assess-
ments, or payment from the proceeds of 
general taxes); (4) the relative extent to 
which the newly developed properties and 
the other properties in the municipality 
will contribute to the cost of existing capi-
tal facilities in the future; (5) the extent to 
which the newly developed properties are 
entitled to a credit because the municipali-
ty is requiring their developers or owners 
(by contractual arrangement or otherwise) 
to provide common facilities (inside or out-
side the proposed development) that have 
been provided by the municipality and fi-
nanced through general taxation or other 
means (apart from user charges) in other 
parts of the municipality; (6) extraordi-
nary costs, if any, in servicing the newly 
developed properties; and (7) the time-
price differential inherent in fair compari-
sons of amounts paid at different times 
Id. at H 5 (quoting Banberry, 631 P 2d at 
903-04). This list, while not exhaustive, illus-
trates that the determination of whether an 
exaction is reasonable is a fact-intensive in-
quiry. 
9. The dissent spends considerable time discuss 
ing the diffeiences between boaid ot adjustments 
and county commissions We acknowledge the 
distinction between these two bodies, but note 
that review from both is limited to whether the 
decision was arbitrary, capiicious, oi illegal 
This similarity is the basis for our analogy to 
section 17-27-708. 
B.A.M. DEVELOPMENT v. SALT LAKE COUNTY Utah 715 
Cite as 87 P.3d 710 (UtahApp. 2004) 
[5] 1112 Here, the absence of a record at 
the administrative level prevented the dis-
trict court from evaluating the propriety of 
the Board's action as directed by Utah Code 
Annotated section 17-27-1001(3)(a). We 
conclude that the district court erred when it 
received evidence on BAM's taking claim. 
The district court should have, instead, de-
termined that the Board, in the absence of an 
adequate factual record, acted arbitrarily and 
capriciously in deciding BAM's takings claim. 
1113 Thus, we reverse the district court's 
decision and remand the case directing the 
district court to enter a judgment that the 
Board acted arbitrarily and capriciously 
when it failed to conduct a hearing on BAM's 
takings claim. The district court should then 
remand the case to the proper county agen-
cy, directing that agency to conduct a proper 
hearing on BAM's takings claim.10 
1114 However, because we anticipate that a 
county body will have to determine the con-
stitutionality of the exaction, we provide 
some guidance regarding the proper stan-
dard to apply. BAM argues that its proper-
ty has been taken without just compensation. 
The Takings Clause, which applies to the 
states through the Fourteenth Amend-
ment, declares: u[N]or shall private prop-
erty be taken for public use, without just 
compensation." U.S. Const, amend. V. 
One of the Clause's primary purposes is 
" 'to bar Government from forcing some 
people alone to bear public burdens which, 
in all fairness and justice, should be borne 
by the public as a whole.' " 
Smith luu Co v Sandy City, 958 P.2d 245, 
257 (Utah CtAppl998) (quoting Dolan v 
City of Tujaid, 512 U.S. 374, 384, 114 S.Ct. 
2309, 2316, 129 L Ed.2d 304 (1994)). One 
type of "taking" associated with subdivision 
approval is a "development exaction." 
10. Effective in 2000, Salt Lake County substan-
tially changed its governmental structure Prior 
to the change, the County was governed by three 
County Commissioneis We remand this case 
directing the district court to order a hearing on 
BAM's takings claim However, in light of the 
change in county structure remand to the Board 
of Commissioners is impossible Thus, the dis-
trict court must also determine which Salt Lake 
County governmental body should consider 
BAM's takings claim 
[Development exactions may be defined as 
contributions to a governmental entity im-
posed as a condition precedent to approv-
ing the developer's project. Usually, exac-
tions are imposed prior to the issuance of a 
building permit or zoning/subdivision ap-
proval. Development exactions may take 
the form of: (1) mandatory dedications of 
land for roads, schools or parks, as a condi-
tion to plat approval, (2) fees-in-lieu of 
mandatory dedication, (3) water or sewage 
connection fees, and (4) impact fees. 
Salt Lake County v. Board of Educ, 808 
R2d 1056, 1058 (Utah 1991) (quotations and 
citations omitted); see also No. 13 Richard 
R. Powell, Powell on Real Property, 
§ 79D.04[2][a], 295-96, (Michael Allan Wolf 
ed., 2003) (noting that "exactions" are gener-
ally sought through several methods (1) 
land dedication requirements, (2) land dedi-
cation requirement with fee option, (3) im-
pact fees, or (4) in-kind exactions) In Dolan 
v City of Tigard, 512 U.S. 374, 114 S.Ct 
2309, 129 L.Ed.2d 304 (1994) and Nollan v 
California Coastal Comm% 483 U.S 825, 
107 S.Ct. 3141, 97 L.Ed.2d 677 (1987), the 
United States Supreme Court developed a 
two-part test for determining whether a par-
ticular developmental exaction violated the 
takings clause of the United States Constitu-
tion. 
H 15 In Dolan, the Court concluded that 
for a development exaction to be constitution-
al, the government must show an " 'essential 
nexus7... between the 'legitimate state inter-
est' " and the land dedication requirement. 
512 U.S. at 386, 114 S.Ct. at 2317 (citation 
omitted). The Court further explained that 
to succeed the government "mubt make borne 
sort of individualized determination that the 
required dedication is related both in nature 
and extent to the impact of the proposed 
development." Id. at 391, 114 S.Ct. at 2319-
The dissent attacks this approach as repug-
nant to the important principles of judicial econ 
omy " While we admit that in this case it might 
be quicker to ignore the appropriate standard of 
review and address the merits of this case, we 
would do so in direct opposition to the mandate 
of Utah Code Annotated section 17-27-1001 
The more appropriate approach is to balance the 
desire for judicial economy against the need for 
judicial restraint In this case, ab in most ca^eb 
judicial restraint should, and does, prevail 
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20 The Court labeled this examination a 
"rough proportionality" test. Id at 391, 114 
S.Ct. at 2319. 
1116 Here, BAM was required to dedicate 
thirteen additional feet of land that abutted 
3500 South before the County would approve 
its subdivision plat. We conclude that this 
constitutes a developmental exaction as de-
scribed in Nollan and Dolan. Accordingly, 
the Nollan/Dolan "rough proportionality" 
test applies in this case Therefore, upon 
remand, the reviewing body must determine: 
(1) whether requiring the exaction serves a 
legitimate government interest, and (2) 
whether there is a " 'rough proportionality*" 
between the exaction and the "impact of the 
proposed development." Dolan, 512 U.S. at 
391, 114 S.Ct. at 2319-20, see also No. 13 
Richard R. Powell, Powell on Real Property, 
fc 79D 04L2][a], 295-96, (Michael Allan Wolf-
ed., 2003).ll 
CONCLUSION 
H 17 We conclude that the district court 
exceeded its authority when it conducted a 
hearing and received evidence on BAM's tak-
ings claim contrary to the limits established 
in Utah Code Annotated section 17-27-
1001(3)(a). The district court should have 
concluded that the Board acted arbitrarily 
and capriciously in deciding BAM's taking 
issue without conducting a hearing. Accord-
ingly, we reverse the district court's decision, 
and remand directing the district court to set 
aside the Board's determination. The dis-
trict court shall then identify the proper body 
to conduct a full hearing on the merits and 
remand the case to that body 
1! 18 1 CONCUR. RUbSELL W BENCH, 
Judge. 
11. in Dolan v City of ligard, 512 U S 374, 114 
SCt 2309, 129 L E d 2 d 304 (1994), the United 
States* Supieme Couit announced for the first 
time a "rough piopoitionahty" test to apply 
when evaluating the constitutionality of exac 
tions Id at 391, 1 14 S Ct at 2319 In Dolan, 
the Couit acknowledged that the majority of 
states have adopted a 'leasonable relationship" 
test Id The Couit concluded that the "reason-
able lelationship" test was close[ ] to the fedeial 
constitutional n o u n ' Id Howevei, the Couit 
declined to adopt the phrase ' reasonable rela-
tionship" because of its similanty to the phrase 
rational basis " Id In all other respects, it 
ORME, Judge (dissenting): 
11 19 With neither party having so aigued, 
it is perplexing that the majority insists on 
analyzing the propriety of the trial court's 
actions under Utah Code Ann. § 17-27-708 
(2001), while at the same time admitting that 
this appeal is governed by Utah Code Ann. 
§ 17-27-1001 (2001). I disagree with this 
approach and the remedy of starting over 
before an entity of county government yet to 
be selected by the trial court. This result is 
especially disturbing given the County's con-
cession in its brief that "BAM followed the 
appeal procedure outlined in the Utah stat-
ute and corresponding Salt Lake County Or-
dinance provision^]." 
1120 Under both sections 17-27-708 and 
17-27-1001, judicial review "is limited to a 
determination of whether the [challenged] 
decision is arbitrary, capricious, or illegal" 
Utah Code Ann § 17-27-708(2)(a) See 
Utah Code Ann. § 17-27-1001(3)(a)(n) 
However, section 17-27-708 restricts the tri-
al court's authority to take evidence, while 
section 17-27-1001 does not. By its own 
terms, section 17-27-708 applies only to trial 
court review of "any decision of a board oi 
adjustment." Id. § 17-27-708(1) BAM's 
appeal was not, of course, from a decision of 
a board of adjustment, but trom a decision of 
the Salt Lake County Board of Commission-
ers. This distinction is significant, given the 
very limited purview of a board of adjust-
ment's powers and duties, which, at the time 
of BAM's appeal to the County Commission, 
was to "hear and decide appeaU from 
zoning decisions applying the zoning ordi-
nance[,] special exceptions to the terms ol 
the zoning ordinance[, and] variances fiom 
appears that the Court adopted a "reasonable 
relationship" test and simply renamed it the 
"lough proportionality" test 
Utah has also applied the "reasonable i elation 
ship ' test when evaluating the constitutionality 
of an exaction See, eg , Home Builder 4>> n v 
City oj Am Foik, 1999 UT 7,11 14-16 973 P 2d 
425 (applying the leasonable relationship test 
to a real estate development fee) Danbarv Ik\ 
Corp v South Jordan City, 631 P 2d 899 905 
(Utah 1981) (applying the leasonable ltlation 
ship' " test to a subdivision impact fee (citation 
omitted)) 
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the terms of the zoning ordinance." Utah 
Code Ann. § 17-27-703(l)(a)-(c) (1995) (em-
phasis added).1 The Salt Lake County zon-
ing ordinances, contained in Title 19 of the 
Salt Lake County Code of Ordinances, are 
not relevant to this appeal. Rather, this 
appeal contests the County's power to re-
quire highway dedication from abutting prop-
erty owners under Title 15 of the Salt Lake 
County Code of Ordinances. Understanding 
the difference in function between a board of 
adjustment and a county commission goes a 
long way in demonstrating that there is a 
rational basis for the distinction between sec-
tion 17-27-708, applicable only to judicial 
review of board of adjustment decisions, and 
section 17-27-1001, applicable to land use 
decisions generally. Such an understanding 
dispels any notion that the Legislature meant 
to include section 17-27-708's restriction in 
section 17-27-1001, but just forgot to say so, 
or that, on some other basis, the restriction 
should be grafted onto section 17-27-1001. 
H 21 Boards of adjustment are adjudicative 
bodies—they take sworn testimony and com-
pel the attendance of witnesses, see id. § 17-
27-702(3); they keep records of their pro-
ceedings, see id. § 17-27-702(4)(b)(ii); and 
they may even choose to make their record 
with the same completeness as a district 
court, i.e., by means of a court reporter or 
tape recorder. See id. § 17-27-702(4)(c). In 
sharp contrast, county commissions are not, 
first and foremost, adjudicative bodies and 
thus are not positioned to generate the kind 
of record that a board of adjustment will. 
Thus, a restriction on judicial roving into the 
evidentiary realm in the case of a board of 
adjustment decision makes sense: There 
should already be an adequate record. How-
ever, in contrast, it makes no sense to pre-
1. The powers and duties of the board of adjust-
ment have since been expanded. See Utah Code 
Ann. § 17-27-703(2001). 
2. Prior ca^es have distinguished boards of adjust-
ment from local legislative bodies, both at the 
county level, see Toone v. Weber County, 2002 UT 
103,11 7, 57 P.3d 1079 (recognizing that section 
17-27-707, for example, "grantls] boards of ad-
justment limited power to grant zoning vari-
ances"); Levie v. Sevier County, 617 P.2d 331, 
333 (Utah 1980) (stating that "the County Com* 
mission is charged with the responsibility for 
approving subdivision plats—not the Board of 
elude a court from taking evidence where a 
county commission has made the decision 
under attack because no equivalent record 
will ordinarily have been made by the county 
commission.2 Therefore, the general provi-
sion set forth in section 17-27-1001 controls, 
not the provision limited, by its own terms, to 
boards of adjustment. 
H 22 The majority argues that the language 
in section 17-27-708 "strengthens [its] posi-
tion that the district court erred in receiving 
evidence" because section 17-27-1001 is si-
lent on the matter. Specifically, section 17-
27-708(5)(a)(ii)-(b) states: "The [trial] court 
may not accept or consider any evidence 
outside the board of adjustment's record un-
less that evidence was offered to the board of 
adjustment and the court determines that it 
was improperly excluded by the board of 
adjustment [or] there is no record." Id. 
(emphasis added). The logic of the majori-
ty's argument is flawed. Section 17-27-708 
restricts the trial court's authority to take 
evidence unless one of the two enumerated 
exceptions applies. Section 17-27-1001, 
however, contains no such restriction. With-
out the restriction, there is no hindrance to 
the trial court's receiving evidence. See Bid-
die v. Washington Terrace City, 1999 UT 
110,1114, 993 P.2d 875 ("[0]missions in statu-
tory language should 4be taken note of and 
given effect.'") (quoting Keunecutl Copper 
Corp. v. Anderson, 30 Utah 2d 102, 514 l\2d 
217, 219 (1973)). Indeed, if silence meant the 
trial court cannot consider evidence in the 
absence of express authorization, there would 
simply be no reason for the restriction ex-
pressed in section 17-27-708—it would al-
ready be the case that evidence could not 
ordinarily be received by the reviewing court. 
Adjustment") (emphasis in original), and at ihe 
municipal level. See Bradley v. Pay sou O/v 
Corp., 2003 UT 16,11 13, 70 P.3d 47 ("[A] board of 
adjustment is a quasi-judicial body designed onl\ 
to correct specific zoning errors."), (lurmuu 
City, Inc. v. Draper City. 2000 UT App 31.11 16 
997 P.2d 321 (noting that "Ulhe diMinuion be 
tween quasi-judicial decisions of a board of ad-
justment as opposed to legislative nnmiupal zon-
ing decisions is significant: board* oi adjustment 
have no legislative powers and ate not pa muted 
to have those powers"). 
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1123 Significantly, this court has previously 
relied on a statute applicable to a board of 
adjustment decision in an appeal stemming 
from a planning commission decision, only to 
have our error corrected by the Utah Su-
preme Court In Sandy City v. Salt Lake 
County, 794 P.2d 482 (Utah CtApp.1990) 
(Sandy City I), rev'd, 827 P.2d 212 (Utah 
1992) (Sandy City II), this court applied 
former section 10-9-15,3 the municipal ana-
logue to current section 17-27-708, to an 
appeal stemming from an action of the Salt 
Lake County Planning Commission. See 
Sandy City I, 794 P.2d at 486. In so doing, 
this court stated that its review was limited 
to the administrative record. See id. • The 
Utah Supreme Court called attention to our 
error in Sandy City II, indicating that "the 
court of appeals [mistakenly] confined its 
review to the administrative record," be-
cause, "[f]irst, section 10-9-15 applies only to 
municipalities, not to counties(, and s]econd, 
section 10-9-15 applies only to relief sought 
from the actions of the board of adjustment, 
not from the actions of the planning commis-
sion or the board of county commissioners," 
827 P.2d at 220 n. 4. Interestingly,.the Court 
also noted that, u[a]t the time [Sandy City I 
was decided], no analogous statute regulated 
legal grievances arising from the actions of 
Salt Lake County or the planning commis-
sion; consequently, there was no basis for 
the court of appeals to confine its review to 
the administrative record." Sandy City II, 
827 P.2d at 220 n. 4. 
H 24 Contrary to the law in existence at the 
time Sandy City I was decided, we do now 
have a statute that controls appeals from 
land use decisions of the Salt Lake County 
Board of Commissioners—section 17-27-
3. That section provided, in relevant part, that 
"any person aggrieved by any decision of the 
board of adjustment may have and maintain a 
plenary action for relief therefrom in any court of 
competent jurisdiction." Utah Code Ann. § 10-
9-15(1986). 
4. It is curious, then, that the majority cites Pat-
terson v. Utah County Board of Adjustment, 893 
P.2d 602 (Utah Ct.App.1995), in support of its 
proposition that the trial court erroneously re-
ceived evidence in the instant case. As the ma-
jority recognizes, the board of adjustment in 
Patterson conducted a hearing and received evi-
dence. See id. at 603. Therefore, pursuant to 
section 17-27-708, a reviewing court could not 
1001. If it is improper to apply a statute 
applicable to actions of a board of adjustment 
even when there is no comparable statute 
governing appeals from another governmen-
tal body, it seems axiomatic that it would be 
improper to do so when there is such a 
statute. 
% 25 But even if it were somehow proper 
to analyze the trial court's actions under 
section 17-27-708, it would not change the 
approach in the instant appeal. As the ma-
jority recognizes, a trial court may not "ac-
cept or consider any evidence outside the 
board of adjustment's record" under section 
17-27-708 unless: (1) there is no record, see 
id. § 17-27-708(5)(b), or (2) "evidence was 
offered to the board of adjustment and the 
court determines that it was improperly ex-
cluded." Id. § 17-27-708(5)(a)(ii). Because 
there was no record made in connection with 
BAM's appeal to the Salt Lake County 
Board of Commissioners, the instant case fits 
squarely within the exception enumerated in 
section 17-27-708(b).4 Therefore, even if we 
do look to section 17-27-708 in analyzing the 
trial court's actions, as the majority urges, 
the court properly called witnesses and took 
evidence, which evidence is properly now 
part of our record. See Xanthos v. Board of 
Adjustment, 685 P.2d 1032, 1034 (Utah 1984) 
(" The nature and extent of [judicial] review 
depends on what happened below as re-
flected by a true record of the proceedings' 
[before the board of adjustment. Thus], if 
the hearing had proceeded in accordance 
with due process requirements, the review-
ing court could look only to the record, but 
where it had not or where there ivas nothing 
to review, the reviewing court must be al-
receive additional evidence in that case unless it 
determined that such evidence "was improperly 
excluded by the board." Utah Code Ann. § 17-
27-708(5)(a)(ii). BAM's appeal, on the other 
hand, was summarily denied by the Salt Lake 
County Board of Commissioners, whose re-
sponse consisted entirely of the following state-
ment: "The Board of County Commissioneis, at 
its meeting held this day, upheld the planning 
commission approval and denied the request ul 
B.A.M. Development, Inc., for an appeal on PL-
97-1063, Westridge Meadows 7755 West 3500 
South." Patterson, then, is quite unlike the case 
before us. 
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lowed to get at the facts.") (emphasis added) 
(decided under former section 10-9-15). Ac-
cord Davis County v. Clearfield City, 756 
P.2d 704, 709-10 (Utah CtApp.), cert, de-
nied, 765 P.2d 1278 (Utah 1988). 
U26 Accordingly, the appeal is ripe for 
decision by this court and, in my vieWt it 
should be resolved at this juncture.6 If I 
were writing the opinion for the court, I 
would write as follows: 
II27 Plaintiff B.A.M. Development, L.L.C. 
(BAM) appeals the trial court's decision hold-
ing that Defendant Salt Lake County (the 
County), acting pursuant to its Transporta-
tion Master Plan, could constitutionally re-
quire BAM to dedicate a fifty-three-foot 
right-of-way, without compensation, as a con-
dition to approval of BAM's subdivision pro-
posal. The trial court's decision should be 
reversed and remanded. 
BACKGROUND6 
H28 Salt Lake County Ordinance 
15.28.010, enacted under authority of Utah 
Code Ann. § 17-27-801 (2001), requires dedi-
cation and improvement of public street 
right-of-way space by developers of abutting 
property in accordance with the County's 
Transportation Master Plan. The Transpor-
tation Master Plan is based on traffic projec-
tions and recommendations from the Was-
atch Front Regional Council and the Utah 
Department of Transportation (UDOT), in-
cluding a long-range transportation study 
projecting highway capacity needs in Salt 
Lake County to the year 2020. 
1129 In July of 1997, BAM submitted a 
proposal to develop Westridge Meadows sub-
division on a fifteen-acre parcel at approxi-
mately 7700 West 3500 South in unincorpo-
rated Salt Lake County. BAM's fee simple 
interest in the parcel proposed for subdivi-
5. This sound approach, fully consistent with the 
plain language of the statutory sections analyzed, 
also advances the cause of avoiding inefficiency, 
duplication, and delay. Considerable court re-
sources have already been expended on this case, 
resulting in a two-day bench trial which pro-
duced a voluminous record. It has been briefed 
and argued to this court and, as will be obvious, 
has been the object of much deliberation and 
sion development extended to the center line 
of 3500 South Street at its northern bound-
ary. Pursuant to Salt Lake County Ordi-
nance 15.28.010, BAM's proposed plat indi-
cated a forty-foot half-road-width dedication 
at 3500 South Street, running along the 
northern boundary of BAM's adjacent prop-
erty. The dedication was to be used for the 
eventual widening of 3500 South, a state 
highway abutting the proposed subdivision. 
3500 South is a thoroughfare used by the 
traveling public, which will also be used by 
future subdivision residents, although the 
highway is not directly accessible from the 
subdivision. 
1130 On September 9, 1997, the County 
approved BAM's subdivision proposal subject 
to compliance with County ordinances and 
departmental requirements in these terms: 
1. Construction of curb, gutter, sidewalk 
and street improvements on proposed 
and adjoining streets including 3500 
South (sidewalk on 3500 South to be 6' 
wide and placed next to the fence). 
2. Elimination, relocation, piping, or fenc-
ing open ditches and/or canals within or 
adjacent to the subdivision by subdivider 
as agreeable to irrigation users or com-
pany. 
3. Construction of a 6' high non-climbable 
barrier fence along 3500 South as these 
lots are non-vehicular access to 3500 
South. A gate is to be constructed on 
each lot for property owner access and 
this note to be on Mylar. 
4. Dedication of 40' from the center line 
of 3500 South to Salt Lake County for 
street right-of-way. 
5. Modification of design as worked out 
by County Departments and subdivider. 
6. Final plat to be drawn on a subdivision 
mylar by a licensed surveyor. 
7. Street on west to be dedicated and 
constructed with curb and gutter on 
analysis. Remanding this case to the tnal couit 
with instructions to send it back to the County to 
repeat the fact-finding process, i> repugnant to 
the important principle of judicial economy 
6. This opinion borrows liberally from the trial 
court's Findings of Fact 
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west side and curb, gutter & sidewalk on 
east side. 
8. Comply with all conditions of the 2 
overpressure zone. This note to be on 
mylar. 
9. A minimum 15' wide landscaping area 
to be installed along 3500 South. The 
landscape strip to be maintained by the 
adjacent property owner. Plan to be 
approved by Development Services 
Staff. 
10. Install traffic calming devices as ap-
proved by Transportation Engineer. 
1131 On September 15, 1997, UDOT re-
ceived BAM's subdivision proposal. UDOT 
responded that the current required highway 
dedication for 3500 South at the location of 
BAM's proposed subdivision was a fifty-
three-foot half-road-width right-of-way,, not 
forty feet, as indicated by the County's 
Transportation Master Plan. In June of 1998, 
the County incorporated the revised right-of-
way requirement of fifty-three feet into its 
Transportation Master Plan. That same 
month, the County granted preliminary ap-
proval of BAM's subdivision proposal subject 
to compliance with, among other things, the 
fifty-three-foot right-of-way dedication.7 
1132 On July 2, 1998, BAM filed a notice of 
appeal with the Salt Lake County Board of 
Commissioners, challenging the constitution-
ality of the County's requirement of a fifty-
three-foot dedication and the resulting "in-
creased expenses" and requesting approval 
of the subdivision proposal with a forty-foot 
dedication. The Board of County Commis-
sioners summarily denied BAM's appeal, and 
BAM filed suit against the County in district 
court, alleging, among other things, that the 
County's development exactions were "unrea-
sonable and excessive" and effected a taking 
of BAM's property without just compensa-
tion. After a two-day bench trial, the trial 
court entered judgment in favor of the Coun-
7. The June 1998 approval was contingent upon 
additional requirements which, aside from the 
fifty-three-foot dedication, substantially mirror 
the September 1997 requirements listed above. 
However, the June 1998 approval eliminated the 
former requirement regarding "[a] minium 15' 
wide landscaping area . . . along 3500 South" 
and added a requirement »hm th* landowner 
ty on all counts, concluding that, inter alia, 
"BAM failed to establish a cause of action on 
its 'takings' claim." The trial court subse-
quently denied BAM's "Motion for Entry of 
New Findings and/or Additional Findings" 
and its "Motion for a New Trial," and BAM 
appealed to this court. 
H 33 While the above litigation was in pro-
cess, the County approved BAM's amended 
subdivision plat, which had been modified, 
under protest, to include the required tifty-
three-foot highway dedication. In August of 
1999, BAM's subdivision plat was recorded in 
the Salt Lake County Recorder's Office, and 
BAM later began construction of Westridge 
Meadows. 
ISSUE AND STANDARD OF REVIEW 
H 34 BAM raises several issues on appeal, 
but its first argument is dispositive. BAM 
argues that requiring it to dedicate property 
for eventual use in widening a street, and 
improve adjacent property, all without com-
pensation, as a condition to approval of its 
subdivision proposal, constitutes an unconsti-
tutional "taking" of its property in violation 
of both federal and state law. This question 
of law is reviewed under the "correction-of-
error standard! ]," with no particular defer-
ence accorded to the trial court. State v, 
Pena, 869 P.2d 932, 936 (Utah 1994). 
ANALYSIS 
I. Introduction: Takings Jurisprudence 
H 35 BAM argues that requiring it to dedi-
cate a fifty-three foot strip of property and 
undertake various improvements to property 
outside the subdivision as a condition to ap-
proval of its subdivision proposal effects a 
"taking" in violation of state and federal con-
stitutional law. Before proceeding to the 
merits of this claim, it is necessary to discern 
the nature of BAM's takings challenge8 In 
"[i]nstall an emergency service turnaround as 
required by the Fire Department." 
8. At oral argument, BAM correctly characterized 
its claim as one for inverse condemnation, which 
"is simply a generic description applicable to all 
actions in which a property owner, in the ab-
sence of a formal condemnation [i.e., eminent 
domain] proceeding, seeks to recover Irom a 
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so doing, this opinion first summarizes rele-
vant United States Supreme Court jurispru-
dence.9 
H36 The Takings Clause of the Fifth 
Amendment, applicable to the states through 
the Fourteenth Amendment, see Chicago, 
Burlington. & Quincy R.R. Co. v. Chicago, 
166 U.S. 226, 241, 17 S.Ct. 581, 586, 41 L.Ed. 
979 (1897), provides that "private property 
[shall not] be taken for public use, without 
just compensation." l0 U.S. Const, amend. V. 
The Court has traditionally recognized two 
categories of takings: "physical takings" and 
so-called "regulatory takings." See, e.g., Yee 
v. City of Escondido, 503 U.S. 519, 527, 112 
S.Ct. 1522, 1528, 118 L.Ed.2d 153 (1992) (dis-
tinguishing the Court's "regulatory takings 
cases" from its "physical takings" cases); 
Loretto v. Teleptvmpter Manhattan CATV 
Cvrp.% 458 U.S. 419, 430, 102 S.Ct. 3164, 3173, 
73 L.Ed.2d 868 (1982) (distinguishing a 
"physical occupation" from a "regulation that 
merely restricts the use of property"); Penn 
Cent Tramp. Co. u City of New York, 438 
U.S. 104, 124-25, 98 S.Ct. 2646, 2659, 57 
L.Ed.2d 631 (1978) (implicitly recognizing 
distinct categories of physical and regulatory 
takings); Abraham Bell & Gideon Parcho-
movsky, Gi-uings, 111 Yale L.J.' 547, 559 
(2001) ("[I]t is indisputable that the case law 
recognizes the existence of two types of tak-
govcrnmenial entity for the appropriation of his 
property interest." 2A Nichols, Eminent Do-
main § 6.14[l], at 6-227 (3d ed.2002). "[T]he 
inverse condemnation action is available to any 
landowner who suffers destruction or impair-
ment of a protected private property right." Id. 
§ 6.14[l], at 6-230. Moreover, although BAM 
correctly points out that inverse condemnation 
claims brought under Article I, Section 22 of the 
Utah Constitution are "self-executing," this 
means only that such claims may be brought 
even absent authorizing legislation and that such 
claims are exempt from the limitations found in 
the Utah Governmental Immunity Act. See Col-
umn v. Utah State land Bd.t 795 P.2d 622, 630-
35 (Utah 1990). It does not follow, as BAM 
contends, that inverse condemnation claims are 
automatically exempt from requirements such as 
exhaustion of administrative remedies. 
9. The lack of a "coherent test" and resulting "sea 
of uncertainty" in takings law inspired one pair 
of commentators to quip that "takings jurispru-
dence is considered a leading candidate for the 
'doctrine-in-most-desperate-need-of-a-principle 
prize.' " Abraham Bell & Cideon Parchomovsky, 
tags: physical takings and regulatory tak-
ings/'). ' Each of these more familiar types of 
takings, and a third category known as "de-
velopment exactions," are addressed below. 
A. Physical Takings 
H37 A physical taking requires govern-
ment activity in the form of an invasion, 
occupation, or intrusion. See, e.g., Loretto, 
458 U.S. at 426, 102 S.Ct. at 3171. "[Gov-
ernmental action [that] results in '[a] per-
manent physical occupation' of the property, 
by the government itself or by others," Nol-
Ian v. California Coastal Comm'v, 483 U.S. 
825, 831, 107 S.Ct, 3141, 3146 (1987) (second 
alteration in original) (citation omitted), con-
stitutes a per se taking and "requires com-
pensation under the [Takings] Clause." Pa-
lazzolo v. Rhod* Island, 533 U.S. 606, 617, 
121 S.Ct. 2448, 2457, 150 L.Ed.2d 592 
(2001). See also Lucas v. South Carolina 
Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003, 1015, 112 
S.Ct. 2886, 2893, 120 L.Ed.2d 798 (1992) 
("[A]t least with regard to permanent inva-
sions[ ], no matter how minute the intru-
sion, and no matter how weighty the public 
purpose behind it, we have required com-
pensation."). Cf Yee, 503 U.S. at 539, 112 
S.Ct. at 1534 ("Because the . . . ordinance 
does not compel a landowner to suffer the 
Givings, 111 Yale L.J. 547, 558-60 (2001) (cita-
tion omitted). Another scholar noted that "[tjhe 
incoherence of the U.S. Supreme Court's output 
in this field has by now been demonstrated time 
and again by practitioners and academic com-
., mentators ad nauseam, and I refuse to add to the 
ongoing gratuitous slaughter of trees for the pa-
per consumed in this frustrating and increasingly 
pointless enterprise." Gideon Kanner, Hunting 
the Snark, Not the Quark: Has the U S. Supieme 
Court Been Competent in fts Effort to Formulate 
Coherent Regulatory Takings Law?, 30 The Uiban 
Lawyer 307, 308 (Spring 1998). Nevertheless, a 
summary of takings jurisprudence is important 
in the disposition of BAM's appeal, especially 
considering the dearth of Utah case law on the 
subject. 
10. Similarly, the Utah Constitution provider that 
"(pjrivate property shall not be taken or dam-
aged for public use without just compensation." 
Utah Const, art. I. § 22. The Utah provision 
has been characterized as broader than its feder-
al counterpart because it ptotccts not only prop-
erty that is "taken," but also property that is 
"damaged" for public use. See Bagford v. Ephra-
im City, 904 P.2d 1095, 1097 (Utah 1995). 
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physical occupation of his property, it does 
not effect a per se taking under Loretto") 
(emphasis in original). 
B. Regulatory Takings 
H38 In contrast to a physical taking, a 
regulatory takings claim challenges state or 
local laws that impose "regulations" or "re-
strictions" on the "use" of property. Yee, 
503 U.S. at 532, 539, 112 S.Ct. at 1531, 1534 
(emphasis in original). See Loretto, 458 U.S. 
at 430, 102 S.C1 at 3173 ("[RJecent cases 
confirm the distinction between a permanent 
physical occupation . . . and a regulation that 
merely restricts the use of property."). In 
the famous words of Justice Holmes, 4<while 
property may be regulated to a certain ex-
tent, if regulation goes too far it will be 
recognized as a taking." Pennsylvania Coal 
Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393, 415,43 S.Ct 158, 
160, 67 L.Ed. 322 (1922). However, "[i]n 70-
odd years of succeeding regulatory takings 
jurisprudence, [the Court has] generally es-
chewed any set formula for determining how 
far is too far." Lucas, 505 U.S. at 1015, 112 
S.Ct. at 2893 (quotations and citations omit-
ted). Instead, the Court has "examined the 
taking question by engaging in essentially ad 
hoc, factual inquiries that have identified sev-
eral factors—such as the economic impact of 
the regulation, its interference with reason-
able investment-backed expectations, and the 
character of the governmental action—that 
have particular significance." MacDonald, 
Sommer.& Frates v. Yolo County, 477 U.S. 
340, 349,106 S.Ct. 2561, 2566, 91 L.Ed.2d 285 
(1986) (quotations and citations omitted). 
11. The per se rule of Lucas is not absolute, but is 
limited by "the restrictions that background prin-
ciples of the State's law of property and nuisance 
already place upon land ownership." Lucas v. 
South Carolina Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003, 
1028, 112 S.Ct. 2886, 2900, 120 L.Ed.2d 798 
(1992). 
12. It is helpful to think of exactions as sort of a 
hybrid between physical and regulatory takings. 
The Court acknowledged as much in Nollan v. 
California Coastal Commission when it charac-
terized "a classic right-of-way easement" as a 
physical taking but nevertheless applied the regu-
latory takings test. 483 U.S. 825, 831 & n. 1, 
107 S.Ct. 3141, 3146 & n. 1, 97 L.Ed.2d 677 
(1987) ("We think a 'permanent physical occupa-
tion' has occurred . . . where individuals are giv-
en a permanent and continuous right to pass to 
H 39 Despite the ad hoc nature of regulato-
ry takings inquiries, at least one general rule 
has emerged: "[T]he Fifth Amendment is 
violated when land-use regulation 'does not 
substantially advance legitimate state inter-
ests or denies an owner economically viable 
use of his land.'" Lucas, 505 U.S. at 1016, 
112 S.Ct. at 2894 (emphasis omitted) (quoting 
Agins v. City of Tiburon, 447 U.S. 255, 260, 
100 S.Ct. 2138, 2141, 65 L.Ed.2d 106 
(1980)).11 Cf. Three D Carp. v. Salt Lake 
City, 752 R2d 1321, 1325 (Utah Ct.App.1988) 
('Where governmental action, not amounting 
to a physical taking, effectively deprives a 
property owner of reasonable access to prop-
erty, the owner is entitled to compensa-
tion!.]") (footnote omitted). This general 
rule incorporates the underlying principle 
that while "[o]ur cases have not elaborated 
on the standards for determining what con-
stitutes a legitimate state interestf,]' 
[t]hey have made clear . . . that a broad 
range of governmental purposes and regula-
tions satisfies these requirements." Nollan, 
483 U.S. at 834-35, 107 S.Ct. at 3147. See 
also Loretto, 458 U.S. at 441, 102 S.Ct. at 
3179 ("We do not . . . question the sub-
stantial authority upholding a State's broad 
power to impose appropriate restrictions 
upon an owner's use of his property.") (em-
phasis in original). 
C. Development Exactions 
H 40 Along with the traditional categories 
of physical and regulatory takings, a third 
category of takings has emerged in the case 
law, namely "development exactions."12 
and fro, so that the real property may continu-
ously be traversed, even though no particular 
individual is permitted to station himself per ma 
nently upon the premises."). The Court ex-
plained: "Given, then, that requiring uncompen-
sated conveyance of the easement outi igiu would 
violate the Fourteenth Amendment, the question 
becomes whether requiring it to be conveyed as a 
condition for issuing a land-use permit alter s the 
outcome." Id. at 834, 107 S.Ct. at 3147. The 
Court then applied the regulatory takings test of 
whether the regulation " 'substantially ad-
vance^] legitimate state interests' and does not 
'den[y] an owner economically viable use of his 
land.'" Id. (alterations in original) (citations 
omitted). 
Similarly, in Dolan v. City ofTigard, the Court 
distinguished the garden-variety regulatory tak-
B.A.M. DEVELOPMENT v. SALT LAKE COUNTY Utah 723 
CUe a* 87 ?M 710 (UuhApp. 2004) 
" '[Development exactions may be defined as 
contributions to a governmental entity im-
posed as a condition precedent to approving 
the developer's project. Usually, exactions 
are imposed prior to the issuance of a build-
ing permit or zoning/subdivision approval/ " 
Salt Lake County u Board of Educ, 808 
P.2d 1056, 1058 (Utah 1991) (citation omit-
ted). Exactions will generally "serve more 
than a single development," 8A Nichols, Emi-
nent Domain § 17.01, at 17-7 (2002), and 
" 'may take the form of: (1) mandatory dedi-
cations of land for roads, schools or parks, as 
a condition to plat approval, (2) fees-in-lieu of 
mandatory dedication, (3) water or sewage 
connection fees and (4) impact fees/ " Salt 
Lake County v. Board ofEduc, 808 P.2d at 
1058 (citation omitted). Exactions "enable 
local government to acquire land for highway 
expansion at no charge to the public. The 
dedicated land is reserved in its present state 
until the government is ready to widen the 
adjacent highway or construct a new road-
way." 8A Nichols, Eminent Domain 
§ 17.02[3], at 17-17. 
H 41 In the famous Nollan and Dolan deci-
sions, see Dolan u City of Tigard, 512 U.S. 
374, 114 S.Ct. 2309, 129 L.Ed.2d 304 (1994); 
Nollan u California Coastal Comm'n, 483 
U.S. 825, 107 S.Ct 3141, 97 L,Ed.2d 677 
(1987), the Court adopted a two-pronged test 
ings cases from the case before it, which involved 
a redevelopment permit conditioned upon a 
forced dedication of land. See 512 U.S. 374, 
385, 114 S.Ct. 2309, 2316, 129 L.Ed.2d 304 
(1994). The Court stated: 
First, [those cases] involved essentially legisla-
tive determinations classifying entire areas of 
the city, whereas here the city made an adjudi-
cative decision to condition petitioner's appli-
cation for a building permit on an individual 
parcel. Second, the conditions imposed were 
not simply a limitation on the use petitioner 
might make of her own parcel, but a require-
ment that she deed portions of the property to 
the city. 
Id. (emphasis added). Thus, it is clear that exac-
tions do not fit neatly into either the regulatory 
or physical takings jurisprudence. See Rogers 
Much, Inc. v Washington County, 181 Or.App. 
369, 45 P.3d 966, 973 (characterizing exactions 
as an ''amalgamation" between physical and reg-
ulatory takings and noting that "[enactions do 
not fit neatly within the more conventional Tak-
ings Clause analytical construct"), review denied, 
334 Or. 492, 52 P.3d 1057 (Or.2002), cert, denied, 
538 U.S. 906, 123 S.Ct. 1482, 155 L.Ed.2d 225 
(2003); Town of Flower Mound v. Stafford Es-
that development exactions—at least when 
they take the form of forced dedications of 
property—must satisfy to withstand scrutiny 
under the Takings Clause.13 In Nollan, the 
Court revisited the "long[-]recognized" rule 
that a "land-use regulation does not effect a 
taking if it Substantially advance[s] legiti-
mate state interests' and does not *den[y] an 
owner economically viable use of his land/ " 
Id. at 834, 107 S.Ct. at 3147 (second and 
third alterations in original) (citation omit-
ted). The Court acknowledged that it had 
"not elaborated on the standards for deter-
mining what constitutes a 'legitimate state 
interest' or what type of connection between 
j. the regulation and the state interest satisfies 
^ the requirement that the former 'substantial-
ly advance' the latter." Id. In addressing 
these questions, the Court set forth the first 
prong of the Nollan/Dolan test: there must 
be an '"essential nexus* between the 
'legitimate state interest' and the permit con-
dition exacted by the [governmental entity]" 
Dolan, 512 U.S. at 386, 114 S.Ct. at 2317 
(quoting Nollan, 483 U.S. at 837,107 S.Ct. at 
3148). 
1142 In Dolan, the Court resolved the 
question it left unanswered in Nollan: If an 
"essential nexus" exists, what is the required 
degree of connection between the exactions 
tates, 71 S,W.3d 18, 30 (Tex.App.) ("In an exac-
tion takings case, the landowner is not simply 
- denied or restricted in some clesired use of his 
' property. Rather, in an exaction takings case, 
" some action—the exaction—is required of the 
landowner as a condition to obtaining govern-
mental approval."), review granted, 2002 Tex. 
LEXIS 209 (Tex.2002); Sparks v. Douglas Coun-
ty, 127 Wash.2d 901, 904 P.2d 738, 742 (1995) 
(recognizing that "[the physical taking*] luie 
does not necessarily apply where conveyance 
of a property nght is required as a condition loi 
issuance of a land permit"); 8 Nichols, Eminent 
Domain § 14E.04[4]4 at 14E-33 & 14E-34 (2002) 
("[T]he Dolan rule applies only to case-by-case 
land exactions, and not to community wide zon-
ing and land use regulations."); Taking 'Takings 
Rights" Seriously: A Debate on Properly Right* 
Legislation Before the J04th Congress, 9 Am U 
Admin. L.J. 253, 277 (1995) (designating Dolan 
as an example of a "special category of cases 
called dedication and exaction cases"). 
13. As explained more fully below, it is unclear 
whether the Court's analysis applies to develop-
ment exactions other than forced dedications of 
property. 
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and the projected impact of the proposed 
development? 14 In response, the Court set 
forth the "rough proportionality" prong of 
the test, which requires the governmental 
entity to "make some sort of individualized 
determination that the required dedication is 
related both in nature and extent to the 
impact of the proposed development." Do-
lan, 512 U.S. at 391, 114 S.Ct. at 2319-20. 
H 43 To summarize the Nollan/Dolan two-
prong test, a development exaction in the 
form of a forced dedication of real property 
will constitute a taking, necessitating just 
compensation, unless the government demon-
strates that (1) an " 'essential nexus* exists 
between the 'legitimate state interest' and 
the permit condition exacted by the [govern-
mental entity]/' and (2) "the required dedica-
tion is related both in nature and extent to 
the impact of the proposed development." 
Dolan, 512 U.S. at 386, 391, 114 S.Ct. at 
2317, 2319-20. 
1144 After considering the rules and ratio-
nales underlying physical, regulatory, and ex-
actions takings cases, it appears that BAM's 
claim most closely fits within the framework 
of the development exactions cases. The 
County conditioned approval of BAM's pro-
posed subdivision on dedication of property 
to be used in the future for widening 3500 
South—at least if the County's Master 
Transportation Plan were to be eventually 
implemented. The forced dedication is a 
" 'contribution ] to a governmental entity 
imposed as a condition precedent to approv-
ing the developer's project,'" which is within 
the definition of an exaction as set forth in 
Salt Lake County v. Board of Education, 808 
14. The Court did not addiess thib question in 
Nollan because, while it "agreed that the Coastal 
Commission's concern with piotecting visual ac-
. cess to the ocean constituted a legitimate public 
interest," the Court deteuwined there was no 
"essential nexus" between "visual access to the 
ocean and a permit condition requiring lateral 
public access along the Nollans' beachfront lot " 
Dolan, 512 US at 386-87, 114 S.Ct. at 2317 
Because the "essential nexus" piong was not 
satisfied, the Court had no occasion to decide 
"the required degree of connection between the 
exactions and the piojected impact of the pro-
posed development." Id. at 386, 114 S.Ct. at 
2317. 
15. In any event, it is far from clear that exhaus-
tion t equipments would apply to BAM, at least 
P.2d at 1058 (citation omitted). More impor-
tantly, the facts of this case mirror the facts 
of both Nollan, where the landowner was 
forced to grant an easement to the public in 
exchange for a building permit, and Dolan, 
where the landowner was forced to dedicate 
a portion of her property to the city of 
Tigard in exchange for a development per-
mit. See Dolan, 512 U.S. at 385-86, 114 
S.Ct. at 2317. 
1 45 Having concluded that BAM has stat-
ed a claim for an exaction in the form of a 
forced dedication of real property, it is neces-
sary to determine what, if any, procedural 
requirements BAM must comply with and 
whether it has done so in this case. 
II. Preservation of Issues 
H 46 The County argues, and the trial court 
agreed, that "the only issue appealed by 
BAM to the County Commission, and thus 
preserved by exhaustion of administrative 
remedies, was the County's requirement of a 
53-foot highway dedication, rather than a 40-
foot dedication." Thus, the County main-
tains that "the only issue properly before this 
Court" is whether the thirteen-foot increase 
in the County's dedication requirement ef-
fected a taking of BAM's property. BAM, 
on the other hand, urges us to address the 
constitutionality of the entire fifty-three-foot 
dedication as well as the County's additional 
in-kind improvement requirements, 
U 47 Although the County phrases its argu-
ment in jurisdictional terms, the County's 
objection, in reality, is one of issue-preserva-
tion rather than exhaustion of administrative 
remedies.15 Tellingly, the County concedes 
insofai as its challenge to the County s forced 
dedication of real property is concerned Ii is 
true that in reference to a garden-variety land 
use regulation, "an essential prerequisite to its 
assertion is a final and authoritative determina-
tion of the type and intensity ot development 
legally permitted on the subject pioperty A 
court cannot determine whether a regulation has 
gone 'too far' unless it knows how far the legula-
tion goes." MacDouald, Sommer & Fraies v 
Yolo County, All U.S. 340, 348, 106 S Ct 2561, 
2566, 91 L.Ed.2d 285 (1986). Such logic does 
not apply to a development exaction consisting of 
a forced dedication of real property The County 
did not attempt to regulate the "use" of BAM s 
land, but conditioned its approval of BAM's sub-
division proposal on a forced dedication of leal 
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that "BAM followed the appeal procedure 
outlined in the Utah statute and correspond-
ing Salt Lake County Ordinance provi-
sions]." Thus, the County's real quarrel is 
with the wording of BAM's appeal to the 
Board of County Commissioners, which chal-
lenges the County's decision to deny develop-
ment approval with the 40-foot dedication 
and argues that the County's imposition of 
"increased expenses and uncompensated ded-
ication of private property for public use, is 
arbitrary, capricious, . . . and contrary to 
law." 
1148 It is true that "a party seeking review 
of agency action must raise an issue before 
that agency to preserve the issue for further 
review," Badger v. Brooklyn Canal Co., 966 
P.2d 844, 847 (Utah 1998). Pursuant to the 
"level of consciousness" test, "a plaintiff 
[must] bring an issue to the fact finder's 
attention so that there is at least the possibil-
ity that it could be considered." 16 Id. 
% 49 It must be concluded that BAM's ap-
peal properly encompassed its objection to 
the entire dedication of real property such 
that the Board of County Commissioners 
was, or should have been, conscious of i t 
BAM's argument that the County should 
have approved its proposal with the 40-foot 
dedication does not foreclose its further ar-
gument that the County's requirement of 
"uncompensated dedication of private prop-
erty," in whatever amount, is "unconstitu-
tional." 
11 50 Furthermore, this case is in a some-
what unusual posture because the "level of 
consciousness" test is being applied not to a 
hearing or other administrative proceeding, 
but to BAM's written notice of appeal. Cf. 
Badger, 966 P.2d at 847 (applying level of 
consciousness test to informal hearing before 
State Engineer); US Xpress, Inc. v. Utah 
property. The only question is whether the 
County's exaction of BAM's property constituted 
a taking. See Nelson v. City of Lake Oswego, 126 
Or.App. 416, 869 P.2d 350, 353 (1994) (en banc) 
("LNo] case of which we are aware attaches an 
exhaustion or ripeness prerequisite to the litiga-
tion of claims, like those here, that are based oh 
a development condition that has resulted in the 
actual acquisition of a private property interest 
by the government."). 
State Tax Comrn'n, 886 P.2d 1115, 1119 n. 7 
(Utah Ct.App.1994) (applying level of con-
sciousness test to hearing before State Tax 
Commission); Ashcroft v. InduUrml 
Comrn'n, 855 P.2d 267, 268-69 (Utah Ct. 
App.) (holding that plaintiff waived issues not 
presented to the administrative law judge 
during formal hearing), cert, denied, 868 P.2d 
95 (Utah 1993). In light of the fact that the 
County Commission summarily denied 
BAM's appeal without a hearing, foreclosing 
the opportunity for BAM to develop and 
explain its concerns, an unnecessarily 
crabbed reading of BAM's notice of appeal is 
not required by the "level of consciousness" 
test, and that test does not foreclose consid-
eration of the constitutionality of requiring 
the entire fifty-three-foot dedication. 
1151 A different conclusion is reached, how-
ever, on the question of whether BAM prop-
erly preserved its objection to the County's 
requirement that certain in-kind improve-
ments be made. On appeal, BAM chal-
lenges, to an unclear extent, a number of 
improvements required by the County as a 
condition to subdivision approval, including 
installation of curbs, gutters, stormdrain 
lines, sidewalks, and fencing. BAM argues 
that such improvements are "unconstitution-
ally excessive and/or unreasonable." The 
only possible evidence of preservation of this 
argument in BAM's written appeal to the 
Board of County Commissioners is in BAM's 
objection to the County's "increased ex-
penses." Even under the most liberal con-
struction of BAM's notice of appeal, it cannot 
be said that this issue was sufficiently raised 
such that the Board of County Commission-
ers should have been conscious of it. 
1152 Furthermore, even if BAM had piop-
erly preserved this argument, BAM advances 
no convincing argument that the County's 
improvement requirements should be invali-
16, The "level of consciousness" test is a "less 
exacting standard" than that applied in a uial 
setting, where preservation requires that "(1) 'the 
issue . . . be raised in a timely fashion;' (2) the 
issue . . . be specifically raised;' and (3)[the] pai-
ty must introduce 'supporting evidence or i ele-
vant legal authority.' " Badger v. Brooklyn Canal 
Co., 966 P.2d 844, 847 (Utah 1998) (quoting Han 
v. Salt Lake County Comrn'n, 945 P2d 125. 130 
(Utah Ct.App.), cert, dented. 953 P 2d 449 (Utah 
1997)). 
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dated, or for that matter even analyzed, un-
der Nollan and Dolan.n The County cannot 
force BAM to dedicate and improve 3500 
South based solely on its own transportation 
planning goals, rather than on the impacts of 
BAM's subdivision, because this would force 
BAM "alone to bear public burdens which, in 
all fairness and justice, should be borne by 
the public as a whole." Armstrong u United 
States, 364 U.S. 40, 49, 80 S.Ct 1563,1569, 4 
L.Ed.2d 1554 (1960). Nevertheless, there is 
"an important distinction between ordinances 
requiring installation of streets, sidewalks, 
sewers and drainage facilities which are inex-
tricably tied to the needs of the subdivision 
development, and those ordinances which re-
quire dedication of land . . . where the nexus 
between the use requirement and the subdi-
vision development is less than evident." 2A 
Nichols, Eminent Domain § 6.13[3][b], at 6 
218 (3d ed.2002). See also Art Piculell 
Group v. Clackamas County, 142 OrApp. 
327, 922 P.2d 1227, 1234 (1996) ("[Conditions 
^hat in whole or in part serve the needs of 
die development itself should be weighed • 
differently than pure 'exactions' of the kind 
rtiat serve only to mitigate an impact of the 
development on the public or public facili-
ties."). 
1153 For example, the County's require-
ment that BAM install a fence and a sidewalk 
along the portion of its property abutting 
S500 South seems to be "inextricably tied to 
17. This is not to say that improvement exactions 
may never be subject to Nollan/Dolan scrutiny. 
See McClure v. City of Springfield, 175 Or.App. 
425, 28 P.3d 1222, 1227-28 (2001) (applying 
Dolan to city ordinance requiring dedication of 
property and installation of sidewalks, driveway 
improvements, and street lighting), review denied, 
334 Or. 327, 52 P.3d 435 (2002); Art Piculell 
Group v. Clackamas County, 142 Or.App. 327, 
922 P.2d 1227, 1230-31 (1996) (applying Dolan 
to county requirement that landowner dedicate 
and approve public street abutting his subdivi-
sion); Clark v. City of Albany, 137 Or.App. 293, 
904 P.2d 185, 189 (1995) (applying Dolan to 
improvement exactions because the court saw 
"little difference between a requirement that a 
developer convey title to the part of the property 
that is to serve a public purpose, and a require-
ment that the developer himself make improve-
ments on the affected and nearby property and 
make it available for the same purpose"), review 
denied, 322 Or. 644, 912 P.2d 375 (1996); Town 
of Flower Mound v. Stafford Estates, 71 S.W.3d 
18, 33 (Tex.Ct.App.) (applying Dolan to town 
ordinance requiring road improvements because 
the needs of [BAM's] subdivision," 2A Nich-
ols, Eminent Domain § 6.13[3][b], at 6-218, 
because such improvements undoubtedly in-
ure to the convenience and safety of the 
subdivision residents. In any event, absent 
proper preservation at the County Commis-
sion level and a well-developed argument on 
appeal, BAM's objection to the County's in-
kind improvement requirements need be ad-
dressed no further. 
III. Merits of BAM's Takings Challenge 
K 54 Having resolved the threshold issue of 
preservation, this opinion proceeds to the 
merits of BAM's takings challenge. Al-
though BAM has formulated its takings chal-
lenge to include separate claims for relief 
under both state and federal law, the legal 
principles underlying both claims are largely 
the same and this opinion therefore treats 
them concurrently. See, e.g., San Remo Ho-
tel v. City & County of San Francisco, 27 
Cal.4th 643, 117 Cal.Rptr.2d 269, 41 P.3d 87, 
100-101 (2002) (construing federal and state 
takings clauses congruently); Sparks v. 
Douglas County, 127 Wash.2d 901, 904 P.2d 
738, 741 (1995) (same). 
H55 As outlined above, it must now be 
determined whether the two-pronged Nol-
lan/Dolan test is satisfied here. The Coun-
ty, however, argues that the Nollan/Dolan 
improvement exactions "involve conditional gov-
ernmental land use approval and present the 
same opportunities for governmental 'leveraging' 
[as dedicatory exactions]"), review granted, 2002 
Tex. LEXIS 209 (Tex.2002); Benchmark Land v 
City of Battle Ground, 94 Wash.App 537, 972 
P.2d 944, 950 (1999) (holding that "Nollan and 
Dolan apply here where the City requires the 
developer as a condition of approval to incur 
substantial costs improving an adjoining street"), 
affdon other grounds, 146 Wash.2d 685, 49 P.3d 
860 (2002); Burton v. Clark County, 91 Wash 
App. 505, 958 P.2d 343, 348, 357 (1998) (apply-
ing Nollan/Dolan to county requirement that per 
mit applicants make "road dedications and lm 
provements"), review denied, 137 Wash.2d 1015 
978 P.2d 1097 (1999). But see Parking Ass'n o 
Georgia, Inc. v. City of Atlanta, 264 Ga. 764, 45( 
S.E.2d 200, 201-02, 204 (1994) (refusing to ap 
ply Dolan to city parking lot ordinance requinn 
owners to install barrier curbs and landscapin 
improvements even though three dissenting jut 
tices argued that Nollan and Dolan were contro 
ling), cert, denied, 515 U.S. 1116, 115 S.Ct 2262 
132 L.Ed.2d 273 (1995). 
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exactions analysis does not apply to this case. 1 56 In the instant case, it should not 
Specifically, the County argues, and the trial matter whether the County ordinance at is-
court agreed, that the Nollan/Dolan analysis sue here is indeed a "generally applicable" 
applies only to "ad hoc discretionary assess- "uniformly imposed" legislative scheme be-
ment[s] imposed on an individualized basis" cause Nollan/Dolan heightened scrutiny iy 
and not to "a generally-applicable legislative should apply to any forced dedication of real 
scheme, uniformly imposing a regulatory property, regardless of whether the exactions 
standard for road-width dedication by subdi- are imposed on an individualized basis or via 
vision developments."18 a comprehensive legislative scheme.20 This 
18. It should be noted that unrebutted evidence 
introduced at trial casts substantial doubt on this 
characterization in any event. For example, tes-
timony from William A. Marsh, a land-use plan-
ner employed by Salt Lake County for over twen-
ty-eight years, elicited the following information: 
Q. Okay. How does the county determine 
how much that developer then dedicates; 
in other words, what the half width actual-
ly is? 
A. When the subdivision application is pro-
cessed, the recommendation is sent out. 
In the case of 3500 South, where it's a 
state highway, it goes to the county trans-
portation engineer and to UDOT. 
Q. Okay. And who makes that determination 
as to what the half width is? 
A. It would be based on the recommenda-
tions that come back from those agencies. 
Q. Okay. So at any given moment we can't, 
say, look in the book and see what that 
half width determination is? 
A. We have the map that guides us, but until 
we get the final written recommendation 
we don't know for sure. 
Such testimony belies the County's assurances 
that there is no discretion involved in assessing 
its road-width dedication requirements. 
19. There has been some confusion about whether 
Nollan and Dotan imposed a new form of height-
ened scrutiny. In Nollan, the Court stated that 
"our verbal formulations in the takings field have 
generally been quite different" from "those ap-
plied to due process or equal protection claims" 
because "[w]e have required that the regulation 
'substantially advance' the 'legitimate state inter-
est' sought to be achieved, not that 'the State 
"could rationally have decided " that the measure 
adopted might achieve the State's objective.'" 
483 U.S. at 834 n. 3, 107 S.Ct. at 3147 n. 3 
(emphasis in original) (citations omitted). There-
fore, Nollan and Dolan could be interpreted as 
merely clarifying the heightened scrutiny that 
already applied to regulatory takings claims. 
See, e.g., Smith Inv. Co. v. Sandy City, 958 P.2d 
245, 258 n. 18 (Utah Ct.App.I998) C[T]he tak-
ings analysis . . . adds the word 'substantially' 
before 'advance.' Thus, this standard appears to 
be more stringent than the standard against 
which we measured the substantive due process 
validity of the ordinance."). However, the 
Court's subsequent warning about being "partic-
ularly careful about the adjective" of "substan-
tial" when an "actual conveyance of property" is 
at issue, Nollan, 483 U.S. at 841, 107 S.Ct. at 
3150-51, implies that such claims are subject to 
increased scrutiny beyond that applied to gar-
den-variety land-use regulations. As discussed in 
Note 20, courts and commentators have disa-
greed about what type of cases invoke Nollan/Do-
lan scrutiny. Most, however, agree that Nollan 
and Dolan do impose some sort of heightened 
scrutiny. See, e.g., San Remo Hotel v. City & 
County of San Francisco, 27 Cal.4th 643, 117 
Cal.Rptr.2d 269, 41 P.3d 87, 102 (2002) (" Thus 
in Nollan, the rule that [physical occupations aie 
per se takings] is transformed, in the context of a 
development application, into a rule of height-
ened scrutiny to ensure that a required develop-
ment dedication is not a mere pretext to obtain 
or otherwise physically invade property without 
just compensation.' ") (citation omitted). See 
also Lee Anne Fennell, Hard Bargains & Real 
Steals: Land Use Exactions Revisited, 86 Iowa 
L.Rev. 1, 4, 9-12 (2000) (arguing that "wholesale 
application of Dolan to regulatory takings juns-
prudence would abruptly dismantle nearly seven-
ty-five years of zoning law"). 
20. It must be acknowledged that the scope of the 
Nollan/Dolan analysis is unsettled. In other 
words, because both Nollan and Dolan were 
decided in the context of forced dedications of 
real property administered, according to the 
Court, on an individualized, adjudicative basis, it 
is unclear whether one or both of those condi-
tions must exist for Nollan/Dolan heightened 
scrutiny to apply. $ee, e.g., Fennell, Hard Bar-
gains, 86 Iowa L.Rev. at 10-11 (stating that two 
uncertainties exist after Nollan and Dolan (I) 
"whether Dolan's requirement of rough piopoi-
tionality applies when land use 'conditions' ate 
not selectively imposed on individual landown-
ers, but are instead embedded in legislative en-
actments" and (2) whether Nollan and Dolan, 
which "both involved actual concessions of land" 
apply' to "other kinds of concessions (such as 
cash payments or the provision of unrelated 
amenities)"). See also Rogers MacJi. Inc. v 
Washington County, 181 Or.App. 369, 45 P 3d 
966, 976 (2002) ("In the eight years since Dolan 
was decided, no consensus has emerged among 
lower courts on [the above] questions and, so lar, 
the Supreme Court has declined to grant certio-
rari in cases that might have provided further 
guidance."), review denied, 334 Or. 492, 52 P.3d 
1057 (2002), cert, denied, 538 U.S. 906, 123 S.Ct 
1482, 155 L.Ed.2d 225 (2003). See also, eg., San 
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is so for at least two reasons. First, "[i]t is 
not clear why the existence of a taking 
should turn on the type of governmental 
entity responsible for the taking." Parking 
AWn of Georgia, Inc. u. City of Atlanta, 515 
U.S. 1116, 115 S.Ct 2268, 2268-69, 132 
L.Ed.2d 273 (1995) (Thomas, J., joined by 
O'Connor, J., dissenting from denial of cer-
tiorari). For example, "[a] city council can 
take property just as well as a planning 
commission can."2I Id. at 1118, 115 S.Ct at 
2269. See also Amoco Oil Co. v. Village of 
Schaumburg, 277 IU.App.3d 926, 214 Ill.Dec. 
526, 661 N.E.2d 380, 390 (1995) ("[A] munici-
pality should not be able to insulate itself 
from a takings challenge merely by utilizing 
a different bureaucratic vehicle when expro-
priating its citizen's property "), ceit denied, 
519 U.S 976, 117 S.Ct 413, 136 L.Ed.2d 325 
(1996); McClure v City of Springfield, 175 
Or.App. 425, 28 P 3d 1222, 1224 (2001) (not-
ing parties' stipulation that "the city's enact-
ment of dedication requirements as an ordi-
nance did not relieve it of the obligation to 
make particularized findings showing that 
any resulting exactions were roughly propor-
tional to the impact of the proposed develop-
ment"), review denied, 334 Or. 327, 52 P.3d 
435 (2002) 
Remo Hotel, 117 CalRptr2d 269, 41 P 3d at 
102-05 (discussing scope of Nollan/Dolan analy-
sis), Krupp v Breckenndge Sanitation Dist, 19 
P3d 687 695-98 (Colo 2001) (en banc) (same), 
Town of Flower Mound, 71 S W 3d at 31-35 
(same) Inna Rezmk, The Distinction Between 
Legislative & Adjudicative Decisions in Dolan v 
Cuv o\ Tigard, 75 N Y U L Rev 242, 252 (2000) 
(cataloguing the pervasive confusion among low-
ei couits attempting to interpret and apply Do-
lan ) 
21. Noting the conflict among lower courts over 
' whethei Dolan's test foi property regulation 
should be applied in cases where the alleged 
taking occurs thi ough an Act of the legislature," 
Justice Thomas concluded: 
It is haidly surpusing that some courts have 
applied Dolan's rough proportionality test even 
when consideiing a legislative enactment 
ITJhe geneial applicability of the ordinance 
should not be relevant in a takings analysis If 
Atlanta had seized several hundred homes in 
oidei to build a freeway, there would be no 
doubt that Atlanta had taken property The 
distinction between sweeping legislative tak-
ings and paiticulanzcd administrative takings 
appeals to be a distinction without a constitu-
tional diffcience 
H 57 Second, it is not always easy to tell 
the difference between an individualized, ad-
judicative decision and a "uniformly im-
posed" legislative scheme. This ambiguity is 
manifest in Dolan itself, where the majority 
characterized'the city's action as an "adjudi-
cative decision'' without further explanation, 
while Justice Souter, in dissent, pointed out 
that "the permit conditions were imposed 
pursuant to [the city's] Community Develop-
ment Code."22 Dolan v City of Tigcnd, 512 
U.S. 374, 413 n. *, 114 SCt. 2309, 2331 n * 
(1994) (Souter, J , dissenting) Distinguish 
mg between adjudicative and legislative ac-
tion is made even more difficult because "lo-
cal governments are not structured under 
strict separation of powers principles" and 
"the nature of the land use decision-making 
process relies on flexibility and discretion' 
Inna Rezmk, The Distinction Betiveen Legis 
lative & Adjudicative Decisions in Dolan v 
City of Tigard, 75 N.Y.U. L.Rev 242, 257 
(2000)P Notwithstanding these uncertain-
ties, it must be concluded that all forced 
dedications of property are subject to Nol-
lan/Dolan scrutiny. This conclusion is 
premised on the United States Supreme 
Court's well-settled takings jurisprudence 
Parking Ass'n of Georgia, Inc v Cit\ of Atlanta 
515 US 1116, 115 SCt 2268 2268-69 132 
L Ed 2d 273 (1995) (Thomas J joined b> O Con 
nor, J , dissenting from denial of cei tiorai i) 
22. Specifically, the City of Tigard imposed the 
floodplain exaction pursuant to us Mastei Diam 
age Plan, codified in its Community Development 
Code and required by the State of Oregon which 
requited land dedications from all permit apph 
cants seeking to develop land within dnd udj<i 
cent to the 100-year floodplain Dolan 512 
US at 377-79, 1 \A S Ct at 2313-14 Of coin se 
these facts are strikingly similar to the ones be 
fore us, where the County, acting pursuant to its 
Transportation Master Plan, requned dedication* 
from alJ landowners seeking to develop property 
abutting 3500 South Street It seems theielore 
that the County cannot fairly characterize the 
scheme in Dolan as "ad hoc" and discretion 
ary" without so chaiactenzing its own 
23. Ms Rezmk astutely points out that somt exac 
tions "are somewhere in the middle of adjudica 
tive and legislative because the legislative 
[may give] some guidelines [while] the admmis 
trative body retain[s] considerable disci etion as 
well" Rezmk, The Distinction Between Legisla 
tive & Adjudicative Decisions in Dolan v Cit\ oj 
Tigard, 75 N Y U L Rev at 266 
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holding that physical invasions, occupations, 
or mandated conveyances of real property 
are entitled to special treatment. As the 
Court stated in Nollan v. California Coastal 
Commission, 
our cases describe the condition for 
abridgement of property rights through 
the police power as a 'substantial ad-
vancing]' of a legitimate state interest 
We are inclined to be particularly careful 
about the adjective where the actual con-
veyance of property is made a condition to 
the lifting of a land-use restriction, since in 
that context there is heightened risk that 
the purpose is avoidance of the compensa-
tion requirement, rather than the stated 
police-power objective. 
483 U.S. 825, 841, 107 S.Ct. 3141, 3150-51, 97 
L.Ed.2d 677 (1987) (alteration and first em-
phasis in original). The Court has "re-
peatedly held that, as to property reserved 
by its owner for private use, 'the right to 
Commission argued that the easement was 
necessary to advance legitimate state inter-
ests such as "protecting the public's ability to 
see the beach, assisting the public in over-
coming the 'psychological barrier' to using 
the beach created by a developed shorefront, 
and preventing congestion on the public 
beaches." Id. at 835,107 S.Ct. at 3148. The 
Court assumed, without deciding, that the 
above interests were legitimate and agreed 
with the Commission that "a permit condition 
that serves the same legitimate police-power 
purpose as a refusal to issue the permit 
should not be found to be a taking if the 
refusal to issue the permit would not consti-
tute a taking." Id. at 836, 107 S.Ct. at 3148. 
Thus, if the "Commission could have exer-
cised its police power . . . to forbid construc-
tion of the house altogether," it may, in the 
alternative, impose permit conditions—for 
example, height or width restrictions—that 
would further the legitimate state interest of 
exclude (others is] "one of the most essential * Protecting "the public's ability to see the 
beach." Id. sticks in the bundle of rights that are com-
monly characterized as property."'" Id. at 
831, 107 S.Ct at 3145 (alteration in original) 
(citations omitted). Anything less than Nol-
lan/Dolan scrutiny, at least when an actual 
conveyance of property is at issue, falls short 
of adequately protecting these rights. Ac-
cordingly, this opinion now addresses the 
question of whether the County's uncompen-
sated dedication requirement passes muster 
under Nollan. 
A. Nollan and the "Essential Nexus" 
11 58 Under Nollan, "[a court] must first 
determine whether the 'essential nexus' ex-
ists between the 'legitimate state interest' 
and the permit condition exacted by the [gov-
ernmental entity]." Dolan, 512 U.S. at 386, 
114 S.Ct. at 2317 (quoting Nollan, 483 U.S. 
at 836-37, 107 S.Ct. at 3148). In doing so 
here, it is appropriate to review the facts of 
Nollan. 
11 59 The Nollans planned to replace their 
beachfront bungalow with a three-bedroom 
house. When they applied to the California 
Coastal Commission for a development per-
mit, the Nollans were told the permit would 
be denied unless they agreed to a public 
easement across their beachfront lot. The 
160 However, the Court went on to ex-
plain that "[t]he evident constitutional propri-
ety disappears . . . if the condition substitut-
ed for the prohibition utterly fails to further 
the end advanced as the justification for the 
prohibition." Id. at 837, 107 S.Ct. at 3148. 
Such was the case in Nollan. The Court 
found it 
quite impossible to understand how a re-
quirement that people already on the pub-
lic beaches be able to walk across the 
Nollans' property reduces any obstacles to 
viewing the beach x created by the new 
house[,] how it lowers any "psychological 
barrier" to using the public beaches, or 
how it helps to remedy any additional con-
gestion on them caused by construction of 
the Nollans' new house. 
Id, at 838-39, 107 S.Ct. at 3149. Thus, "the 
lack of nexus between the condition and the 
original purpose of the building restriction 
converts that purpose to something other 
than what it was. The purpose then be-
comes, quite simply, the obtaining of an ease-
ment to serve some valid governmental pur-
pose, but without payment of compensation." 
Id. at 837, 107 S.Ct. at 3149. Such a restric-
tion "is not a valid regulation of land use but 
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'an out-and-out plan of extortion/ " Id (cita-
tion omitted). 
1161 Having reviewed the holding and ra-
tionale underlying Nollan, this opinion now 
turns to the facts of the instant case. The 
County devotes the majority of its takings 
analysis to arguing that Nollan and Dolan 
are inapplicable to this case. In so doing, 
the County fails to articulate, in the alterna-
tive, the legitimate state interests in support 
of its dedication requirements, arguing only 
in passing that "[s]uch a uniform scheme is 
fundamental to ensuring that community de-
velopment occurs in accordance with sensible 
long-range transportation planning."24 Fol-
lowing the lead of the Nollan Court, it may 
be assumed that the County's traffic goals 
are a legitimate governmental interest.25 
See Smith Inv. Co, v. Sandy City, 958 P.2d 
245, 255 (Utah CtApp.1998) (" *[I]t is clear 
that the flow of traffic is a legitimate concern 
of a municipal legislative body in its enact-
ment of zoning regulations,' ") (quoting Ken-
neth H. Young, Anderson's American Law of 
Zoning § 3A.04 (4th ed.1996)). Neverthe-
less, the validity of the interest does not, by 
24. The Commission advanced a similar argu-
ment in Nollan, pointing out that it had already 
similarly conditioned 43 out of 60 coastal de-
velopment permits along the same tract of 
land, and that of the 17 not so conditioned, 14 
had been approved when the Commission did 
not have administrative regulations in place 
allowing imposition of the condition, and the 
remaining 3 had not involved shorefront prop-
erty. 
483 U.S. at 829, 107 S.Ct. at 3144. The Com-
mission argued that such a scheme was neces-
sary as "part of a comprehensive program to 
provide continuous public access along [the 
beach] as the lots undergo development or rede-
velopment." /</. at 841, 107 S.Ct. at 3151. The 
Court was unmoved, holding that such a justifi-
cation was "unrelated to land-use regulation" 
and was "simply an expression of the Commis-
sion's belief that the public interest will be served 
by a continuous strip of publicly accessible beach 
along the coast." Id. The Court continued: 
The Commission may well be right that it is a 
good idea, but that does not establish that the 
Nollans (and other coastal residents) alone can 
be compelled to contribute to its realization. 
Rather, California is free to advance its "com-
prehensive program," if it wishes, by using its 
power of eminent domain for this "public pur-
pose. . . . " 
M a t 841-42, 107 S.Ct. at 3151. 
25. To this end, the County argues that "under 
BAM's view of constitutional law, road-width re-
itself, justify imposing the entire cost of real-
izing that goal upon BAM and other land-
owners whose property abuts 3500 South. 
See 8A Nichols, Eminent Domain § 17.01, at 
17-6, 17-7 (2002) (articulating the reasons "it 
makes a great deal of sense for a governmen-
tal agency to attempt to acquire, or at least 
reserve, land for major roads before an area 
develops" but nevertheless noting that "the 
need for reducing the cost of acquiring public 
right-of-way . . . cannot override the consti-
tutional guarantee that an individual's prop-
erty rights be protected"). Rather, the 
County must demonstrate an "essential nex-
us" between that interest and the roadway 
dedication requirements it imposed upon 
BAM. Although the County fails to under-
take this demonstration in its brief, the rec-
ord reveals unrebutted evidence, introduced 
at trial, that construction of the Westridge 
Meadows subdivision, consisting of forty-four 
single-family units, would increase traffic 
flow along 3500 South only "by approximate-
ly three to four percent."26 
K 62 Clearly, there is an "essential nexus" 
between the problem of increased traffic 
quirements for new construction along major 
traffic corridors would vary radically from par-
cel-to-parcel, depending on the size, usage, and 
other impact characteristics of each individual 
parcel." This would only be true if BAM was 
challenging the County's authority to require 
road-width dedications as a condition of develop-
ment. BAM's argument, however, is that while 
the County surely has the authority to require 
such dedications, it does not have the authority 
to require them for free. Contrary to the Coun-
ty's contention, BAM's view would have no effect 
on the uniformity of road width along 3500 
South—it would just mean that the cost of such 
uniformity would be borne by the public/not by 
BAM alone. 
26. This conclusion is based on a study promul-
gated by the Institute of Transportation Engi-
neers, which estimates that the typical residential 
dwelling generates an average of ten car trips 
per day. Thus, Westridge Meadows, consisting 
of forty-four units, would generate approximately 
440 additional trips per day on 3500 South, the 
nearest major street to which Westridge Mead-
ows residents would have vehicular access. Evi-
dence at trial showed that, in 1997, about 13,000 
cars traveled on 3500 South per day. Therefore, 
the 440 additional trips generated by the Wes-
tridge Meadows subdivision would increase the 
1997 estimate by, at most, three or four percent. 
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along 3500 South, insofar as attributable to 
the subdivision, and the solution of property 
dedication so that 3500 South can eventually 
be widened. The County, understandably, 
must project and prepare for the inevitable 
increase in traffic along state highways. 
Should widening of 3500 South become nec-
essary in the future, the County ideally 
would be able to accomplish this without 
having to buy, only to then demolish and 
remove, existing structures. BAM's subdivi-
sion, as acknowledged by both sides at trial, 
will necessarily contribute, albeit a relatively 
small amount, to increased traffic along 3500 
South and the eventual need for a wider 
road. Thus, the County's roadway dedica-
tion requirements are connected to the goal 
of insuring that the County will be able to 
fulfill that need. Having determined that an 
essential nexus exists between a legitimate 
state interest and the required condition of 
approval, this opinion now addresses whether 
the required dedication is sufficiently related 
in both nature and extent to the impact of 
the proposed development. 
B. Dolan and Rough Proportionality 
H 63 Dolan requires this court to deter-
mine whether the exactions demanded by the 
County bear a "rough proportionality" to the 
"projected impact of [BAM's] proposed de-
velopment." 512 U.S. at 388-91, 114 S.Ct. at 
2318-19. In Dolan, the landowner applied 
for a building permit to expand her plumbing 
and electrical supply store. See id at 379, 
27. As support for the adoption of this test, the 
United States Supreme Court cited Call v. City of 
West Jordan, 606 P.2d 217 (Utah 1979) (Call I), 
modified on reh'g, 614 P.2d 1257 (Utah 1980) 
{Call II), the only Utah case of which I am 
aware that addressed the constitutionality of ex-
actions in the form of forced dedications of prop-
erty. In Call 1, our Supreme Court addressed 
the validity of a city ordinance that required 
subdividers to dedicate seven percent of their 
land, or pay the cash equivalent, as a condition 
to development approval. The Court originally 
upheld the ordinance against a takings challenge 
because the dedication, which was to be used for 
" 'Hood control and/or parks and recreation facil-
ities,' " bore a "reasonable relationship to the 
needs created by the subdivision." Id. at 220. 
This was so, the Court held, even though the 
dedication requirements would necessarily bene-
fit the whole community along with the individu-
al subdivision. See id. 
114 S.Ct at 2313. The city responded that, 
in exchange for the permit, the landowner 
would be required to dedicate "the portion of 
her property lying within the 100-year flood-
plain for improvement of a storm drainage 
system . . . and that she dedicate an addi-
tional 15-foot strip of land adjacent to the 
floodplain as a pedestrian/bicycle pathway " 
Id. at 379-50, 114 S.Ct. at 2314. As justifica-
tion for these exactions, the city argued, first, 
that the floodplain dedication was necessary 
to alleviate the "anticipated increased storm 
water flow from the subject property to an 
already strained creek and drainage basin." 
Id. at 382, 114 S.Ct. at 2315. Second, the 
city argued that "creation of a convenient, 
safe pedestrian/bicycle pathway system as an 
alternative means of transportation 'could 
offset some of the traffic demand on [nearby] 
streets and lessen the increase in traffic con-
gestion' " caused, at least in part, by the 
proposed development. Id. at 381-82, 114 
S.Ct at 2314. 
H 64 After determining that the above jus-
tifications satisfied the "essential nexus" 
prong of Nollan, the Court was left with the 
question of 4\vhether these findings are con-
stitutionally sufficient to justify the condi-
tions imposed by the city on petitioner's 
building permit." Id. at 389, 114 S.Ct. at 
2318. After reviewing "representative deci-
sions" by State courts addressing this ques-
tion, the Court adopted the "rough propor-
tionality" test.27 Id. at 389-91, 114 S.Ct. at 
- . After granting the landowner's petition for re-
hearing, however, the Utah Supreme Court held 
that "disposition of this issue as a matter of law 
[is] inappropriate," Call II, 614 P.2d at 1258, 
"without plaintiffs being given the opportunity to 
present evidence to show that the dedication 
required of them had no reasonable relationship 
to the needs for flood control or parks and reci e-
ation facilities created by their subdivision, ll 
any." Id. at 1259. Like the United Suites Su-
preme Court, I think the "reasonable relation-
ship" test is virtually equivalent to the "rough 
proportionality" test, and thub piesents no ibbiie 
of inconsistency between the precedents ol the 
United States and Utah Supreme Courts See 
Dolan, 512 U.S. at 391, 114 S.Ct. at 2319 ("[T]he 
'reasonable relationship' test adopted by a major-
ity of the state courts is closet to the federal 
constitutional norm[,] . . [b]ut we do not adopt 
it as such partly because the term .. seems 
confusingly similar to the term 'rational basis' 
which describes the minimal level of scmtiny 
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2318-19. In other words, "[n]o precise math-
ematical calculation is required, but the city 
must make some sort of individualized deter-
mination that the required dedication is re-
lated both in nature and extent to the impact 
of the proposed development." Id. at 391, 
114 S.Ct. at 2319-20. Under this test, the 
Court determined that the city had failed to 
demonstrate that its permit conditions bore a 
"rough proportionality" to the "projected im-
pact of [the landowner's] proposed develop-
ment" Id at 388-95, 114 S.Ct. at 2318-22. 
1165 Regarding the floodplam dedication, 
the Coui t acknowledged that "[i]t is axiomat-
ic that increasing the amount of impervious 
surface will increase the quantity and rate of 
storm water flow from petitioner's property." 
Id. at 392, 114 S.Ct. at 2320. "Therefore, 
keeping the floodplam open and free from 
development would likely confine the pres-
sures . created by petitioner's develop-
ment." Id at 393, 114 S.Ct. at 2320. The 
city, however, "demanded more—it not only 
wanted petitioner not to build in the flood-
plain, but it also wanted petitioner's property 
. for its greenway system." Id. The city 
failed to explain 44why a public greenway, as 
opposed to a private one, was required in the 
interest of flood control " Id 
H 66 Further, u[w]ith respect to the pedes-
tnan/bicycle pathway," the Court accepted 
undei the Equal Pioiection Clause of the Four-
teenth Amendment") Indeed, the Couit itself 
used the two terms inteichangeably See id at 
391,395, 114 SCt at 2319,232! 
We aie, however, pi evented with a potential 
conflict between state and federal law insofar as 
Call II, decided before Nollan and Dolan, ap-
pears to place the bui den on the party challeng-
ing the dedication to show that it "had no rea 
sonable relationship to the needs created by 
then subdivision' Call II 614 P 2d at 1259, 
while Dolun places this burden on the entity of 
local government See Dolan, 512 U S at 391 n 
8 U4 SCt at 2320 n 8 (While "m evaluating 
most generally applicable zoning regulations, the 
burden pioperly rests on the party challenging 
the legulation," the buiden is on the government 
to 'justify the required dedication" when it 
makes an adjudicative decision to condition 
[anj application foi a building pei mit on an 
individual paicel ' ) It must be noted, however, 
that the landownei in Call II, at the request of 
the city, paid a (te instead of actually conveying 
his pioperty to the city, Cull I, 606 P 2d at 218, 
so the casts aie distinguishable on that basis 
Additionally, in Call v City of West Jordan, 727 
P2d 180 (1986) (Call III), the Court upheld a 
the city's finding that "the larger retail sales 
facility proposed by petitioner [would] in-
crease traffic" in the downtown area by an 
estimated u435 additional trips per clay " Id 
at 395, 114 S.Ct at 2321 The Court also 
acknowledged that "[dedications lor streets, 
sidewalks, and other public ways are genei al-
ly reasonable exactions to avoid excessive 
congestion from a proposed pioperty u^e " 
Id 
1167 Nevertheless, the Couit held that the 
city's conclusory statement that "the cieation 
of the pathway 'could offset some ot the 
traffic demand"' tell far short of "demon 
stratmg that the additional number of vehicle 
and bicycle trips generated by petitioner's 
development reasonably relate to the city's 
requirement for a dedication of the pedestri-
an/bicycle pathway easement" Id at 395, 
114 S.Ct. at 2321-22 (emphasis added) The 
Court concluded that while 
[t]he city's goals of reducing flooding haz 
ards and traffic congestion, and providing 
for public greenways, are laudable 
there are outer limits to how this may be 
done. "A strong public desire to improve 
the public condition [will not] wan ant 
achieving the desire by a shoitei cut than 
the constitutional way of paying for the 
change " 
taal court order which placed the buidcn ot 
producing evidence' regarding the reasonable 
ness of the impact fee ' on the city Id at 182 
In so doing, the Court indicated that Call II 
should be interpreted in light of the Court's sub 
sequent decision in Banberry Development Corp 
v South Jordan City, 631 P 2d 899 (Utah 1981) 
which states: 
Since the information that must be used to 
assuie that subdivision fees are within ttic 
standard of reasonableness is most accessi) e 
to the municipality thai body should dispose 
the basis of its calculations to whoever chal 
lenges the reasonableness of as subdivision ot 
hookup fees Once that is done the buidcn ot 
showing failure to comply with the consutu 
tional standard of reasonableness in this mat 
tei is on the challenges 
Id at 904 See aUo Call III 727 P 2d at 131 
However, where the burdtn ot proof ultimately 
falls should not affect the outcome heie because 
even if the burden properly lests on BAM it has 
presented sufficient evidence that the Count) b 
dedication requnement does not have the lequi 
site relationship—whether couched in terms of 
reasonableness or rough piopoitionahty—to the 
impact of BAM's subdivision 
B.A.M. DEVELOPMENT v. SALT LAKE COUNTY 
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Id. at 396, 114 S.Ct. at 2322 (quoting Pmn- nent Domain § 1.42(2], at 
Utah 733 
sylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393, 
416, 43 S.Ct. 158, 160, 67 L.Ed. 322 (1922)) 
(second alteration in original). 
H 68 The justifications advanced in favor of 
the County's highway dedication require-
ments in this case suffer from the same 
shortcomings as those identified in Dolan. 
As acknowledged earlier in this opinion, the 
County's goal of "ensuring that community 
development occurs in accordance with sensi-
ble long-range transportation planning" qual-
ifies as a legitimate public purpose. Howev-
er, the County has not demonstrated why, in 
the interest of transportation planning, BAM 
must convey the right-of-way to the County 
outright, instead of, for example, implement-
ing a set-back requirement that would pro-
hibit BAM and similarly situated property 
owners from erecting structures that could 
complicate the future widening of 3500 
South. 
M 69 Similarly, the anticipated three to four 
percent increase in traffic congestion caused 
by the subdivision does not, by itself, justify 
the County's dedication requirement, which 
in essence requires BAM to pay for 100 
percent of the cost of the County's long-
range transportation goal of widening 3500 
South, at least as to the portion of 3500 
South that abuts BAM's property. Any ar-
gument the County makes to the contrary is 
fatally hobbled by its repeated assertions 
that "the County highway-dedication require-
ment operates independently of any unique 
characteristics or proposed uses of specific 
parcels to which it applies." While it is clear 
that the County employed such reasoning to 
convince the court that Nollan and Dolan do 
not apply to this case, it still leaves the 
County a ufar cry" from the "individualized 
determination" required by Dolan. Id. at 
391, 114 S.Ct. at 2319. See 1 Nichols, Emi-
28. Although Dolan doeb not require "precipe 
mathematical calculation," it doeb not pieclude a 
mathematical mquuy, and the Court in fact con 
bideted such evidence in Dolan 512 US. at 
391. 395, 114 SCt at 2319, 232t In any event, 
mathematical calculations, while not required, 
aie at least one way to show an exaction is not 
roughly pioportional to the impact of the pro-
posed development. See Art Piculell Croup v. 
Clackamas County, 142 Or.App. 327, 922 P.2d 
1227, 1235 (1996) ("[Dolan] in fact requires 
1-239 (3d ed 
2002) ("[W]here the need for a road is sub-
stantially generated by public traffic de-
mands, rather than by the proposed develop-
ment, eminent domain must be used tathei 
than the police power.").28 CJ Sparks v 
Dvuglas Ccrunty, 127 Wash.2d 901, 904 P2d 
738, 741, 746 (1995) (upholding county dedica-
tion requirements where proposed develop-
ment "would approximately double traffic" 
along adjacent streets). 
H 70 Under Dolan, the County "must make 
some sort of individualized determination 
that the required dedication is related both 
in nature and extent to the impact of the 
proposed development." Dolan, 512 U.S. at 
391, 114 S.Ct. at 2319-20. There appears to 
be no such evidence in the record before us 
While it is agreed that community develop-
ment and transportation planning are worthy 
goals, the County should not be permitted to 
implement these goals in an unconstitutional 
fashion by avoiding the compensation re 
quirement.29 "Rather, [the County] is hee to 
advance its comprehensive program, if it 
wishes, by using its power of eminent domain 
for this public purpose, but if it wants [a 
right-of-way] across [BAM's] propeity, it 
must pay for it." Nollan, 483 U.S. at 842-43, 
107 S.Ct. at 3151 (citations and quotations 
omitted). 
CONCLUSION 
H 71 The County's exaction requiring dedi-
cation of a fifty-three-foot right-of-way along 
3500 South Street constitutes a taking of 
BAM's property under both the Fifth 
Amendment of the United States Constitu 
tion and Article I, Section 22, of the Utah 
Constitution. BAM is entitled to ju&t com-
pensation for its property, and this couit 
should reverse and remand for determination 
some quantification [and thus] such inloimaiion 
although not necebbauly determinative mas be 
consulted ' ) (emphasis* in oiigmal) 
29. It is acknowledged that the County may valid 
ly administer thei>e goals via its dedication oidi 
nance. Nevertheless, the County should not be 
permitted to short circuit the just compensation 
requirement by reading as ordinance to lequire 
landowners to dedicate their propeity foi free 
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of an appropriate award.30 Such award 
should reflect unrebutted evidence that the 
County's dedication requirement caused 
BAM to lose two lots that it could have 
otherwise developed. See, e,g.t City of Mi-
ddle v. Cooke, 2001 UT 56,119, 28 P.3d 697 
(" '[Landowners must be put in as good a 
position money wise as they would have occu-
pied had their property not been taken/ ") 
(quoting State v. Noble, 6 Utah 2d 40, 43, 305 
P.2d 495, 497 (1957)). 
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Barry KELLY, individually and in the 
right of Wapiti Heights, L.L.C., a Utah 
limited liability company, Plaintiff and 
Appellant, 
v. 
HARD MONEY FUNDING, INC., a Utah 
corporation; each assignee of a benefi-
cial interest of a certain trust deed; 
Gary A. Weston, as trustee under a cer-
tain trust deed; M.V.I.; JJ Associates; 
and V.C.I., Defendants and Appellees. 
No. 20020854-CA. 
Court of Appeals of Utah. 
March 4, 2004. 
Background: Member of limited liability 
company brought quiet title and declarato-
ry judgment action, on behalf of company 
and in his individual capacity, against lend-
er who held security interest in properties 
once owned by the company. The Third 
District Court, Salt Lake Department, 
William B. Bohling, J., granted lender's 
30. To the extent BAM has successfully persuaded 
me of the fundamental soundness of its position, 
that success should not be attributed, in any 
degree, to its counsel's unrestrained and unnec-
essary use of the bold, underline, and "all caps" 
functions of word processing or his repeated use 
of exclamation marks to emphasize points in his 
briefs. Nor are the briefs he filed in this case 
unique. Rather, BAM's counsel has regularly 
employed these devices in prior appeals to this 
motion for summary judgment, and denied 
member's motion to amend his complaint. 
Member appealed. 
Holdings: The Court of Appeals, Norman 
H. Jackson, J., held that: 
(1) member did not have standing to bring 
quiet title action against lender on 12 
of company's properties that were 
transferred at foreclosure sale; 
(2) misnomer of grantee in warranty deed 
transferring seven of company's prop-
erties did not invalidate the transfer; 
and 
(3) trial court abused its discretion in de-
nying member's motion to amend his 
complaint to add interference with con-
tractual relations and breach of fiducia-
ry duty claims against lender. 
Affirmed in part, and reversed and remanded 
in part. 
Russell W. Bench, J., concurred in the result. 
1. Appeal and Error <S=>761 
Declaratory Judgment <S^ 392.1 
Argument by member of limited liability 
company in appeal of quiet title and declara-
tory judgment action against lender who had 
security interest in properties once owned by 
company, that purported involvement by 
lender in scheme of other members of com-
pany to defraud company should act as 
grounds to subordinate lender's interest in 
the properties to member's own claims 
against other members, would not be ad-
dressed on appeal, though member alluded to 
argument in his various discussions of the 
alleged involvement of lender in the various 
machinations of other members, where mem 
ber had not specifically argued subordinatioi 
issue in his appellate brief, and did not pro 
court. While I appreciate a zealous advocate a 
much as anyone, such techniques, which real! 
amount to a written form of shouting, are simp) 
inappropriate in an appellate brief. It is cour 
terproductive for counsel to litter his brief wit 
burdensome material such as "WRON( 
WRONG ANALYSIS! WRONG RESUl/ 
WRONG! WRONG! WRONG!" It is also \ 
odds with Rule 24(j) of the Utah Rules of Appt 
late Procedure. 
APPENDIX #2 
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cy may well have influenced the sentence 
that Burger received, I would vacate Burg-
er's death sentence and remand for resen-
tencing. 
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usual and raises special concern.5 At 
js^least, where a State permits the execu-
tion of a minor, great care must be taken 
to ensure that the minor truly deserves to 
be treated as an adult. A specific inquiry 
including "age, actual maturity, family en-
vironment, education, emotional and mental 
stability, and . . . prior record" is particu-
larly relevant when a minor's criminal cul-
pability is at issue. See Fare v. Mic]wel 
C, 442 U.S. 707, 734, n. 4, 99 S.Ct. 2560, 
2576, n. 4, 61 L.Ed.2d 197 (1979) (POWELL, 
J., dissenting). No such inquiry occurred 
in this case. In every realistic sense Burg-
er not only was a minor according to law, 
but clearly his mental capacity was subnor-
mal to the point where a jury reasonably 
could have believed that death was not an 
appropriate punishment. Because there is 
a reasonable probability that the evidence 
not presented to the sentencing jury in this 
case would have affected its outcome, 
Burger has demonstrated prejudice due to 
counsel's deficient performance. 
483 U.S. 825, 97 L.Ed.2d 677 
|825James Patrick NOLLAN, et 
ux., Appellant 
v. 
CALIFORNIA COASTAL 
COMMISSION. 
No. 86-133. 
Argued March 30, 1987. 
Decided June 26, 1987. 
Ill 
As I conclude that counsel's performance 
in this case was deficient, and the deficien-
charges of ineffective assistance of counsel is 
likely to have a significant "chilling effect" on 
the willingness of experienced lawyers to under-
take the defense of capital cases. See ante, at 
3118, n. 2. In this case, however, I conclude 
that the facts and circumstances that no one 
now disputes clearly show that counsel made a 
serious mistake of judgment in failing fully to 
develop and introduce mitigating evidence that 
the Court concedes was "relevant" and that the 
jury would have been compelled "to consider." 
See ante, at 3123, n. 7. 
5. We noted in Eddings v. Oklahoma that 
"[e]very State in the country makes some sepa-
rate provision for juvenile offenders." 455 U.S., 
at 116, n. 12, 102 S.Ct. 877, n. 12 (citing In re 
Gault, 387 U.S. 1, 14, 87 S.Ct. 1428, 1436, 18 
L.Ed.2d 527 (1967)). Of the 37 States that have 
enacted capital-punishment statutes since this 
Court's decision in Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 
238, 92 S.Ct. 2726, 33 L.Ed.2d 346 (1972), 11 
prohibit the execution of persons under 18 at 
the time of the offense. Three States impose a 
prohibition at age 17, and Nevada sets its limit 
Property owners brought action 
against California Coastal Commission 
seeking writ of mandate. The Commission 
had imposed as a condition to approval of 
at age 16. Streib, The Eighth Amendment and 
Capital Punishment of Juveniles, 34 Cleveland 
State L.Rev. 363, 368-369, and nn. 33-36 (1986). 
Of the States permitting imposition of the death 
penalty on juveniles, over half of them explicitly 
denominate youth as a mitigating factor. The 
American Law Institute's Model Penal Code cap-
ital-punishment statute states an exclusion for 
defendants "under 18 years of age at the time of 
the commission of the crime." § 210.6(l)(d) 
(1980). The Institute reasons "that civilized so-
cieties will not tolerate the spectacle of execu-
tion of children, and this opinion is confirmed 
by the American experience in 'punishing youth-
ful offenders." Id, Comment, p. 133. In 1983, 
the American Bar Association adopted a resolu-
tion stating that the organization "oppo[ses], in 
principle, the imposition of capital punishment 
on any person for an offense committed while 
that person was under the age of 18." See ABA 
Opposes Capital Punishment for Persons under 
18, 69 A.B.A.J. 1925 (1983). 
International opinion on the issue is reflected 
in Article 6 of the International Covenant on 
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rebuilding permit requirement that owners 
provide lateral access to public to pass and 
repass across property. The Superior 
Court, Ventura County, William L. Peck, J., 
granted peremptory writ of mandate, and 
the Commission appealed. The California 
Court of Appeal, Abbe, J., 177 Cal.App.3d 
719, 223 Cal.Rptr. 28, reversed and remand-
ed with directions. Appeal was taken. 
The Supreme Court, Justice Scalia, helc^ 
that Commission could not, without paying 
compensation, condition grant of permis-
sion to rebuild house on property owners' 
transfer to public of easement across 
beachfront property. 
Reversed. 
Justice Brennan filed a dissenting opin-
ion in which Marshall joined. 
Justice Blackmun filed a dissenting 
opinion. 
Justice Stevens filed a dissenting opin-
ion in which Justice Blackmun joined. 
1. Eminent Domain <3=*2(1.2) 
Although outright taking of uncom-
pensated, permanent, public-access ease-
ment violates Fifth Amendment taking 
clause, conditioning property owners' re-
building permit on granting of easement 
can be allowed for land use regulation if 
condition substantially furthers govern-
mental purposes that justify denial of per-
mit. U.S.C.A. ConstAmend. 5. 
2. Eminent Domain <s=>2(10) 
California Coastal Commission could 
not, without paying compensation, condi-
Civil and Political Rights and the American Con-
vention on Human Rights. See United Nations, 
Human Rights, A Compilation of International 
Instruments 9 (1983). See also Weissbrodt, 
United States Ratification of the Human Rights 
Covenants, 63 Minn.L.Rev. 35, 40 (1978). Both 
prohibit the execution of individuals under the 
age of 18 at the time of their crime. The United 
States is not a party to either of these treaties, 
but at least 73 other nations have signed or 
ratified the International Covenant. See Weiss-
brodt, supra. All European countries forbid 
tion grant of permission to rebuild house 
on property owners' transfer to public of 
easement across beachfront property. U.S. 
C.A. ConstAmend. 5. 
Syllabus * 
The California Coastal Commission 
granted a permit to appellants to replace a 
small bungalow on their beachfront lot 
with a larger house upon the condition that 
they allow the public an easement to pass 
across their beach, which was located be-
tween two public beaches. The County 
Superior Court granted appellants a writ of 
administrative mandamus and directed that 
the permit condition be struck. However, 
the State Court of Appeal reversed, ruling 
that imposition of the condition did not 
violate the Takings Clause of the Fifth 
Amendment, as incorporated against the 
States by the Fourteenth Amendment. 
Held: 
1. Although the outright taking of an 
uncompensated, permanent, public-access 
easement would violate the Takings 
Clause, conditioning appellants' rebuilding 
permit on their granting such an easement 
would be lawful land-use regulation if it 
substantially furthered governmental pur-
poses that would justify denial of the per-
mit. The government's power to forbid 
particular land uses in order to advance 
some legitimate police-power purpose in-
cludes the power to condition such use 
upon some concession by the owner, even a 
concession of property rights, so long as 
the condition furthers the same govern-
imposition of the death penalty on those under 
18 at the time of their offense. Streib, supra, at 
389 (citing Amnesty International, The Death 
Penalty (1979)). 
The syllabus constitutes no part of the opinion 
of the Court but has been prepared by the Re-
porter of Decisions for the convenience of the 
reader. See United States v. Detroit Lumber Co., 
200 U.S. 321, 337, 26 S.Ct. 282, 287, 50 L.Ed. 
499. 
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mental purpose advanced as justification ^Jus t ice SCALIA delivered the 
for prohibiting the use. Pp. 3145-3148. opinion of the Court. 
2. Here the Commission's imposition 
of the access-easement condition cannot be 
treated as an exercise of land-use regula-
tion power since the condition does not 
serve public purposes related to the permit 
requirement. Of those put forth to justify 
it—protecting the public's ability to see the 
beach, assisting the public in overcoming a 
perceived "psychological" barrier to using 
the beach, and preventing beach conges-
tion—none is plausible. Moreover, the 
Commission's justification for the access 
requirement unrelated to land-use regula-
tion—that it is part of a comprehensive 
program to provide beach access arising 
from prior coastal permit decisions—is sim-
ply an expression of the belief that the 
public interest will be served by a continu-
ous strip of publicly accessible beach. Al-
though the State is free to advance its 
"comprehensive program" by exercising its 
eminent domain power and paying for ac-
cess easements, it 1826cannot compel coastal 
residents alone to contribute to the realiza-
tion of that goal. Pp. 3148-3150. 
177 Cal.App.3d 719, 223 Cal.Rptr. 28 
(1986), reversed. 
SCALIA, J., delivered the opinion of 
the Court, in which REHNQUIST, C.J., and 
WHITE, POWELL, and O'CONNOR, JJ., 
joined. BRENNAN, J., filed a dissenting 
opinion, in which MARSHALL, J., joined, 
post, p. 3151. BLACKMUN, J., filed a dis-
senting opinion, post, p. 3163. STEVENS, 
J., filed a dissenting opinion, in which 
BLACKMUN, J., joined, post, p. 3163. 
Robert K. Best, Sacramento, Cal., for 
appellants. 
Andrea Sheridan Ordin, Los Angeles, 
Cal., for appellee. 
i James and Marilyn Nollan appeal from a 
3 decision of the California Court of Appeal 
 ruling that the California Coastal Commis-
sion could condition its grant of permission 
to rebuild their house on their transfer to 
j the public of an easement across their 
3 beachfront property. 177 Cal.App.3d 719, 
i 223 Cal.Rptr. 28 (1986). The California 
r court rejected their claim that imposition of 
that condition violates the Takings Clause 
> of the Fifth Amendment, as incorporated 
5 against the States by the Fourteenth 
. Amendment. Ibid. We noted probable 
jurisdiction. 479 U.S. 913, 107 S.Ct. 312, 93 
r L.Ed.2d 286 (1986). 
I 
The Nollans own a beachfront lot in Ven-
tura County, California. A quarter-mile 
north of their property is Faria County 
Park, an oceanside public park with a pub-
lic beach and recreation area. Another 
public beach area, known locally as "the 
Cove/' lies 1,800 feet south of their lot. A 
concrete seawall approximately eight feet 
high separates the beach portion of the 
Nollans7 property from the rest of the lot 
The historic mean high tide line determines 
the lot's oceanside boundary. 
The Nollans originally leased their prop-
erty with an option to buy. The building 
on the lot was a small bungalow, totaling 
504 square feet, which for a time they 
rented to summer vacationers. After 
years of rental use, however, the building 
had fallen into disrepair, and could no long-
er be rented out. 
1828The Nollans' option to purchase was 
conditioned on their promise to demolish 
the bungalow and replace it. In order to 
do so, under Cal.Pub.Res. Code Ann. 
§§ 30106, 30212, and 30600 (West 1986), 
they were required to obtain a coastal de-
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velopment permit from the California 
Coastal Commission. On February 25, 
1982, they submitted a permit application 
to the Commission in which they proposed 
to demolish the existing structure and re-
place it with a three-bedroom house in 
keeping with the rest of the neighborhood. 
The Nollans were informed that their 
application had been placed on the adminis-
trative calendar, and that the Commission-
staff had recommended that the permit be 
granted subject to the condition that they 
allow the public an easement to pass across 
a portion of their property bounded by the 
mean high tide line on one side, and their 
seawall on the other side. This would 
make it easier for the public to get to Faria 
County Park and the Cove. The Nollans 
protested imposition of the condition, but 
the Commission overruled their objections 
and granted the permit subject to their 
recordation of a deed restriction granting 
the easement. App. 31, 34. 
On June 3, 1982, the Nollans filed a 
petition for writ of administrative manda-
mus asking the Ventura County Superior 
Court to invalidate the access condition. 
They argued that the condition could not be 
imposed absent evidence that their pro-
posed development would have a direct ad-
verse impact on public access to the beach. 
The court agreed, and remanded the case 
to the Commission for a full evidentiary 
hearing on that issue. Id., at 36. 
On remand, the Commission held a public 
hearing, after which it made further factu-
al findings and reaffirmed its imposition of 
the condition. It found that the new house 
would increase blockage of the view of the 
ocean, thus contributing to the develop-
ment of "a 'wall' of residential structures7' 
that would prevent the public "psychologi-
cally . . . from realizing a stretch of coast-
line exists nearby that they have every 
right 1829to visit." Id., at 58. The new 
house would also increase private use of 
the shorefront. Id., at 59. These effects 
of construction of the house, along with 
other area development, would cumulative-
ly "burden the public's ability to traverse 
to and along the shorefront." Id., at 65-
66. Therefore the Commission could prop-
erly require the Nollans to offset that bur-
den by providing additional lateral access 
to the public beaches in the form of an 
easement across their property. The Com-
mission also noted that it had similarly 
conditioned 43 out of 60 coastal develop-
^ment permits along the same tract of land, 
ancl that of the 17 not so conditioned, 14 
had been approved when the Commission 
did not have administrative regulations in 
place allowing imposition of the condition, 
and the remaining 3 had not involved shore-
front property. Id., at 47-48. 
The Nollans filed a supplemental petition 
for a writ of administrative mandamus 
with the Superior Court, in which they ar-
gued that imposition of the access condition 
violated the Takings Clause of the Fifth 
Amendment, as incorporated against the 
States by the Fourteenth Amendment. 
The Superior Court ruled in their favor on 
statutory grounds, finding, in part to avoid 
"issues of constitutionality," that the Cali-
fornia Coastal Act of 1976, Cal.Pub.Res. 
Code Ann. § 30000 et seq. (West 1986), 
authorized the Commission to impose pub-
lic access conditions on coastal develop-
ment permits for the replacement of an 
existing single-family home with a new one 
only where the proposed development 
would have an adverse impact on public 
access to the sea. App. 419. In the court's 
view, the administrative record did not pro-
vide an adequate factual basis for conclud-
ing that replacement of the bungalow with 
the house would create a direct or cumula-
tive burden on public access to the sea. 
Id., at 416-417. Accordingly, the Superior 
Court granted the writ of mandamus and 
directed that the permit condition be 
struck. 
The Commission appealed to the Califor-
nia Court of Appeal. While that appeal 
was pending, the Nollans satisfied 183othe 
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condition on their option to purchase by 
tearing down the bungalow and building 
the new house, and bought the property. 
They did not notify the Commission that 
they were taking that action. 
The Court of Appeal reversed the Superi-
or Court. 177 Cal.App.3d 719, 223 Cal. 
Rptr. 28 (1986). It disagreed with the Su-
perior Court's interpretation of the Coastal 
Act, finding that it required that a coastal 
permit for the construction of a new house > 
whose floor area, height or bulk was more 
than 10% larger than that of the house it 
was replacing be conditioned on a grant of 
access. Id., at 723-724, 223 Cal.Rptr., at 
31; see Cal.Pub.Res.Code Ann. § 30212. It 
also ruled that the requirement did not 
violate the Constitution under the reason-
ing of an earlier case of the Court of Ap-
peal, Grupe v. California Coastal 
Comm'n, 166 Cal.App.3d 148, 212 Cal.Rptr. 
578 (1985). In that case, the court had 
found that so long as a project contributed 
to the need for public access, even if the 
project standing alone had not created the 
need for access, and even if there was only 
an indirect relationship between the access 
exacted and the need to which the project 
contributed, imposition of an access condi-
tion on a development permit was suffi-
ciently related to burdens created by the 
project to be constitutional. 177 Cal. 
App.3d, at 723, 223 Cal.Rptr., at 30-31; see 
Grupe, supra, 166 Cal.App.3d, at 165-168, 
212 Cal.Rptr., at 587-590; see also Rem-
menga v. California Coastal Comm'n, 
163 Cal.App.3d 623, 628, 209 Cal.Rptr. 628, 
631, appeal dism'd, 474 U.S. 915, 106 S.Ct. 
241, 88 L.Ed.2d 250 (1985). The Court of 
Appeal ruled that the record established 
that that was the situation with respect to 
the Nollans' house. 177 Cal.App.3d, at 
722-723, 223 Cal.Rptr., at 30-31. It ruled 
that the Nollans' taking claim also failed 
because, although the condition diminished 
the value of the Nollans' lot, it did not 
deprive them of all reasonable use of their 
property. Id., at 723, 223 Cal.Rptr., at 30; 
see Grupe, supra, 166 Cal.App.3d, at 175-
176, 212 Cal.Rptr., at 595-596. Since, in 
the Court of Appeal's view, there was no 
statutory or constitutional obstacle to impo-
sjtion83i of the access condition, the Superi-
or Court erred in granting the writ of man-
damus. The Nollans appealed to this 
Court, raising only the constitutional ques-
tion. 
II 
[1] Had California simply required the 
Nollans to make an easement across their 
beachfront available to the public on a per-
manent basis in order to increase public 
access to the beach, rather than condition-
ing their permit to rebuild their house on 
their agreeing to do so, we have no doubt 
there would have been a taking. To say 
that the appropriation of a public easement 
across a landowner's premises does not 
constitute the taking of a property interest 
but rather (as Justice BRENNAN con-
tends) "a mere restriction on its use," post, 
at 3155, n. 3, is to use words in a manner 
that deprives them of all their ordinary 
meaning. Indeed, one of the principal uses 
of the eminent domain power is to assure 
that the government be able to require 
conveyance of just such interests, so long 
as it pays for them. J. Sackman, 1 Nichols 
on Eminent Domain § 2.1[1] (Rev. 3d ed. 
1985), 2 id., § 5.01[5]; see 1 id., § 1.42[9], 2 
id., § 6.14. Perhaps because the point is so 
obvious, we have never been confronted 
with a controversy that required us to rule 
upon it, but our cases' analysis of the ef-
fect of other governmental action leads to 
the same conclusion. We have repeatedly 
held that, as to property reserved by its 
owner for private use, "the right to exclude 
[others is] 'one of the most essential sticks 
in the bundle of rights that are commonly 
characterized as property.'" Loretto v. 
Teleprompter Manhattan CATV Corp., 
458 U.S. 419, 433, 102 S.Ct. 3164, 3175, 73 
L.Ed.2d 868 (1982), quoting Kaiser Aetna 
v. United States, 444 U.S. 164, 176, 100 
S.Ct. 383, 391, 62 L.Ed.2d 332 (1979). In 
3146 107 SUPREME COURT REPORTER 483 U.S. 831 
Loretto we observed that where govern-
mental action results in "[a] permanent 
physical occupation" of the property, by 
the government itself or by others, see 458 
U.S., at 432-433, n. 9, 102 S.Ct, at 3174-
3175, n. 9, "our cases uniformly have found 
a taking to the extent of the occupation, 
without regard to whether the action 
achieves an important public ^benef i t or 
has only minimal economic impact on the 
owner," id., at 434-435, 102 S.Ct, at 31*5-
3176. We think a "permanent physical oc-
cupation" has occurred, for purposes of 
that rule, where individuals are given a 
permanent and continuous right to pass to 
and fro, so that the real property may 
continuously be traversed, even though no 
particular individual is permitted to station 
himself permanently upon the premises.1 
Justice BRENNAN argues that while 
this might ordinarily be the case, the Cali-
fornia Constitution's prohibition on any in-
dividual's "excluding] the right of way to 
[any navigable] water whenever it is re-
quired for any public purpose," Art. X, § 4, 
produces a different result here. Post, at 
3154; see also post, at 3158,3159. There are 
a number of difficulties with that argument. 
Most obviously, the right of way sought here 
is not naturally described as one to navigable 
water (from the street to the sea) but along 
it; it is at least highly questionable whether 
the text of the California Constitution has 
any prima facie application to the situation 
before us. Even if it does, however, several 
California cases suggest that Justice BREN-
NAN's interpretation of the effect of the 
clause is erroneous, and that to obtain 
easements of access across private proper-
ty the State must proceed through its emi-
nent domain power. See Bolsa Land Co, 
v. Burdick, 151 Cal. 254, 260, 90 P. 532, 
534-535 (1907); Oakland v. Oakland Wa-
1. The holding of Prune Yard Shopping Center v. 
Robins, 447 U.S. 74, 100 S.Ct. 2035, 64 L.Ed.2d 
741 (1980), is not inconsistent with this analysis, 
since there the owner had already opened his 
property to the general public, and in addition 
permanent access was not required. The analy-
sis of Kaiser Aetna v. United States, 444 U.S. 164, 
ter Front Co., 118 Cal. 160, 185, 50 P. 277, 
286 (1897); Heist v. County of Colusa, 163 
Cal.App.3d 841, 851, 213 Cal.Rptr. 278, 285 
(1984); Aptos Seascape Corp. v. Santa 
v Cruz, 138 Cal.App.3d 484, 505-506, 188 
Cal.Rptr. 191, 204-205 (1982). (None of 
these cases specifically adplressed833 the ar-
gument that Art. X, § 4 allowed the public 
to cross private property to get to naviga-
ble water, but if that provision meant what 
Justice BRENNAN believes, it is hard to 
^see why it was not invoked.) See also 41 
Op.Cal.Atty.Gen. 39, 41 (1963) ("In spite of 
the sweeping provisions of [Art. X, § 4], 
and the injunction therein to the Legisla-
ture to give its provisions the most liberal 
interpretation, the' few reported cases in 
California have adopted the general rule 
that one may not trespass on private land 
to get to navigable tidewaters for the pur-
pose of commerce, navigation or fishing"). 
In light of these uncertainties, and given 
the fact that, as Justice BLACKMUN 
notes, the Court of Appeal did not rest its 
decision on Art. X, § 4, post, at 3163, we 
should assuredly not take it upon ourselves 
to resolve this question of California consti-
tutional law in the first instance. See, e.g., 
Jenkins v. Anderson, 447 U.S. 231, 234, n. 
1, 100 S.Ct. 2124, 2127, n. 1, 65 L.Ed.2d 86 
(1980). That would be doubly inappropri-
ate since the Commission did not advance 
this argument in the Court of Appeal, and 
the Nollans argued in the Superior Court 
that any claim that there was a pre-existing 
public right of access had to be asserted 
through a quiet title action, see Points and 
Authorities in Support of Motion for Writ 
of Administrative Mandamus, No. SP50805 
(Super.Ct.Cal.), p. 20, which the Commis-
sion, possessing no claim to the easement 
itself, probably would not have had stand-
ing under California law to bring. See 
100 S.Ct. 383, 62 L.Ed.2d 332 (1979), is not 
inconsistent because it was affected by tradi-
tional doctrines regarding navigational servi-
tudes. Of course neither of those cases in-
volved, as this one does, a classic right-of-way 
easement. 
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|834Given, then, that requiring uncompen-
sated conveyance of the easement outright 
would violate the Fourteenth Amendment, 
the question becomes whether requiring it 
to be conveyed as a condition for issuing a 
land-use permit alters the outcome. We 
have long recognized that land-use regula-
tion does not effect a taking if it "substan-
tially advance[s] legitimate state interests" 
and does not "den[y] an owner economical-N 
ly viable use of his land," Agins v. Tibu-
ron, 447 U.S. 255, 260, 100 S.Ct. 2138, 2141, 
65 L.Ed.2d 106 (1980). See also Penn Cen-
tral Transportation Co, v. New York 
City, 438 U.S. 104, 127, 98 S.Ct. 2646, 2660, 
57 L.Ed.2d 631 (1978) ("[A] use restriction 
2. Justice BRENNAN also suggests that the Com-
mission's public announcement of its intention 
to condition the rebuilding of houses on the 
transfer of easements of access caused the Nol-
lans to have "no reasonable claim to any expec-
tation of being able to exclude members of the 
public" from walking across their beach. Post, 
at 3159-3161. He cites our opinion in Ruckel-
shaus v. Monsanto Co., 467 U.S. 986, 104 S.Ct. 
2862, 81 L.Ed.2d 815 (1984), as support for the 
peculiar proposition that a unilateral claim of 
entitlement by the government can alter proper-
ty rights. In Monsanto, however, we found 
merely that the Takings Clause was not violated 
by giving effect to the Government's announce-
ment that application for "the right to [the] valu-
able Government benefit" id., at 1007, 104 S.Ct., 
at 2875 (emphasis added), of obtaining registra-
tion of an insecticide would confer upon the 
Government a license to use and disclose the 
trade secrets contained in the application. Id., 
at 1007-1008, 104 S.Ct., at 2875-2876. See also 
Bowen v. Gilliard, 483 U.S. 587, 605, 107 S.Ct. 
3008, 3019, 97 L.Ed.2d 485 (1987). But the right 
to build on one's own property—even though its 
exercise can be subjected to legitimate permit-
ting requirements—cannot remotely be de-
scribed as a "governmental benefit." And thus 
the announcement that the application for (or 
granting of) the permit will entail the yielding 
of a property interest cannot be regarded as 
establishing the voluntary "exchange," 467 U.S., 
at 1007, 104 S.Ct., at 2875, that we found to have 
occurred in Monsanto. Nor are the Nollans' 
rights altered because they acquired the land 
well after the Commission had begun to imple-
ment its policy. So long as the Commission 
could not have deprived the prior owners of the 
easement without compensating them, the prior 
owners must be understood to have transferred 
their full property rights in conveying the lot. 
may constitute a 'taking' if not reasonably 
necessary to the effectuation of a substan-
tial government purpose"). Our cases 
have not elaborated on the standards for 
determining what constitutes^ "legitimate 
state interest" or what type of connection 
between the regulation and the state inter-
est satisfies the requirement that the for-
mer "substantially advance" the latter.3 
They have made clear, however, that a 
1835broad range of governmental purposes 
v
 and regulations satisfies these require-
ments. See Agins v. Tiburon, supra, 447 
U.S., at 260-262, 100 S.Ct., at 2141-2142 
(scenic zoning); Penn Central Transpor-
tation Co. v. New York City, supra (land-
mark preservation); Euclid v. Ambler Re-
alty Co., 272 U.S. 365, 47 S.Ct. 114, 71 
3. Contrary to Justice BRENNAN's claim, post, at 
3150, our opinions do not establish that these 
standards are the same as those applied to due 
process or equal protection claims. To the con-
trary, our verbal formulations in the takings 
field have generally been quite different. We 
have required that the regulation "substantially 
advance" the "legitimate state interest" sought to 
be achieved, Agins v. Tiburon, 447 U.S. 255, 260, 
100 S.Ct. 2138, 2141, 65 L.Ed.2d 106 (1980), not 
that "the State 'could rationally have decided' 
that the measure adopted might achieve the 
State's objective." Post, at 3152, quoting Minne-
sota v. Clover Leaf Creamery Co., 449 U.S. 456, 
466, 101 S.Ct. 715, 725, 66 L.Ed.2d 659 (1981). 
Justice BRENNAN relies principally on an equal 
protection case, Minnesota v. Clover Leaf 
Creamery Co., supra, and two substantive due 
process cases, Williamson v. Lee Optical of Okla-
homa, Inc., 348 U.S. 483, 487-488, 75 S.Ct. 461, 
464-465, 99 L.Ed. 563 (1955), and Day-Brite 
Lighting, Inc. v. Missouri, 342 U.S. 421, 423, 72 
S.Ct. 405, 407, 96 L.Ed. 469 (1952), in support of 
the standards he would adopt. But there is no 
reason to believe (and the language of our cases 
gives some reason to disbelieve) that so long as 
the regulation of property is at issue the stan-
dards for takings challenges, due process chal-
lenges, and equal protection challenges are 
identical; any more than there is any reason to 
believe that so long as the regulation of speech 
is at issue the standards for due process chal-
lenges, equal protection challenges, and First 
Amendment challenges are identical. Goldblatt 
v. Hempstead, 369 U.S. 590, 82 S.Ct, 987, 8 
L.Ed.2d 130 (1962), does appear to assume that 
the inquiries are the same, but that assumption 
is inconsistent with the formulations of our 
later cases. 
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L.Ed. 303 (1926) (residential zoning); Laitos 
& Westfall, Government Interference with 
Private Interests in Public Resources, 11 
Harv.Envtl.L.Rev. 1, 66 (1987). The Com-
mission argues that among these permissi-
ble purposes are protecting the public's 
ability to see the beach, assisting the public 
in overcoming the "psychological barrier" 
to using the beach created by a developed 
shorefront, and preventing congestion on 
the public beaches. We assume, withouV 
deciding, that this is so—in which case the 
Commission unquestionably would be able 
to deny the Nollans their permit outright if 
their new house (alone, or by reason of the 
cumulative impact produced in conjunction 
with other construction)4 would substan-
tially impede these puiposes,836 unless the 
denial would interfere so drastically with 
the Nollans' use of their property as to 
constitute a taking. See Penn Central 
Transportation Co. v. New York City, su-
pra. 
The Commission argues that a permit 
condition that serves the same legitimate 
police-power purpose as a refusal to issue 
the permit should not be found to be a 
taking if the refusal to issue the permit 
would not constitute a taking. We agree. 
Thus, if the Commission attached to the 
permit some condition that would have pro-
tected the public's ability to see the beach 
notwithstanding construction of the new 
house—for example, a height limitation, a 
width restriction, or a ban on fences—so 
long as the Commission could have exer-
cised its police power (as we have assumed 
it could) to forbid construction of the house 
altogether, imposition of the condition 
would also be constitutional. Moreover 
(and here we come closer to the facts of the 
present case), the condition would be con-
4. If the Nollans were being singled out to bear 
the burden of California's attempt to remedy 
these problems, although they had not contrib-
uted to it more than other coastal landowners, 
the State's action, even if otherwise valid, might 
violate either the incorporated Takings Clause 
or the Equal Protection Clause. One of the 
principal purposes of the Takings Clause is "to 
bar Government from forcing some people 
alone to bear public burdens which, in all fair-
stitutional even if it consisted of the re-
quirement that the Nollans provide a view-
ing spot on their property for passersby 
with whose sighting of the ocean their new 
house would interfere. Although such a 
requirement, constituting a permanent 
grant of continuous access to the property, 
would have to be considered a taking if it 
were not attached to a development permit, 
the Commission's assumed power to forbid 
-construction of the house in order to pro-
tect- the public's view of the beach must 
surely include the power to condition con-
struction upon some concession by the own-
er, even a concession of property rights, 
that serves the same end. If a prohibition 
designed to accomplish that purpose would 
be a legitimate exercise of the police power 
rather than a taking, it would be strange to 
conclude that providing the |837owner an 
alternative to that prohibition which accom-
plishes the same purpose is not. 
The evident constitutional propriety dis-
appears, however, if the condition substi-
tuted for the prohibition utterly fails to 
further the end advanced as the justifica-
tion for the prohibition. When that essen-
tial nexus is eliminated, the situation be-
comes the same as if California law for-
bade shouting fire in a crowded theater, 
but granted dispensations to those willing 
to contribute $100 to the state treasury. 
While a ban on shouting fire can be a core 
exercise of the State's police power to pro-
tect the public safety, and can thus meet 
even our stringent standards for regulation 
of speech, adding the unrelated condition 
alters the purpose to one which, while it 
may be legitimate, is inadequate to sustain 
the ban. Therefore, even though, in a 
sense, requiring a $100 tax contribution in 
ness and justice, should be borne by the public 
as a whole." Armstrong v. United States, 364 
U.S. 40, 49, 80 S.Ct. 1563, 1569, 4 L.Ed.2d 1554 
(1960); see also San Diego Gas & Electric Co. v. 
San Diego, 450 U.S. 621, 656, 101 S.Ct. 1287, 
1306, 67 L.Ed.2d 551 (1981) (BRENNAN, J., 
dissenting); Penn Central Transportation Co. v. 
New York City, 438 U.S. 104, 123, 98 S.Ct. 2646, 
2658, 57 L.Ed.2d 631 (1978). But that is not the 
basis of the Nollans' challenge here. 
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order to shout fire is a lesser restriction on 
speech than an outright ban, it would not 
pass constitutional muster. Similarly here, 
the lack of nexus between the condition 
and the original purpose of the building 
restriction converts that purpose to some-
thing other than what it was. The purpose 
then becomes, quite simply, the obtaining 
of an easement to serve some valid govern-
mental purpose, but without payment of 
compensation. Whatever may be^the outer 
limits of "legitimate state interests" in^he 
takings and land-use context, this is not 
one of them. In short, unless the permit 
condition serves the same governmental 
purpose as the development ban, the build-
ing restriction is not a valid regulation of 
land use but "an out-and-out plan of extor-
tion." J.E.D. Associates, Inc. v. Atkinson, 
121 N.H. 581, 584, 432 A.2d 12, 14-15 
(1981); see Brief for United States as Ami-
cus Curiae 22, and n. 20. See also Loretto 
v. Teleprompter Manhattan CATV Corp., 
458 U.S., at 439, n. 17, 102 S.Ct, at 3178, n. 
17.5 
J838IH 
The Commission claims that it concedes 
as much, and that we may sustain the 
condition at issue here by finding that it is 
reasonably related to the public need or 
burden that the Nollans' new house creates 
or to which it,contributes. We can accept, 
for purposes of discussion, the Commis-
sion's proposed test as to how close a "fit" 
between the condition and the burden is 
required, because we find that this case 
does not meet even the most untailored 
5. One would expect that a regime in which this 
kind of leveraging of the police power is al-
lowed would produce stringent land-use regula-
tion which the State then waives to accomplish 
other purposes, leading to lesser realization of 
the land-use goals purportedly sought to be 
served than would result from more lenient (but 
nontradeable) development restrictions. Thus, 
the importance of the purpose underlying the 
prohibition not only does not justify the imposi-
tion of unrelated conditions for eliminating the 
prohibition, but positively militates against the 
practice. 
6. As Justice BRENNAN notes, the Commission 
also argued that the construction of the new 
standards. The Commission's principal 
contention to the contrary essentially turns 
on a play on the word "access." The Nol-
lans' new house, the Commission found, 
will interfere with "visual access" to the 
beach. That in turn (along with other 
shorefront development) will interfere with 
the desire of people who drive past the 
Nollans' house to use the beach, thus creat-
ing a "psychological barrier" to "access." 
The Nollans' new house will also, by a 
process not altogether clear from the Com-
mission's opinion but presumably potent 
enough to more than offset the effects of 
the psychological barrier, increase the use 
of the public beaches, thus creating the 
need for more "access." These burdens on 
"access" would be alleviated by a require-
ment that the Nollans provide "lateral ac-
cess" to the beach. 
[2] Rewriting the argument to elimi-
nate the play on words makes clear that 
there is nothing to it. It is quite impossible 
to understand how a requirement that peo-
ple already on the public beaches be able to 
walk across the Nollans' property reduces 
any obstacles to viewing the beach created 
by the new house. It is also impossible to 
understand how it lowers any "psychologi-
cal barrier" to using the public beaches, or 
how it helps to remedy any additional con-
gestion on them |839caused by construction 
of the Nollans' new house. We therefore 
find that the Commission's imposition of 
the permit condition cannot be treated as 
an exercise of its land-use power for any of 
these purposes.6 Our conclusion on this 
house would " 'increase private use immediately 
adjacent to public tidelands,'" which in turn 
might result in more disputes between the Nol-
lans and the public as to the location of the 
boundary. Post, at 3156, quoting App. 62. That 
risk of boundary disputes, however, is inherent 
in the right to exclude others from one's proper-
ty, and the construction here can no more justi-
fy mandatory dedication of a sort of "buffer 
zone" in order to avoid boundary disputes than 
can the construction of an addition to a single-
family house near a public street. Moreover, a 
buffer zone has a boundary as well, and unless 
that zone is a "no-man's land" that is off limits 
for both neighbors (which is of course not the 
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point is consistent with the approach taken 
by every other court that has considered 
the question, with the exception of the Cali-
fornia state courts. See Parks v. Watson, 
716 F.2d 646, 651-653 (CA9 1983); Bethle-
hem Evangelical Lutheran Church v. 
Lakewood, 626 P.2d 668, 671-674 (Colo. 
1981); Aunt Hack Ridge Estates, Inc. v. 
Planning Comm'n, 160 Conn. 109, 117-
120, 273 A.2d 880, 885 (1970); Longboat 
Key v. Lands End, Ltd., 433 So.2d 574 
(Fla.App.1983); Pioneer Trust & Savings 
Bank v. Mount Prospect, 22 I11.2d 375, 380, 
176 N.E.2d 799, 802 (1961); Lampton v. 
Pinaire, 610 S.W.2d 915, 918-919 (Ky.App. 
1980); Schwing v. Baton Rouge, 249 So.2d 
304 (La.App.), application denied, 259 La. 
770, 252 So.2d 667 (1971); Howard County 
v. JJM, Inc., 301 Md. 256, 280-282, 482 
A.2d 908, 920-921 (1984); Collis v. Bloom-
ington, 310 Minn. 5, 246 N.W.2d 19 (1976); 
State ex rel. Noland v. St. Louis County, 
478 S.W.2d 363 (Mo.1972); juoBillings 
Properties, Inc. v. Yellowstone County, 
144 Mont. 25, 33-36, 394 P.2d 182, 187-188 
(1964); Simpson v. North Platte, 206 Neb. 
240, 292 N.W.2d 297 (1980); Briar West, 
Inc. v. Lincoln, 206 Neb. 172, 291 N.W.2d 
730 (1980); J.E.D. Associates v. Atkinson, 
121 N.H. 581, 432 A.2d 12 (1981); Lon-
gridge Builders, Inc. v. Planning Bd. of 
Princeton, 52 NJ . 348, 350-351, 245 A.2d 
336, 337-338 (1968); Jenad, Inc. v. Scars-
dale, 18 N.Y.2d 78, 271 N.Y.S.2d 955, 218 
N.E.2d 673 (1966); MacKall v. White, 85 
App.Div.2d 696, 445 N.Y.S.2d 486 (1981), 
appeal denied, 56 N.Y.2d 503, 450 N.Y.S.2d 
1025, 435 N.E.2d 1100 (1982); Frank An-
suini, Inc. v. Cranston, 107 R.I. 63, 68-69, 
71, 264 A.2d 910, 913, 914 (1970); College 
Station v. Turtle Rock Corp., 680 S.W.2d 
802, 807 (Tex. 1984); Call v. West Jordan, 
614 P.2d 1257, 1258-1259 (Utah 1980); 
Board of Supervisors of James City 
County v. Rowe, 216 Va. 128, 136-139, 216 
case here) its creation achieves nothing except 
to shift the location of the boundary dispute 
further on to the private owner's land. It is true 
that in the distinctive situation of the Nollans' 
property the seawall could be established as a 
clear demarcation of the public easement. But 
S.E.2d 199, 207-209 (1975); Jordan v. Me-
nomonee Falls, 28 Wis.2d 608, 617-618, 
137 N.W.2d 442, 447-449 (1965), appeal 
dism'd, 385 U.S. 4, 87 S.Ct. 36, 17 L.Ed.2d 3 
(1966). See also Littlefzeld v. Afton, 785 
F.2d 596, 607 (CA8 1986); Brief for Nation-
al Association of Home Builders et al. as 
Amid Curiae 9-16. 
Justice BRENNAN argues that imposi-
tion of the access requirement is not irra-
tional. In his version of the Commission's 
argument, the reason for the requirement 
is that in its absence, a person looking 
toward the beach from the road will see a 
street of residential structures including 
the Nollans' new home and conclude that 
there is no public beach nearby. If, how-
ever, that person sees people passing and 
repassing along the dry sand behind the 
Nollans' home, he will realize that there is 
a public beach somewhere in the vicinity. 
Post, at 3155-3156. The Commission's ac-
tion, however, was based on the opposite 
factual finding that the wall of houses com-
pletely blocked the view of the beach and 
that a person looking from the road would 
not be able to see it at all. App. 57-59. 
Even if the Commission had made the 
finding that Justice BRENNAN proposes 
however, it is not certain that it woulc 
l84isuffice. We do not share Justice BREN-
NAN's confidence that the Commission 
"should have little difficulty in the future 
in utilizing its expertise to demonstrate a 
specific connection between provisions for 
access and burdens on access," post, at 
3161, that will avoid the effect of today's 
decision. We view the Fifth Amendment's 
Property Clause to be more than a pleading 
requirement, and compliance with it to be 
more than an exercise in cleverness anc 
imagination. As indicated earlier, oui 
cases describe the condition for abridge 
ment of property rights through the police 
power as a "substantial advancing]" of s 
since not all of the lands to which this land-us< 
condition applies have such a convenient refer 
ence point, the avoidance of boundary dispute 
is, even more obviously than the others, a made 
up purpose of the regulation. 
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legitimate state interest. We are inclined 
to be particularly careful about the adjec-
tive where the actual conveyance of proper-
ty is made a condition to the lifting of a 
land-use restriction, since in that context
 x 
there is heightened risk that the purpose is 
avoidance of the compensation require-
ment, rather than the stated police-power 
objective. 
We are left, then, with the Commission's 
justification for the access requirement un-
related to land-use regulation: x 
"Finally, the Commission notes that 
there are several existing provisions of 
pass and repass lateral access benefits 
already given by past Faria Beach Tract 
applicants as a result of prior coastal 
permit decisions. The access required as 
a condition of this permit is part of a 
comprehensive program to provide con-
tinuous public access along Faria Beach 
as the lots undergo development or rede-
velopment." App. 68. 
That is simply an expression of the Com-
mission's belief that the public interest will 
be served by a continuous strip of publicly 
accessible beach along the coast. The 
Commission may well be right that it is a 
good idea, but that does not establish that 
the Nollans (and other coastal residents) 
alone can be compelled to contribute to its 
realization. Rather, California is free to 
advance its "comprehensive program," if it 
wishes, by using its power of eminent do-
main for this "public purpose,^" see U.S. 
Const., Amdt. 5; but if it wants an ease-
ment across the Nollans' property, it must 
pay for it. 
Reversed. 
Justice BRENNAN, with whom Justice 
MARSHALL joins, dissenting. 
Appellants in this case sought to con-
struct a new dwelling on their beach lot 
that would both diminish visual access to 
the beach and move private development 
closer to the public tidelands. The Com-
mission reasonably concluded that such 
"buildout," both individually and cumula-
tively, threatens public access to the shore. 
It sought to offset this encroachment by 
obtaining assurance that the public may 
walk along the shoreline in order to gain 
access to the ocean. The Court finds this 
an illegitimate exercise of the police power, 
because it maintains that there is no rea-
sonable relationship between the effect of 
the development and the condition imposed. 
The first problem with this conclusion is 
that the Court imposes a standard of preci-
sion for the exercise of a State's police 
power that has been discredited for the 
better part of this century. Furthermore, 
even under the Court's cramped standard, 
the permit condition imposed in this case 
directly responds to the specific type of 
burden on access created by appellants' 
development. Finally, a review of those 
factors deemed most significant in takings 
analysis makes clear that the Commission's 
action implicates none of the concerns un-
derlying the Takings Clause. The Court 
has thus struck down the Commission's 
reasonable effort to respond to intensified 
development along the California coast, on 
behalf of landowners who can make no 
claim that their reasonable expectations 
have been disrupted. The Court has, in 
short, given appellants a windfall at the 
expense of the public. 
I 
The Court's conclusion that the permit 
condition imposed on appellants is unrea-
sonable cannot withstand analysis. First, 
the Court demands a degree of exactitude 
that is injconsistent843 with our standard for 
reviewing the rationality of a State's exer-
cise of its police power for the welfare of 
its citizens. Second, even if the nature of 
the public-access condition imposed must be 
identical to the precise burden on access 
created by appellants, this requirement is 
plainly satisfied. 
There can be no dispute that the police 
power of the States encompasses the au-
thority to impose conditions on private de-
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velopment. See, e.g., Agins v. Tiburon, 
447 U.S. 255, 100 S.Ct. 2138, 65 L.Ed.2d 106 
(1980); Penn Central Transportation Co. 
v. New York City, 438 U.S. 104, 98 S.Ct. 
2646, 57 L.Ed.2d 631 (1978); Gorieb v. Fox, 
274 U.S. 603, 47 S.Ct. 675, 71 L.Ed. 1228 
(1927). It is also by now commonplace that 
this Court's review of the rationality of a 
State's exercise of its police power de-
mands only that the State "could rational-
ly have decided " that the measure adopted^ 
1. See also Williamson v. Lee Optical of Okla-
homa, Inc., 348 U.S. 483, 487-488, 75 S.Ct. 461, 
464-465, 99 L.Ed. 563 (1955) ("[T]he law need 
not be in every respect logically consistent with 
its aims to be constitutional. It is enough that 
there is an evil at hand for correction, and that 
it might be thought that the particular legislative 
measure was a rational way to correct it"); Day-
Brite Lighting, Inc. v. Missouri, 342 U.S. 421, 
423, 72 S.Ct. 405, 407, 96 L.Ed. 469 (1952) ("Our 
recent decisions make it plain that we do not sit 
as a super-legislature to weigh the wisdom of 
legislation nor to decide whether the policy 
which it expresses offends the public wel-
fare [Sjtate legislatures have constitutional 
authority to experiment with new techniques; 
they are entitled to their own standard of the 
public welfare"). 
Notwithstanding the suggestion otherwise, 
ante, at 3147, n. 3, our standard for reviewing 
the threshold question whether an exercise of 
the police power is legitimate is a uniform one. 
As we stated over 25 years ago in addressing a 
takings challenge to government regulation: 
'The term 'police power' connotes the time-
tested conceptional limit of public encroach-
ment upon private interests. Except for the 
substitution of the familiar standard of 'reason-
ableness,' this Court has generally refrained. 
from announcing any specific criteria. The 
classic statement of the rule in Lawton v. Steele, 
152 U.S. 133, 137 [14 S.Ct. 499, 501, 38 L.Ed. 
385] (1894), is still valid today: . . . '[I]t must 
appear, first, thai the interests of the public . . . 
require [government] interference; and, second, 
that the means are reasonably necessary for the 
accomplishment of the purpose, and not unduly 
oppressive upon individuals.' Even this rule is 
not applied with strict precision, for this Court 
has often said that 'debatable questions as to 
reasonableness are not for the courts but for the 
legislature ' E.g., Sproles v. Binford, 286 
U.S. 374, 388 [52 S.Ct. 581, 585, 76 L.Ed. 1167] 
(1932)." Goldblatt v. Hempstead, 369 U.S. 590, 
594-595, 82 S.Ct. 987, 990-991, 8 L.Ed.2d 130 
(1962). 
See also id., at 596, 82 S.Ct. at 991 (upholding 
regulation from takings challenge with citation 
to, inter alia, United States v. Carolene Products 
Co., 304 U.S. 144, 154, 58 S.Ct. 778, 784, 82 L.Ed. 
might achieve the State's objective. 
Minnesota v. Clover Leaf Creamery Co., 
449 U.S. 456, 466, 101 S.Ct. 715, 725, 66 
L.Ed.2d 659 (1981) (emphasis in original).1 
In t^ iis case, California hasj£44employed its 
police power in order to condition develop-
ment upon preservation of public access to 
the ocean and tidelands. The Coastal Com-
mission, if it had so chosen, could have 
dejnieds45 the Nollans' request for a devel-
1234 (1938), for proposition that exercise of 
police power will be upheld "if any state of facts 
either known or which could be reasonably 
assumed affords support for it"). In Connolly v. 
Pension Benefit Guaranty Corporation, 475 U.S. 
211, 106 S.Ct. 1018, 89 L.Ed.2d 166 (1986), for 
instance, we reviewed a takings challenge to 
statutory provisions that had been held to be a 
legitimate exercise of the police power under 
due process analysis in Pension Benefit Guaran-
ty Corporation v. R.A. Gray & Co., 467 U.S. 717, 
104 S.Ct. 2709, 81 L.Ed.2d 601 (1984). Gray, in 
turn, had relied on Usery v. Turner Elkhorn 
Mining Co., 428 U.S. 1, 96 S.Ct. 2882, 49 L.Ed.2d 
752 (1976). In rejecting the takings argument 
that the provisions were not within Congress' 
regulatory power, the Court in Connolly stated: 
"Although both Gray and Turner Elkhorn were 
due process cases, it would be surprising indeed 
to discover now that in both cases Congress 
unconstitutionally had taken the assets of the 
employers there involved." 475 U.S., at 223, 106 
S.Ct., at 1025. Our phraseology may differ 
slightly from case to case—e.g., regulation must 
"substantially advance," Agins v. Tiburon, 447 
U.S. 255, 260, 100 S.Ct. 2138, 2141, 65 L.Ed.2d 
106 (1980), or be "reasonably necessary to," 
Penn Central Transportation Co. v. New York 
City, 438 U.S. 104, 127, 98 S.Ct. 2646, 2660, 57 
L.Ed.2d 631 (1978), the government's end. 
These minor differences cannot, however, ob-
scure the fact that the inquiry in each case is the 
same. 
Of course, government action may be a valid 
exercise of the police power and still violate 
specific provisions of the Constitution. Justice 
SCALIA is certainly correct in observing that 
challenges founded upon these provisions are 
reviewed under different standards. Ante, at 
3147, n. 3. Our consideration of factors such as 
those identified in Penn Central, supra, for in-
stance, provides an analytical framework for 
protecting the values underlying the Takings 
Clause, and other distinctive approaches are uti-
lized to give effect to other constitutional provi-
sions. This is far different, however, from the 
use of different standards of review to address 
the threshold issue of the rationality of govern-
ment action. 
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opment permit, since the property would 
have remained economically viable without 
the requested new development.2 Instead, 
the State sought to accommodate the Nol-
lans' desire for new development, on the 
condition that the development not diminish 
the overall amount of public access to the 
coastline. Appellants' proposed develop-
ment would reduce public access by re-
stricting visual access to the beach, by con-
tributing to an increased need for commu-
nity facilities, and by moving private devek 
opment closer to public beach property. 
The Commission sought to offset this dimi-
nution in access, and thereby preserve the 
overall balance of access, by requesting a 
deed restriction that would ensure "later-
al" access: the right of the public to pass 
and repass along the dry sand parallel to 
the shoreline in order to reach the tidelands 
and the ocean. In the expert opinion of the 
Coastal Commission, development condi-
tioned on such a restriction would fairly 
attend to both public and private interests. 
The Court finds fault with this measure 
because it regards the condition as insuffi-
ciently tailored to address the precise 
Retype of reduction in access produced by 
the new development. The Nollans' devel-
opment blocks visual access, the Court tells 
as, while the Commission seeks to preserve 
ateral access along the coastline. Thus, it 
concludes, the State acted irrationally. 
>uch a narrow conception of rationality, 
lowever, has long since been discredited as 
i judicial arrogation of legislative authori-
,y. "To make scientific precision a criteri-
>n of constitutional power would be to sub-
t. As this Court declared in United States v. Riv-
erside Bayview Homes, Inc., 474 U.S. 121, 127, 
106 S.Ct. 455, 459, 88 L.Ed.2d 419 (1985): 
"A requirement that a person obtain a permit 
before engaging in a certain use of his or her 
property does not itself 'take' the property in 
any sense: after all, the very existence of a 
permit system implies that permission may be 
granted, leaving the landowner free to use the 
property as desired. Moreover, even if the per-
mit is denied, there may be other viable uses 
available to the owner. Only when a permit is 
denied and the effect of the denial is to prevent 
'economically viable' use of the land in question 
can it be said that a taking has occurred." 
ject the State to an intolerable supervision 
hostile to the basic principles of our 
Government." Sproles v. Binford, 286 
U.S. 374, 388, 52 S.Ct. 581, 585, 76 L.Ed. 
1167 (1932). Cf. Keystone Bituminous 
Coal Assn. v. DeBenedictis, 480 U.S. 470, 
491, n. 21, 107 S.Ct. 1232, 1245, n. 21, 94 
L.Ed.2d 472 (1987) ("The Takings Clause 
has never been read to require the States 
or the courts to calculate whether a specific 
individual has suffered burdens . . . in ex-
cess of the benefits received"). As this 
Court long ago declared with regard to 
various forms of restriction on the use of 
property: 
"Each interferes in the same way, if not 
to the same extent, with the owner's 
general right of dominion over his prop-
erty. All rest for their justification upon 
the same reasons which have arisen in 
recent times as a result of the great 
increase and concentration of population 
in urban communities and the vast 
changes in the extent and complexity of 
the problems of modern city life. State 
legislatures and city councils, who deal 
with the situation from a practical stand-
point, are better qualified than the courts 
to determine the necessity, character, 
and degree of regulation which these 
new and perplexing conditions require; 
and their conclusions should not be dis-
turbed by the courts unless clearly arbi-
trary and unreasonable." Gorieb, 274 
U.S., at 608, 47 S.Ct., at 677 (citations 
omitted). 
We also stated in Kaiser Aetna v. United States, 
444 U.S. 164, 179, 100 S.Ct. 383, 392, 62 L.Ed.2d 
332 (1979), with respect to dredging to create a 
private marina: 
"We have not the slightest doubt that the 
Government could have refused to allow such 
dredging on the ground that it would have im-
paired navigation in the bay, or could have 
conditioned its approval of the dredging on peti-
tioners' agreement to comply with various mea-
sures that it deemed appropriate for the pro-
motion of navigation." 
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The Commission is charged by both the 
State Constitution and legislature to pre-
serve overall public access to the California 
coastline. Furthermore, by virtue of its 
participation m the Coastal Zone Manage-
ment Act (CZMA) program, the ^ S t a t e 
must "exercise effectively [its] responsibili-
ties in the coastal zone through the devel-
opment and implementation of manage-
ment programs to achieve wise use of the 
land and water resources of the coastab 
zone/' 16 U.S.C. § 1452(2), so as to provide 
for, inter alia, "public access to the coas[t] 
for recreation purposes/1 § 1452(2)(D). 
The Commission has sought to discharge 
its responsibilities in a flexible manner. It 
has sought to balance private and public 
interests and to accept tradeoffs: to permit 
development that reduces access in some 
ways as long as other means of access are 
enhanced. In this case, it has determined 
that the Nollans' burden on access would 
be offset by a deed restriction that formal-
izes the public's right to pass along the 
shore. In its informed judgment, such a 
tradeoff would preserve the net amount of 
public access to the coastline. The Court's 
insistence on a precise fit between the 
forms of burden and condition on each indi-
vidual parcel along the California coast 
would penalize the Commission for its flexi-
bility, hampering the ability to fulfill its 
public trust mandate. 
The Court's demand for this precise fit is 
based on the assumption that private land-
owners in this case possess a reasonable 
expectation regarding the use of their land 
that the public has attempted to disrupt. 
In fact, the situation is precisely the re-
verse: it is private landowners who are the 
interlopers. The public's expectation of ac-
cess considerably antedates any private de-
velopment on the coast. Article X, § 4, of 
the California Constitution, adopted in 
1879, declares: 
"No individual, partnership, or corpora-
tion, claiming or possessing the frontage 
or tidal lands of a harbor, bay, inlet, 
estuary, or other navigable water in this 
State, shall be permitted to exclude the 
right of way to such water whenever it is 
required for any public purpose, nor to 
destroy or obstruct the free navigation 
of such water; and the Legislature shall 
$nact such laws as will give the most 
liberal construction to this provision, so 
|848that access to the navigable waters of 
this State shall always be attainable for 
the people thereof." 
It is therefore private landowners who 
"threaten the disruption of settled public 
expectations. Where a private landowner 
has had a reasonable expectation that his 
or her property will be used for exclusively 
private purposes, the disruption of this ex-
pectation dictates that the government pay 
if it wishes the property to be used for a 
public purpose. In this case, however, the 
State has sought to protect public expecta-
tions of access from disruption by private 
land use. The State's exercise of its police 
power for this purpose deserves no less 
deference than any other measure designed 
to further the welfare of state citizens. 
Congress expressly stated in passing the 
CZMA that "[i]n light of competing de-
mands and the urgent need to protect and 
to give high priority to natural systems in 
the coastal zone, present state and local 
institutional arrangements for planning 
and regulating land and water uses in such 
areas are inadequate." 16 U.S.C. 
§ 1451(h). It is thus puzzling that the 
Court characterizes as a "non-land-use jus-
tification," ante, at 3151, the exercise of 
the police power to " 'provide continuous 
public access along Faria Beach as the lots 
undergo development or redevelopment.'" 
Ibid, (quoting App. 68). The Commission's 
determination that certain types of develop-
ment jeopardize public access to the ocean, 
and that such development should be condi-
tioned on preservation of access, is the 
essence of responsible land-use planning. 
The Court's use of an unreasonably de-
manding standard for determining the ra-
tionality of state regulation in this area 
thus could hamper innovative efforts to 
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preserve an increasingly fragile national 
resource.3 
I849B 
Even if we accept the Court's unusual, 
demand for a precise match between the 
condition imposed and the specific type of 
burden on access created by the appellants, 
the State's action easily satisfies this re-
quirement. First, the lateral access condi-
tion serves to dissipate the impression^ tjiat 
the beach that lies behind the wall ofx 
homes along the shore is for private use 
only. It requires no exceptional imagina-
tive powers to find plausible the Commis-
sion's point that the average person pass-
ing along the road in front of a phalanx of 
imposing permanent residences, including 
the appellants' new home, is likely to con-
clude that this particular portion of the 
shore is not open to the public. If, how-
ever, that person can see that numerous 
people are passing and repassing along the 
dry sand, this conveys the message that 
the beach is in fact open for use by the 
public. Furthermore, those persons who 
go down to the public beach a quarter-mile 
away will be able to look down the coast-
line and see that persons have continuous 
access to the tidelands, and will observe 
signs that proclaim the public's right of 
access over the dry sand. The burden pro-
duced by the diminution in visual access— 
the impression that the beach is not open to 
3. The list of cases cited by the Court as support 
for its approach, ante, at 3149-3150, includes no 
instance in which the State sought to vindicate 
pre-existing rights of access to navigable water, 
and consists principally of cases involving a 
requirement of the dedication of land as a con-
dition of subdivision approval. Dedication, of 
course, requires the surrender of ownership of 
property rather than, as in this case, a mere 
restriction on its use. The only case pertaining 
to beach access among those cited by the Court 
is MacKall v. White, 85 App.Div.2d 696, 445 
N.Y.S.2d 486 (1981). In that case, the court 
found that a subdivision application could not 
be conditioned upon a declaration that the land-
owner would not hinder the public from using a 
trail that had been used to gain access to a bay. 
The trail had been used despite posted warnings 
prohibiting passage, and despite the owner's re-
sistance to such use. In that case, unlike this 
the public—is thus directly alleviated by 
the provision for public access over the dry 
sand. The Court therefore has an 
l85ounrealistically limited conception of 
what measures could reasonably be chosen 
to mitigate the burden produced by a dimi-
nution of visual access. 
The second flaw in the Court's analysis 
of the fit between burden and exaction is 
more fundamental. The Court assumes 
that the only burden with which the Coast-
- al Commission was concerned was blockage 
of visual access to the beach. This is incor-
rect.4 The Commission specifically stated 
in its report in support of the permit condi-
tion that "[t]he Commission finds that the 
applicants' proposed development would 
present an increase in view blockage, an 
increase in private use of the shorefront, 
and that this impact would burden the pub-
lic's ability to traverse to and along the 
shorefront." App. 65-66 (emphasis added). 
It declared that the possibility that "the 
public may get the impression that the 
beachfront is no longer available for public 
use" would be "due to the encroaching 
nature of private use immediately adja-
cent to the public use, as well as the visual 
'block' of increased residential build-out im-
pacting the visual' quality of the beach-
front." Id., at 59 (emphasis added). 
The record prepared by the Commission 
is replete with references to the threat to 
one, neither the State Constitution, state statute, 
administrative practice, nor the conduct of the 
landowner operated to create any reasonable 
expectation of a right of public access. 
4. This may be because the State in its briefs and 
at argument contended merely that the permit 
condition would serve to preserve overall public 
access, by offsetting the diminution in access 
resulting from the project, such as, inter alia, 
blocking the public's view of the beach. The 
State's position no doubt reflected the reason-
able assumption that the Court would evaluate 
the rationality of its exercise of the police power 
in accordance with the traditional standard of 
review, and that the Court would not attempt to 
substitute its judgment about the best way to 
preserve overall public access to the ocean at 
the Faria Family Beach Tract. 
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public access along the coastline resulting 
from the seaward encroachment of private 
development along a beach whose mean 
high-tide line is constantly shifting. As the 
Commission observed in its report: "The 
Faria Beach shoreline fluctuates during the 
year depending on the seasons and accom-
panying storms, and the public is not al-
ways able to traverse the shoreline below 
the mean|85ihigh tide line/' Id., at 67. As 
a result, the boundary between publicly 
owned tidelands and privately owned beach" 
is not a stable one, and "[t]he existing 
seawall is located very near to the mean 
high water line." Id., at 61. When the 
beach is at its largest, the seawall is about 
10 feet from the mean high-tide mark; 
"[djuring the period of the year when the 
beach suffers erosion, the mean high water 
line appears to be located either on or 
beyond the existing seawall." Ibid. Ex-
pansion of private development on appel-
lants' lot toward the seawall would thus 
"increase private use immediately adjacent 
to public tidelands, which has the potential 
of causing adverse impacts on the public's 
ability to traverse the shoreline." Id., at 
62. As the Commission explained: 
"The placement of more private use adja-
cent to public tidelands has the potential 
of creating use conflicts between the ap-
plicants and the public. The results of 
new private use encroachment into 
boundary/buffer areas between private 
and public property can create situations 
in which landowners intimidate the public 
and seek to prevent them from using 
public tidelands because of disputes, be-
5. As the Commission's Public Access (Shoreline) 
Interpretative Guidelines state: 
"[T]he provision of lateral access recognizes the 
potential for conflicts between public and pri-
vate use and creates a type of access that allows 
the public to move freely along all the tidelands 
in an area that can be clearly delineated and 
distinguished from private use areas Thus 
the 'need' determination set forth in P[ublic] 
Resources] C[ode] 30212(a)(2) should be mea-
sured in terms of providing access that buffers 
public access to the tidelands from the burdens 
generated on access by private development." 
App. 358-359. 
tween the two parties over where the 
exact boundary between private and pub-
lic ownership is located. If the appli-
cants' project would result in further sea-
ward encroachment of private use into 
an area of clouded title, new private use 
in the subject encroachment area could 
result in use conflict between private and 
public entities on the subject shorefront." 
Id., at 61-62. 
The deed restriction on which permit ap-
proval was conditioned would directly ad-
dress this threat to the public's access to 
the tidelands. It would provide a formal 
declaration of the public's right of access, 
thereby ensuring that the shifting charac-
ter of the tidelands, and the presence of 
private development immediately adjacent 
to it, would not jeopjardize852 enjoyment of 
that right.5 The imposition of the permit 
condition was therefore directly related to 
the fact that appellants development would 
be "located along a unique stretch of coast 
where lateral public access is inadequate 
due to the construction of private resi-
dential structures and shoreline protective 
devices along a fluctuating shoreline." Id., 
at 68. The deed restriction was crafted to 
deal with the particular character of the 
beach along which appellants sought to 
build, and with the specific problems cre-
ated by expansion of development toward 
the public tidelands. In imposing the re-
striction, the State sought to ensure that 
such development would not disrupt the 
historical expectation of the public regard-
ing access to the sea.6 
6. The Court suggests that the risk of boundary 
disputes "is inherent in the right to exclude 
others from one's property," and thus cannot 
serve as a purpose to support the permit condi-
tion. Ante, at 3149, n. 6. The Commission 
sought the deed restriction, however, not to ad 
dress a generalized problem inherent in any 
system of property, but to address the particular 
problem created by the shifting high-tide line 
along Faria Beach. Unlike the typical area in 
which a boundary is delineated reasonably 
clearly, the very problem on Faria Beach is that 
the boundary is not constant. The area open to 
public use therefore is frequently in question, 
and, as the discussion, supra, demonstrates, the 
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l853The Court is therefore simply wrong 
that there is no reasonable relationship be-
tween the permit condition and the specific 
type of burden on public access created by 
the appellants' proposed development. 
Even were the Court desirous of assuming 
the added responsibility of closely monitor-
ing the regulation of development along 
the California coast, this record reveals ra-
tional public action by any conceivable 
standard. 
II 
The fact that the Commission's action is 
a legitimate exercise of the police power 
does not, of course, insulate it from a tak-
ings challenge, for when "regulation goes 
too far it will be recognized as a taking." 
Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 
393, 415, 43 S.Ct. 158, 160, 67 L.Ed. 322 
(1922). Conventional takings analysis un-
derscores the implausibility of the Court's 
holding, for it demonstrates that this exer-
cise of California's police power implicates 
none of the concerns that underlie our tak-
ings jurisprudence. 
In reviewing a Takings Clause claim, we 
have regarded as particularly significant 
the nature of the governmental action and 
the economic impact of regulation, espe-
cially the extent to which regulation inter-
feres with investment-backed expectations. 
Penn Central, 438 U.S., at 124, 98 S.Ct, at 
Commission clearly tailored its permit condi-
tion precisely to address this specific problem. 
The Court acknowledges that the Nollans' sea-
wall could provide "a clear demarcation of the 
public easement," and thus avoid merely shift-
ing "the location of the boundary dispute fur-
ther on to the private owner's land." Ante, at 
3150, n. 6. It nonetheless faults the Commission 
because every property subject to regulation 
may not have this feature. This case, however, 
is a challenge to the permit condition as applied 
to the Nollans'property, so the presence or ab-
sence of seawalls on other property is irrele-
vant. 
7. See, e.g., Bellefontaine Neighbors v. /./. Kelley 
Realty & Bldg. Co., 460 S.W.2d 298 (Mo.Ct.App. 
1970); Allen v. Stockwell, 210 Mich. 488, 178 
N.W. 27 (1920). See generally Shultz & Kelley, 
Subdivision Improvement Requirements and 
Guarantees: A Primer, 28 Wash.UJ.Urban and 
Contemp.L. 3 (1985). 
2659. The character of the government 
action in this case is the imposition of a 
condition on permit approval, which allows 
the public to continue to have access to the 
^oast. The physical intrusion permitted by 
the deed restriction is minimal. The public 
is permitted the right to pass and repass 
along the coast in an area from the seawall 
to the mean high-tide mark. App. 46. This 
area is at its widest 10 feet, id.} at 61, 
which means that even without the permit 
^condition, the public's right of access per-
mits it to pass on average within a few feet 
of the seawall. Passage closer to the 8-
foot-high rocky seawall will make the 
J854appellants even less visible to the public 
than passage along the high-tide area far-
ther out on the beach. The intrusiveness 
of such passage is even less than the intru-
sion resulting from the required dedication 
of a sidewalk in front of private residences, 
exactions which are commonplace condi-
tions on approval of development.7 Fur-
thermore, the high-tide line shifts through-
out the year, moving up to and beyond the 
seawall, so that public passage for a por-
tion of the year would either be impossible 
or would not occur on appellant's property. 
Finally, although the Commission had the 
authority to provide for either passive or 
active recreational use of- the property, it 
chose the least intrusive alternative: a 
mere right to pass and repass. Id., at 370.8 
8. The Commission acted in accordance with its 
Guidelines both in determining the width of the 
area of passage, and in prohibiting any recrea-
tional use of the property. The Guidelines state 
that it may be necessary on occasion to provide 
for less than the normal 25-foot-wide accessway 
along the dry sand when this may be necessary 
to "protect the privacy rights of adjacent proper-
ty owners." App. 363. They also provide this 
advice in selecting the type of public use that 
may be permitted: 
"Pass and Repass. Where topographic con 
straints of the site make use of the beach dan-
gerous, where habitat values of the shoreline 
would be adversely impacted by public use of 
the shoreline or where the accessway may en-
croach closer than 20 feet to a residential struc-
ture, the accessway may be limited to the right 
of the public to pass and repass along the access 
area. For the purposes of these guidelines, pass 
and repass is defined as the right to walk and 
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As this Court made isssdear in Prune Yard 
Shopping Center v. Robins, 447 U.S. 74, 
83, 100 S.Ct. 2035, 2042, 64 L.Ed.2d 741 
(1980), physical access to private property 
in itself creates no takings problem if it 
does not "unreasonably impair the value or 
use of [the] property." Appellants can 
make no tenable claim that either their 
enjoyment of their property or its value is 
diminished by the public's ability merely to 
pass and repass a few feet closer to the 
seawall beyond which appellants' house is 
located. 
Prune Yard is also relevant in that we 
acknowledged in that case that public ac-
cess rested upon a "state constitutional . . . 
provision that had been construed to create 
rights to the use of private property by 
strangers." Id., at 81, 100 S.Ct, at 2041. 
In this case, of course, the State is also 
acting to protect a state constitutional 
right. See supra, at 3154 (quoting Art. X, 
§ 4, of California Constitution). The con-
stitutional provision guaranteeing public 
access to the ocean states that "the Legis-
lature shall enact such laws as will give the 
most liberal construction to this provi-
sion so that access to the navigable waters 
of this State shall be always attainable for 
the people thereof." Cal. Const., Art. X, 
§ 4 (emphasis added). This provision is the 
explicit basis for the statutory directive to 
provide for public access along the coast in 
new development projects, Cal.Pub.Res. 
Code Ann. § 30212 (West 1986), and has 
been construed by the state judiciary to 
permit passage over private land where 
necessary to gain access to the tidelands. 
Grupe v. California Coastal Comm'n, 166 
Cal.App.3d 148, 171-172, 212 Cal.Rptr. 578, 
592-593 (1985). The physical access to the 
perimeter of appellants' property at issue 
in this case thus results directly from the 
State's enforcement of the State Constitu-
tion. 
run along the shoreline. This would provide 
for public access along the shoreline but would 
not allow for any additional use of the access-
way. Because this severely limits the public's 
ability to enjoy the adjacent state owned tide-
lands by restricting the potential use of the 
Finally, the character of the regulation in 
this case is not unilateral government ac-
tion, but a condition on approval of a devel-
opment request submitted by appellants. 
The. State has not sought to interfere with 
any pre-existing property interest, but has 
responded to appellants' proposal to inten-
sify development on the coast. Appellants 
themselves chose to ^ submi t a new devel-
opment application, and could claim no 
property interest in its approval. They 
were aware that approval of such develop-
ment would be conditioned on preservation 
of adequate public access to the ocean. 
The State has initiated no action against 
appellants' property; had the Nollans' not 
proposed more intensive development in 
the coastal zone, they would never have 
been subject to the provision that they chal-
lenge. 
Examination of the economic impact of 
the Commission's action reinforces the con-
clusion that no taking has occurred. Al-
lowing appellants to intensify development 
along the coast in exchange for ensuring 
public access to the ocean is a classic in-
stance of government action that produces 
a "reciprocity of advantage." Pennsylva-
nia Coal, 260 U.S., at 415, 43 S.Ct., at 160. 
Appellants have been allowed to replace a 
one-story, 521-square-foot beach home 
with a two-story, 1,674-square-foot resi-
dence and an attached two-car garage, re-
sulting in development covering 2,464 
square feet of the lot. Such development 
obviously significantly increases the value 
of appellants' property; appellants make 
no contention that this increase is offset by 
any diminution in value resulting from the 
deed restriction, much less that the restric-
tion made the property less valuable than it 
would have been without the new construc-
tion. Furthermore, appellants gain an ad-
ditional benefit from the Commission's per-
access areas, this form of access dedication 
should be used only where necessary to protect 
the habitat values of the site, where topographic 
constraints warrant the restriction, or where it 
is necessary to protect the privacy of the land-
owner." Id., at 370. 
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mit condition program. They are able to 
walk along the beach beyond the confines 
of their own property only because the 
Commission has required deed restrictions 
as a condition of approving other new 
beach developments.9 Thus, appellants 
benefit both as private landowners and as 
members of the public from the fact that 
new development permit requests are con-
ditioned on preservation of public access. 
jj^Ultimately, appellants' claim of eco-x 
nomic injury is flawed because it rests on 
the assumption of entitlement to the full 
value of their new development. Appel-
lants submitted a proposal for more inten-
sive development of the coast, which the 
Commission was under no obligation to ap-
prove, and now argue that a regulation 
designed to ameliorate the impact of that 
development deprives them of the full val-
ue of their improvements. Even if this 
novel claim were somehow cognizable, it is 
not significant. "[T]he interest in antici-
pated gains has traditionally been viewed 
as less compelling than other property-re-
lated interests." Andrus v. Allard, 444 
U.S. 51, 66, 100 S.Ct. 318, 327, 62 L.Ed.2d 
210 (1979). 
With respect to appellants' investment-
backed expectations, appellants can make 
no reasonable claim to any expectation of 
being able to exclude members of the pub-
lic from crossing the edge of their property 
to gain access to the ocean. It is axiomat-
ic, of course, that state law is the source of 
those strands that constitute a property 
owner's bundle of property rights. "[A]s a 
general proposition^] the law of real prop-
erty is, under our Constitution, left to the 
individual States to develop and adminis-
ter." Hughes v. Washington, 389 U.S. 
290, 295, 88 S.Ct. 438, 441, 19 L.Ed.2d 530 
(1967) (Stewart, J., concurring). See also 
Borax Consolidated, Ltd. v. Los Angeles, 
296 U.S. 10, 22, 56 S.Ct. 23, 29, 80 L.Ed. 9 
(1935) ("Rights and interests in the tide-
land, which is subject to the sovereignty of 
9. At the time of the Nollans' permit application, 
43 of the permit requests for development along 
the Faria Beach had been conditioned on deed 
the State, are matters of local law"). In 
this case, the State Constitution explicitly 
states that no one possessing the "front-
age" of any "navigable water in this State, 
shall be permitted to exclude the right of 
way to such water whenever it is required 
for any public purpose." Cal. Const., Art. 
X, § 4. The state Code expressly provides 
that, save for exceptions not relevant here, 
"[p]ublic access from the nearest public 
roadway to the shoreline and along the 
coast shall be provided in new development 
projects." Cal.Pub.Res.Code Ann. § 30212 
(West 1986). The Coastal Commission In-
terpretative Guidelines make clear that ful-
fillment of the Commission's constitutional 
and statutory duty 1858requires that approv-
al of new coastline development be condi-
tioned upon provisions ensuring lateral 
public access to the ocean. App. 362. At 
the time of appellants' permit request, the 
Commission had conditioned all 43 of the 
proposals for coastal new development in 
the Faria Family Beach Tract on the provi-
sion of deed restrictions ensuring lateral 
access along the shore. Id., at 48. Finally, 
the Faria family had leased the beach prop-
erty since the early part of this century, 
and "the Faria family and their lessees 
[including the Nollans] had not interfered 
with public use of the beachfront within 
the Tract, so long as public use was limited 
to pass and re-pass lateral access along the 
shore." Ibid. California therefore has 
clearly established that the power of exclu-
sion for which appellants seek compensa-
tion simply is not a strand in the bundle of 
appellants' property rights, and appellants 
have never acted as if it were. Given this 
state of affairs, appellants cannot claim 
that the deed restriction has deprived them 
of a reasonable expectation to exclude from 
their property persons desiring to gain ac-
cess to the sea. 
Even were we somehow to concede a 
pre-existing expectation of a right to ex-
clude, appellants were clearly on notice 
restrictions ensuring lateral public access along 
the shoreline. App. 48. 
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when requesting a new development permit 
that a condition of approval would be a 
provision ensuring public lateral access to 
the shore. Thus, they surely could have 
had no expectation that they could obtain 
approval of their new development and ex-
ercise any right of exclusion afterward. In 
this respect, this case is quite similar to 
Ruckelshaus v. Monsanto Co., 467 U.S. 
986, 104 S.Ct. 2862, 81 L.Ed.2d 815 (1984). 
In Monsanto, the respondent hadxsub-
mitted trade data to the Environmental 
Protection Agency (EPA) for the purpose^ 
of obtaining registration of certain pesti-
cides. The company claimed that the agen-
cy's disclosure of certain data in accord-
ance with the relevant regulatory statute 
constituted a taking. The Court conceded 
that the data in question constituted prop-
erty under state law. It also found, how-
ever, that certain of the data had been 
submitted to the agency after Congress 
had |859made clear that only limited confi-
dentiality would be given data submitted 
for registration purposes. The Court ob-
served that the statute served to inform 
Monsanto of the various conditions under 
which data might be released, and stated: 
"If, despite the data-consideration and 
data-disclosure provisions in the statute, 
Monsanto chose to submit the requisite 
data in order to receive a registration, it 
can hardly argue that its reasonable in-
vestment-backed expectations are dis-
turbed when EPA acts to use or disclose 
the data in a manner that was authorized 
by law at the time of the submission." 
Id., at 1006-1007, 104 S.Ct, at 2874-
2875. 
The Court rejected respondent's argument 
that the requirement that it relinquish 
some confidentiality imposed an unconstitu-
tional condition on receipt of a Government 
benefit: 
"[A]s long as Monsanto is aware of the 
conditions under which the data are sub-
mitted, and the conditions are rationally 
10. The Court suggests that Ruckelshaus v. Mon-
santo is distinguishable, because government 
regulation of property in that case was a condi-
tion on receipt of a "government benefit," while 
related to a legitimate Government inter-
est, a voluntary submission of data by an 
applicant in exchange for the economic 
advantages of a registration can hardly 
be called a taking." Id., at 1007, 104 
S.Ct, at 2875. 
The similarity of this case to Monsanto 
is obvious. Appellants were aware that 
stringent regulation of development along 
the California coast had been in place at 
least since 1976. The specific deed restric-
tion to which the Commission sought to 
subject them had been imposed since 1979 
on all 43 shoreline new development 
projects in the Faria Family Beach Tract. 
App. 48. Such regulation to ensure public 
access to the ocean had been directly au-
thorized by California citizens in 1972, and 
reflected their judgment that restrictions 
on coastal development represented " 'the 
advantage of living and doing business in a 
civilized community.' " Andrus v. Allard, 
supra, 444 U.S., at 67, 100 S.Ct, at 328, 
quoting Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Makon, 
260 U.S., at 422, 43 S.Ct, at 163 (Brandeis, 
J., dissenting). The deed restriction was 
"authorized by law at the 186otime of [appel-
lants' permit] submission," Monsanto, su-
pra, 467 U.S., at 1007, 104 S.Ct, at 2875, 
and, as earlier analysis demonstrates, su-
pra, at 3155-3157, was reasonably related to 
the objective of ensuring public access. Ap-
pellants thus were on notice that new devel-
opments would be approved only if provi-
sions were made for lateral beach access. In 
requesting a new development permit from 
the Commission, they could have no reason-
able expectation of, and had no entitlement 
to, approval of their permit application 
without any deed restriction ensuring pub-
lic access to the ocean. As a result, analy-
sis of appellants' investment-backed expec-
tations reveals that "the force of this 
factor is so overwhelming . . . that it dis-
poses of the taking question." Monsanto, 
supra, at 1005, 104 S.Ct, at 2874.10 
here regulation takes the form of a restriction 
on "the right to build on one's own property," 
which "cannot remotely be described as a 
'government benefit.'" ante, at 3147, n. 2. This 
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Standard Takings Clause analysis thus 
indicates that the Court employs its unduly 
restrictive standard of police power ration-
ality to find a taking where neither the 
character of governmental action nor the 
nature of the private interest affected raise 
any takings concern. The result is that the 
Court invalidates regulation that repre-
sents a reasonable adpustmentsei of the 
burdens and benefits of development along 
the California coast. 
Ill 
The foregoing analysis makes clear that 
the State has taken no property from appel-
lants. Imposition of the permit condition in 
this case represents the State's reasonable 
exercise of its police power. The Coastal 
Commission has drawn on its expertise to 
preserve the balance between private devel-
opment and public access, by requiring that 
any project that intensifies development on 
the increasingly crowded California coast 
must be offset by gains in public access. 
Under the normal standard for review of 
the police power, this provision is eminently 
reasonable. Even accepting the Court's 
novel insistence on a precise quid pro quo 
of burdens and benefits, there is a reason-
able relationship between the public benefit 
and the burden created by appellants' de-
velopment. The movement of development 
closer to the ocean creates the prospect .of 
encroachment on public tidelands, because 
of fluctuation in the mean high-tide line. 
The deed restriction ensures that disputes 
about the boundary between private and 
public property will not deter the public 
proffered distinction is not persuasive. Both 
Monsanto and the Nollans hold property whose 
use is subject to regulation; Monsanto may not 
sell its property without obtaining government 
approval and the Nollans may not build new 
development on their property without govern-
ment approval. Obtaining such approval is as 
much a "government benefit" for the Nollans as 
it is for Monsanto. If the Court is somehow 
suggesting that "the right to build on one's own 
property" has some privileged natural rights sta-
tus, the argument is a curious one. By any 
traditional labor theory of value justification for 
property rights, for instance, see, e.g., J. Locke, 
from exercising its right to have access to 
the sea. 
Furthermore, consideration of the Com-
mission's action under traditional takings 
^analysis underscores the absence of any 
viable takings claim. The deed restriction 
permits the public only to pass and repass 
along a narrow strip of beach, a few feet 
closer to a seawall at the periphery of 
appellants' property. Appellants almost 
surely have enjoyed an increase in the val-
"ue of their property even with the restric-
tion, because they have been allowed to^ 
build a significantly larger new home with 
garage on their lot. Finally, appellants can 
claim the disruption of no expectation inter-
est, both because they have no right to 
exclude the public under state law, and 
because, even if they did, they had full 
advance notice that new development along 
the coast is conditioned on provisions for 
continued public access to the ocean. 
|862Fortunately, the Court's decision re-
garding this application of the Commis-
sion's permit program will probably have 
little ultimate impact either on this parcel 
in particular or the Commission program in 
general. A preliminary study by a Senior 
Lands Agent in the State Attorney Gener-
al's Office indicates that the portion of the 
beach at issue in this case likely belongs to 
the public. App. 85.11 Since a full study 
had not been completed at the time of 
appellants' permit application, the deed re-
striction was requested "without regard to 
the possibility that the applicant is propos-
ing development on public land." Id., at 
45. Furthermore, analysis by the same 
Land Agent also indicated that the public 
The Second Treatise of Civil Government 15-26 
(E. Gough, ed. 1947), Monsanto would have a 
superior claim, for the chemical formulae 
which constitute its property only came into 
being by virtue of Monsanto's efforts. 
11. The Senior Land Agent's report to the Com-
mission states that "based on my observations, 
presently, most, if not all of Faria Beach water-
ward of the existing seawalls [lies] below the 
Mean High Tide Level, and would fall in public 
domain or sovereign category of ownership." 
App. 85 (emphasis added). 
3162 107 SUPREME COURT REPORTER 483 U.S. 862 
had obtained a prescriptive right to the use 
of Faria Beach from the seawall to the 
ocean. Id., at 86.12 The Superior Court 
explicitly stated in its ruling against the 
Commission on the permit condition issue 
that "no part of this opinion is intended to 
foreclose the public's opportunity to adjudi-
cate the possibility that public rights in 
[appellants'] beach have been acquired 
through prescriptive use." Id., at 420.. 
With respect to the permit condition pro- x 
gram in general, the Commission should 
have little difficulty in the future in utiliz-
ing its expertise to demonstrate a specific 
connection between provisions for access 
and burdens on access produced by new 
development. Neither the Commission in 
its report nor the State in its briefs and at 
argument highlighted the particular threat 
to lateral access created by appellants' 
^development project. In defending its 
action, the State emphasized the general 
point that overall access to the beach had 
been preserved, since the diminution of ac-
cess created by the project had been offset 
by the gain in lateral access. This ap-
proach is understandable, given that the 
State relied on the reasonable assumption 
that its action was justified under the nor-
mal standard of review for determining 
legitimate exercises of a State's police pow-
er. In the future, alerted to the Court's 
apparently more demanding requirement, it 
need only make clear that a provision for 
public access directly responds to a particu-
lar type of burden on access created by a 
new development. Even if I did not believe 
that the record in this case satisfies this 
requirement, I would have to acknowledge 
12. The Senior Land Agent's report stated: 
"Based on my past experience and my investiga-
tion to date of this property it is my opinion 
that the area seaward of the revetment at 3822 
Pacific Coast Highway, Faria Beach, as well as 
all the area seaward of the revetments built to 
protect the Faria Beach community, if not pub-
lic owned, has been impliedly dedicated to the 
public for passive recreational use." Id., at 86. 
13. As the California Court of Appeals noted in 
1985, "Since 1972, permission' has been granted 
to construct more than 42,000 building units 
within the land jurisdiction of the Coastal Corn-
that the record's documentation of the im-
pact of coastal development indicates that 
the Commission should have little problem 
presenting its findings in a way that avoids 
a takings problem. 
Nonetheless it is important to point out 
that the Court's insistence on a precise 
accounting system in this case is insensi-
tive to the fact that increasing intensity of 
development in many areas calls for far-
-sighted, comprehensive planning that takes 
into account both the interdependence of 
land uses and the cumulative impact of 
development13 As one scholar has noted: 
"Property does not exist in isolation. 
Particular parcels are tied to one another 
in complex ways, and property isi864more 
accurately described as being inextrica-
bly part of a network of relationships 
that is neither limited to, nor usefully 
defined by, the property boundaries with 
which the legal system is accustomed to 
dealing. Frequently, use of any given 
parcel of property is at the same time 
effectively a use of, or a demand upon, 
property beyond the border of the user." 
Sax, Takings, Private Property, and Pub-
lic Rights, 81 Yale L.J. 149, 152 (1971) 
(footnote omitted). 
As Congress has declared: 'The key to 
more effective protection and use of the 
land and water resources of the coastal 
zone [is for the states to] develo[p] land 
and water use programs for the coastal 
zone, including unified policies, criteria, 
standards, methods, and processes for deal-
ing with land and water use decisions of 
more than local significance." 16 U.S.C. 
mission. In addition, pressure for development 
along the coast is expected to increase since 
approximately 85% of California's population 
lives within 30 miles of the coast." Grupe v. 
California Coastal Comm'n, 166 Cal.App.3d 148, 
167, n. 12, 212 Cal.Rptr. 578, 589, n. 12 (1985). 
See also Coastal Zone Management Act, 16 
U.S.C. § 1451(c) (increasing demands on coastal 
zones "have resulted in the loss of living marine 
resources, wildlife, nutrient-rich areas, perma-
nent and adverse changes to ecological systems, 
decreasing open space for public use, and shore-
line erosion"). 
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§ 1451(i). This is clearly a call for a focus 
on the overall impact of development on 
coastal areas. State agencies therefore re-
quire considerable flexibility in responding 
to private desires for development in a way 
that guarantees the preservation of public 
access to the coast. They should be en-
couraged to regulate development in the 
context of the overall balance of competing 
uses of the shoreline. The Court today 
does precisely the opposite, overruling air 
eminently reasonable exercise of an expert 
state agency's judgment, substituting its 
own narrow view of how this balance 
should be struck. Its reasoning is hardly 
suited to the complex reality of natural 
resource protection in the 20th century. I 
can only hope that today's decision is an 
aberration, and that a broader vision ulti-
mately prevails.14 
I dissent. 
I sGsJustice BLACKMUN, dissenting. 
I do not understand the Court's opinion 
in this case to implicate in any way the 
public-trust doctrine. The Court certainly 
had no reason to address the issue, for the 
Court of Appeal of California did not rest 
its decision on Art. X, § 4, of the California 
Constitution. Nor did the parties base 
their arguments before this Court on the 
doctrine. 
I disagree with the Court's rigid interpre-
tation of the necessary correlation between 
a burden created by development and a 
condition imposed pursuant to the State's 
police power to mitigate that burden. The 
land-use problems this country faces re-
quire creative solutions. These are not ad-
vanced by an "eye for an eye" mentality. 
The close nexus between benefits and bur-
dens that the Court now imposes on permit 
14. I believe that States should be afforded con-
siderable latitude in regulating private develop-
ment, without fear that their regulatory efforts 
will often be found to constitute a taking. "// 
. . . regulation denies the private property own-
er the use and enjoyment of his land and is 
found to effect a 'taking/" however, I believe 
that compensation is the appropriate remedy 
for this constitutional violation. San Diego Gas 
conditions creates an anomaly in the ordi-
nary requirement that a State's exercise of 
its police power need be no more than 
rationally based. See, e.g., Minnesota v. 
Clover Leaf Creamery Co., 449 U.S. 456, 
466, 101 S.Ct. 715, 725, 66 L.Ed.2d 659 
(1981). In my view, the easement exacted 
from appellants and the problems their de-
velopment created are adequately related 
to the governmental interest in providing 
.public access to the beach. Coastal devel-
opment by its very nature makes public 
access to the shore generally more diffi-
cult. Appellants' structure is part of that 
general development and, in particular, it 
diminishes the public's visual access to the 
ocean and decreases the public's sense that 
it may have physical access to the beach. 
These losses in access can be counteracted, 
at least in part, by the condition on appel-
lants' construction permitting public pas-
sage that ensures access along the beach. 
Traditional takings analysis compels the 
conclusion that there is no taking here. 
The governmental action is a valid exercise 
of the police power, and, so far as the 
record reveals, |g66has a nonexistent eco-
nomic effect on the value of appellants' 
property. No investment-backed expecta 
tions were diminished. It is significan 
that the Nollans had notice of the easemem 
before they purchased the property anc 
that public use of the beach had been per 
mitted for decades. 
For these reasons, I respectfully dissent 
Justice STEVENS, with whom Justice 
BLACKMUN joins, dissenting. 
The debate between the Court and Jus 
tice BRENNAN illustrates an extremel; 
important point concerning governmen 
regulation of the use of privately owne 
& Electric Co. v. San Diego, 450 U.S. 621, 65( 
101 S.Ct. 1287, 1306, 67 L.Ed.2d 551 (1981 
(BRENNAN, J., dissenting) (emphasis added), 
therefore see my dissent here as compietel 
consistent with my position in First EngliSi 
Evangelical Lutheran Church of Glendale v. Lo 
Angeles County, 482 U.S. 304, 107 S.Ct. 2378, 9 
L.Ed.2d 250 (1987). 
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real estate. Intelligent, well-informed pub-
lic officials may in good faith disagree 
about the validity of specific types of land-
use regulation. Even the wisest lawyers 
would have to acknowledge great uncer-
tainty about the scope of this Court's tak-
ings jurisprudence. Yet, because of the 
Court's remarkable ruling in First English 
Evangelical Lutheran Church of Glen-
dale v. Los Angeles County, 482 U.S. 304^ 
107 S.Ct. 2378, 96 L.Ed.2d 250 (1987), local 
governments and officials must pay the 
price for the necessarily vague standards 
in this area of the law. 
In his dissent in San Diego Gas & Elec-
tric Co. v. San Diego, 450 U.S. 621, 101 
S.Ct. 1287, 67 L.Ed.2d 551 (1981), Justice 
BRENNAN proposed a brand new constitu-
tional rule.* He argued that a mistake 
such as the one that a majority of the 
Court believes that the California Coastal 
Commission made in this case should auto-
matically give rise to pecuniary liability for 
a "temporary taking." Id., at 653-661, 101 
S.Ct, at 1304-1309. Notwithstanding the 
unprecedented chilling effect that such a 
rule will obviously have on public officials 
charged with the responsibility for drafting 
and implementing regulations designed to 
protect the envjronment867 and the public 
welfare, six Members of the Court recently 
endorsed Justice BRENNAN's novel pro-
posal. See First English Evangelical Lu-
theran Church, supra. 
I write today to identify the severe ten-
sion between that dramatic development in 
the law and the view expressed by Justice 
BRENNAN's dissent in this case that the 
public interest is served by encouraging 
state agencies to exercise considerable flex-
ibility in responding to private desires for 
development in a way that threatens the 
preservation of public resources. See 
ante, at 3153-3154. I like the hat that 
Justice BRENNAN has donned today bet-
ter than the one he wore in San Diego, and 
* "The constitutional rule I propose requires that, 
once a court finds that a police power regula-
tion has effected a 'taking/ the government enti-
ty must pay just compensation for the period 
commencing on the date the regulation first 
I am persuaded that he has the better of 
the legal arguments here. Even if his posi-
tion prevailed in this case, however, it 
would be of little solace to land-use plan-
ners who would still be left guessing about 
how the Court will react to the next case, 
and the one after that. As this case dem-
onstrates, the rule of liability created by 
the Court in First English is a shortsight-
ed one. Like Justice BRENNAN, I hope 
'th^t "a broader vision ultimately prevails." 
Ante,.dX 3161. 
I respectfully dissent. 
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jsesJoseph G. GRIFFIN, Petitioner, 
v. 
WISCONSIN. 
No. 86-5324. 
Argued April 20, 1987. 
Decided June 26, 1987. 
Probationer was convicted in the Cir-
cuit Court, Rock County, J. Richard Long, 
J., of possession of firearm by a felon, and 
he appealed. The Court of Appeals, 126 
Wis.2d 183, 376 N.W.2d 62, affirmed, and 
probationer appealed. The Wisconsin Su-
preme Court, 131 Wis.2d 41, 388 N.W.2d 
535, affirmed, and certiorari was granted. 
The Supreme Court, Justice Scalia, held 
that search of probationer's home, pursu-
ant to Wisconsin regulation replacing stan-
dard of probable cause by "reasonable 
grounds/' satisfied Fourth Amendment. 
Affirmed. 
effected the 'taking,' and ending on the date the 
government entity chooses to rescind or other-
wise amend the regulation." 450 U.S., at 658, 
101 S.Ct., at 1307. 
APPENDIX #3 
Dolan vs City of Tigard 
114 SCt 2309 (United States Supreme Court 1994) 
512 U.S. 374 DOLAN v. CITY OF TIGARD 
Cite as 114 S.Ct. 2309 (1994) 
2309 
On May 9, 1983, at his first appearance 
before the court, Reed, appearing without 
counsel, informed the court that he would be 
in a halfway house but for the detainer. 
"App. 12. The court acknowledged that there 
{is a "world of difference" between a halfway 
house and the Fulton County jail. Id., at 14. 
The court later observed that Reed's incar-
ceration rendered him incapable of preparing 
his defense. Id, at 54. 
At the June 27 pretrial conference, Reed 
..asked the court if it would prefer future 
motions orally or in writing. The court re-
sponded, "I want it in writing," and "I read 
better ^ t h a n I listen." Id., at 39-40; see 
also id., at 123 (noting preference for written 
motions). Conforming to this request, Reed 
filed a motion on July 25, requesting that 
/'trial be held within the legal guidelines of 
Jhe Agreement on Detainer Act." Id., at 56. 
Clarifying his concerns, Reed complained 
that the State of Indiana was "forcing [him] 
to be tried beyond the limits as set forth in 
the Agreement on Detainer Act," and specifi-
cally "requested that] no extension of time 
be granted beyond those guidelines." Ibid. 
./This pro se motion was filed 31 days before 
ltthe 120-day period expired. 
L Three days later, Reed filed a motion stat-ing that there was "limited time left for trial 
"within the laws." Id., at 88. This pro se 
^motion was filed 28 days before the IAD 
clock ran out. Finally, on August 11, he filed 
ca motion for subpoenas that sought prompt 
relief because the "Detainer Act time limits" 
were "approaching." Id., at 91. This pro se 
motion was filed 15 days before the 120-day 
IAD time limit expired. 
Thus, after being instructed that the court 
wanted all motions in writing, Reed filed 
nthree timely written motions indicating his 
~
rdesire to be tried within the IAD time limits. 
^The Supreme Court of Indiana concluded 
"
rthat Reed's July 26 motion constituted "a 
9,11. The Court, referring to the "clarity" of Reed's 
August 29 motion seeking discharge of the indict-
ment, suggests that he deliberately obscured his 
request until after the clock had run. Ante, at 
2295, 2297. The Court fails to mention, howev-
er, that Reed prepared his earlier motions both 
without counsel and without adequate access to 
-ibt 
general demand that trial be held within the 
time limits of the IAD." 491 N.E.2d 182, 185 
(1993). Under Mauro, this was enough to 
put the court on notice of his demands. 
Even as an original matter, when a trial 
court instructs a pro se defendant to put his 
motions in writing, and the defendant does 
so, not once, but three times, it is wholly 
unwarranted then to penalize him for failing 
to object orally at what this Court later 
singles out as the magic moment.11 
|373This should be a simple matter. Reed 
invoked, and the trial court denied, his right 
to be tried within the IAD's 120-day time 
limit. Section 2254 authorizes federal courts 
to grant for such a violation whatever relief 
law and justice require. The IAD requires 
dismissal of the indictment. Nothing in the 
IAD, in § 2254, or in our precedent requires 
or even suggests that federal courts should 
refrain from entertaining a state prisoner's 
claims of a violation of the IAD. According-
ly, I respectfully dissent. 
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374Florence DOLAN, Petitioner 
v. 
CITY OF TIGARD. 
No. 93-518. 
Argued March 23, 1994. 
Decided June 24, 1994. 
Landowner petitioned for judicial review 
of decision of Oregon Land Use Board of 
legal materials. It was only at the August 1 
pretrial conference that the court ordered the 
sheriff to provide Reed with access to legal mate-
rials. App. 85. On August 9, Reed was given 
two lawbooks, including one on Indiana criminal 
procedure, and thereafter his draftsmanship im-
proved 
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Appeals, affirming conditions placed by city 
on development of commercial property. 
The Court of Appeals, 113 OrApp. 162, 832 
P.2d 853, affirmed, and landowner again ap-
pealed. The Oregon Supreme Court affirmed, 
317 Or. 110, 854 P.2d 437, and certiorari was 
granted. The Supreme Court, Chief Justice 
Rehnquist, held that: (1) city's requirement 
that landowner dedicate portion of her prop-
erty lying within flood plain for improvement 
of storm drainage system and property^adja-
cent to flood plain as bicycle/pedestrian path-
way, as condition for building permit allowing 
expansion of landowner's commercial proper-
ty, had nexus with legitimate public pur-
poses; (2) findings relied upon by city to 
require landowner to dedicate portion of her 
property in flood plain as public greenway, 
did not show required reasonable relation-
ship necessary to satisfy requirements of 
Fifth Amendment; and (3) city failed to meet 
its burden of demonstrating that additional 
number of vehicle and bicycle trips generated 
by proposed commercial development reason-
ably related to city's requirement of dedica-
tion of pedestrian/bicycle pathway easement. 
Reversed and remanded. 
Justice Stevens filed dissenting opinion 
in which Justices Blackmun and Ginsburg 
joined. 
Justice Souter filed dissenting opinion. 
1. Eminent Domain <&=>1 
One of the principal purposes of the 
takings clause of the Fifth Amendment is to 
bar Government from forcing some people 
alone to bear public burdens which, in all 
fairness and justice, should be borne by pub-
lic as a whole. U.S.CA. ConstAmends. 5, 
14. 
2. Eminent Domain <S>2(1.2) 
Zoning and Planning <S=>40 
Land use regulation does not effect a 
taking if it substantially advances legitimate 
state interest and does not deny owner eco-
nomically viable use of his or her land. 
U.S.CA ConstAmends. 5, 14. 
3. Eminent Domain <s=»2(l.l, 1.2) 
Under doctrine of "unconstitutional con-
ditions," government may not require person 
to give up constitutional right in exchange for 
discretionary benefit conferred by govern-
ment where property sought has little or no 
relationship to the benefit. U.S.CA Const. 
Amends. 5, 14. 
See publication Words and Phrases 
for other judicial constructions and def-
initions. 
4. Eminent Domain <S>2(1.2) 
In evaluating landowner's claim that 
city's requirement that she dedicate a portion 
of her property as condition of further devel-
opment was unconstitutional taking, Supreme 
Court was first required to determine wheth-
er "essential nexus" existed between legiti-
mate state interest and permit condition ex-
acted by city; if Court found that nexus 
existed, it was then required to decide re-
quired degree of connection between exac-
tions and projected impact of proposed devel-
opment. U.S.CA. ConstAmends. 5, 14. 
5. Eminent Domain S>2(1.2) 
Zoning and Planning <s>382.3 
City's requirement that landowner dedi-
cate portion of her property lying within 
flood plain for improvement of storm drain-
age system and property adjacent to flood 
plain as bicycle/pedestrian pathway, as condi-
tion for building permit allowing expansion of 
landowner's commercial property, had nexus 
with legitimate public purposes of preventing 
flooding along creek and reducing traffic con-
gestion in city's central business district, for 
purposes of Fifth Amendment takings analy-
sis. U.S.CA ConstAmends. 5, 14. 
6. Eminent Domain <3»2(1.2) 
Zoning and Planning <S=»382.3 
"Rough proportionality" test applied in 
determining whether degree of exactions re-
quired by city's building permit conditions 
bore required relationship to projected im-
pact on proposed development to satisfy tak-
ings clause of Fifth Amendment; no precise 
mathematical calculation was required, but 
city was required to make some sort of indi-
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vidualized determination that required dedi-
cation was related both in nature and extent 
to impact of proposed development. 
U.S.C.A. ConstAmends. 5, 14. 
See publication Words and Phrases 
for other judicial constructions and def-
initions. 
7. Constitutional Law <s*82(6.1) 
Simply denominating governmental in-
terest as "business regulation" does rit>t im-
munize it from constitutional challenge on 
grounds that it violates provision of the Bill 
of Rights. U.S.C.A. ConstAmends. 1-10. 
8. Eminent Domain <&=>56 
Zoning and Planning @=>439 
Findings relied upon by city to require 
landowner to dedicate portion of her proper-
ty in flood plain as public greenway, as condi-
tion for constructing new commercial build-
ing, did not show required, reasonable rela-
tionship between flood plain easement and 
landowner's proposed new building necessary 
to satisfy requirement of Fifth Amendment 
"takings" clause; although city found that 
paved parking lot that was included in pro-
posed development would increase storm wa-
ter flow from property, city never stated why 
public greenway, as opposed to private one, 
was required in interest of flood control. 
U.S.C.A. ConstAmends. 5, 14. 
9. Zoning and Planning <S>382.3 
City failed to meet its burden of demon-
strating that additional number of vehicle 
and bicycle trips generated by proposed com-
mercial development were reasonably related 
;;to city's requirement of dedication of pedes-
ttrian/bicycle pathway easement as condition 
• of granting building permit; city simply 
f^ound that creation of pathway could offset 
s^ome of the traffic demand and lessen in-
crease in traffic congestion, but did not find 
lthat pathway was likely to offset traffic de-
mand. U.S.C.A. ConstAmends. 5, 14. 
k*The syllabus constitutes no part of the opinion of 
the Court but has been prepared by the Reporter 
of Decisions for the convenience of the reader. 
10. Zoning and Planning <s>382.3 
Dedications for streets, sidewalks, and 
other public ways are generally reasonable 
exactions to avoid excessive congestion from 
proposed property use. U.S.C.A. Const 
Amends. 5, 14. 
Syllabus * 
The City Planning Commission of re-
spondent city conditioned approval of peti-
tioner Dolan's application to expand her 
store and pave her parking lot upon her 
compliance with dedication of land (1) for a 
public greenway along Fanno Creek to mini-
mize flooding that would be exacerbated by 
the increases in impervious surfaces associat-
ed with her development and (2) for a pedes-
trian/bicycle pathway intended to relieve 
traffic congestion in the city's Central Busi-
ness District. She appealed the commis-
sion's denial of her request for variances 
from these standards to the Land Use Board 
of Appeals (LUBA), alleging that the land 
dedication requirements were not related to 
the proposed development and therefore' con-
stituted an uncompensated taking of her 
property under the Fifth Amendment 
LUBA found a reasonable relationship be-
tween (1) the development and the require-
ment to dedicate land for a greenway, since 
the larger building and paved lot would~in-
crease the impervious surfaces and thus the 
runoff into the creek, and (2) alleviating the 
impact of increased traffic from the develop-
ment and facilitating the provision of a path-
way as an alternative means of transporta-
tion. Both the Oregon Court of Appeals and 
the Oregon Supreme Court affirmed. 
Held: The city's dedication require-
ments constitute an uncompensated taking of 
property. Pp. 2316-2322. 
(a) Under the well-settled doctrine of 
"unconstitutional conditions," the govern-
ment may not require a person to give up a 
constitutional right in exchange for a discre-
tionary benefit conferred by the government 
where the property sought has little or no 
See United States v Detroit Lumber Co , 200 U S 
321, 337, 26 S.Ct. 282, 287, 50 L.Ed. 499 
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relationship to the benefit. In evaluating 
Dolan's claim, it must be determined whether 
an "essential nexus" exists between a legiti-
mate state interest and the permit condition. 
Nollan v. California Coastal Comm'n, 483 
U.S. 825, 837, 107 S.Ct. 3141, 3148, 97 
L.Ed.2d 677. If one does, then it must be 
decided whether the degree of the exactions 
demanded by the permit conditions bears the 
required relationship to the projected impact 
of the proposed development. Id, at "834, 
107 S.Ct. at 3147. Pp. 2316-2317. 
(b) Preventing flooding along Fanno 
Creek and reducing traffic congestion in the 
district are legitimate public purposes; and a 
nexus exists between the first purpose and 
limiting development within the creeps 
Jj75floodplain and between the second pur-
pose and providing for alternative means of 
transportation. Pp. 2317-2318. 
(c) In deciding the second question— 
whether the city's findings are constitutional-
ly sufficient to justify the conditions imposed 
on Dolan's permit—the necessary connection 
required by the Fifth Amendment is "rough 
proportionality." No precise mathematical 
calculation is required, but the city must 
make some sort of individualized determina-
tion that the required dedication is related 
both in nature and extent to the proposed 
development's impact. This is essentially the 
"reasonable relationship" test adopted by the 
majority of the state courts. Pp. 2318-2320. 
(d) The findings upon which the city 
relies do not show the required reasonable 
relationship between the floodplain easement 
and Dolan's proposed building. The Commu-
nity Development Code already required that 
Dolan leave 15% of her property as open 
space, and the undeveloped floodplain would 
have nearly satisfied that requirement. 
However, the city has never said why a 
public, as opposed to a private, greenway is 
required in the interest of flood control. The 
difference to Dolan is the loss of her ability 
to exclude others from her property, yet the 
city has not attempted to make any individu-
alized determination to support this part of 
its request. The city has also not met its 
burden of demonstrating that the additional 
number of vehicle and bicycle trips generated 
by Dolan's development reasonably relates to 
the city's requirement for a dedication of the 
pathway easement. The city must quantify 
its finding beyond a conclusory statement 
that the dedication could offset some of the 
traffic demand generated by the develop-
ment. Pp. 2319-2322. 
317 Ore. 110, 854 P.2d 437 (1993), re-
versed and remanded. 
REHNQUIST, C.J., delivered the 
opinion of the Court, in which O'CONNOR, 
SCALIA, KENNEDY, and THOMAS, JJ., 
joined. STEVENS, J., filed a dissenting 
opinion, in which BLACKMUN and 
GINSBURG, JJ., joined, post, p. 2322. 
SOUTER, J., filed a dissenting opinion, post, 
p. 2330. 
David B. Smith, Tigard, OR, for petitioner. 
Timothy V. Ramis, Portland, OR, for re-
spondent. 
l376Edwin S. Kneedler, Washington, DC, 
for U.S., as amicus curiae by special leave of 
the Court. 
For U.S. Supreme Court briefs, see: 
1994 WL 249537 (Pet.Brief) 
1994 WL 123754 (Resp.Brief) 
1994 WL 82042 (Reply.Brief) 
1994 WL 106731 (Resp.Supp.Brief) 
| yrrChief Justice REHNQUIST delivered 
the opinion of the Court. 
Petitioner challenges the decision of the 
Oregon Supreme Court which held that the 
city of Tigard could condition the approval of 
her building permit on the dedication of a 
portion of her property for flood control and 
traffic improvements. 317 Ore. 110, 854 P.2d 
437 (1993). We granted certiorari to resolve 
a question left open by our decision in Nollan 
v. California Coastal Comm'n, 483 U.S. 825, 
107 S.Ct. 3141, 97 L.Ed.2d 677 (1987), of 
what is the required degree of connection 
between the exactions imposed by the city^  
and the projected impacts of the proposed 
development. 
512 U.S. 379 DOLAN v. CITY OF TIGARD 
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The State of Oregon enacted a comprehen-
sive land use management program in 1973. 
Ore.Rev.Stat §§ 197.005-197.860 (1991). 
The program required all Oregon cities and 
counties to adopt new comprehensive land 
use plans that were consistent with the state-
wide planning goals. §§ 197.175(1), 197.250. 
The plans are implemented by land use regu-
lations which are part of an integrated^hier-
archy of legally binding goals, plans, ancT 
regulations. §§ 197.175, 197.175(2)(b). Pur-
suant to the State's requirements, the city of 
Tigard, a community of some 30,000 resi-
dents on the southwest edge of Portland, 
developed a comprehensive plan and codified 
it in its Community Development Code 
(CDC). The CDC requires property owners 
in the area zoned Central Business District 
to comply with a 15% open space and land-
scaping requirement, which limits total site 
coverage, including all structures and paved 
parking, to 85% of the parcel. CDC, ch. 
18.66, App. to Pet. for Cert. G-16 to G-17. 
After the completion of a transportation 
study that identified ^congestion in the 
. Central Business District as a particular 
problem, the city adopted a plan for a pedes-
1
 trian/bicycle pathway intended to encourage 
alternatives to automobile transportation for 
short trips. The CDC requires that new 
development facilitate this plan by dedicating 
'land for pedestrian pathways where provided 
for in the pedestrian/bicycle pathway plan.1 
s
" The city also adopted a Master Drainage 
*Plan (Drainage Plan). The Drainage Plan 
-noted that flooding occurred in several areas 
~ along Fanno Creek, including areas near pe-
titioner's property. Record, Doc. No. F, ch. 
2, pp. 2-5 to 2-8; 4-2 to 4-6; Figure 4-1. 
^The Drainage Plan also established that the 
i^ncrease in impervious surfaces associated 
with continued urbanization would exacer-
t. 
'1 . CDC § 18.86.040.A.i.b provides: "The devel-
J
«' opment shall facilitate pedestrian/bicycle circula-
° tion if the site is located on a street with desig-
'
J1,
 nated bikepaths or adjacent to a designated 
>r~ greenway/open space/park. Specific items to be 
5
" addressed [include]: (i) Provision of efficient, 
v convenient and continuous pedestrian and bicy-
cle transit circulation systems, linking develop-
bate these flooding problems. To combat 
these risks, the Drainage Plan suggested a 
series of improvements to the Fanno Creek 
Basin, including channel excavation in the 
xarea next to petitioner's property. App. to 
Pet. for Cert. G-13, G-38. Other recommen-
dations included ensuring that the floodplain 
remains free of structures and that it be 
preserved as greenways to minimize flood 
damage to structures. Record, Doc. No. F, 
ch. 5, pp. 5-16 to 5-21. The Drainage Plan 
x
 concluded that the cost of these improve-
ments should be shared based on both direct 
and indirect benefits, with property owners 
along the waterways paying more due to the 
direct benefit that they would receive. Id., 
ch. 8, p. 8-H. CDC Chapters 18.84 and 
18.86 |379and CDC § 18.164.100 and the Ti-
gard Park Plan carry out these recommenda-
tions. 
Petitioner Florence Dolan owns a plumb-
ing and electric supply store located on Main 
Street in the Central Business District of the 
city. The store covers approximately 9,700 
square feet on the eastern side of a 1.67-acre 
parcel, which includes a gravel parking lot. 
Fanno Creek flows through the southwestern 
corner of the lot and along its western 
boundary. The year-round flow of the creek 
renders the area within the creek's 100-year 
floodplain virtually unusable for commercial 
development. The city's comprehensive plan 
includes the Fanno Creek floodplain as part 
of the city's greenway system. 
Petitioner applied to the city for a permit 
to redevelop the site. Her proposed'plans 
called for nearly doubling the size of the 
store to 17,600 square feet and paving a 39-
space parking lot. The existing store, locat-
ed on the opposite side of the parcel, would 
be razed in sections as construction progress-
ed on the new building. In the second phase 
of the project, petitioner proposed to build an 
additional structure on the northeast side of 
ments by requiring dedication and construction 
of pedestrian and bikepaths identified in the 
comprehensive plan. If direct connections can-
not be made, require that funds in the amount of 
the construction cost be deposited into an ac-
count for the purpose of constructing paths." 
App. to Brief for Respondent B-33 to B-34. 
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the site for complementary businesses and to 
provide more parking. The proposed expan-
sion and intensified use are consistent with 
the city's zoning scheme in the Central Busi-
ness District. CDC § 18.66.030, App. to 
Brief for Petitioner C-l to C-3. 
The City Planning Commission (Commis-
sion) granted petitioner's permit application 
subject to conditions imposed by the city's 
CDC. The CDC establishes the following 
standard for site development review approv-
al: 
"Where landfill and/or development is al-
lowed within and adjacent to the 100-year 
floodplain, the City shall require the dedi-
cation of sufficient open land area for 
greenway adjoining and within the flood-
plain. This area shall include portions at a 
suitable elevation for the construction of a 
pedestrian/bicycle pathway within the 
|38ofloodplain in accordance with the 
adopted pedestrian/bicycle plan." CDC 
§ 18.120.180.A.8, App. to Brief for Respon-
dent B-45 to B-46. 
Thus, the Commission required that petition-
er dedicate the portion of her property lying 
within the 100-year floodplain for improve-
ment of a storm drainage system along Fan-
no Creek and that she dedicate an additional 
15-foot strip of land adjacent to the flood-
plain as a pedestrian/bicycle pathway.2 The 
dedication required by that condition encom-
passes approximately 7,000 square feet, or 
roughly 10% of the property. In accordance 
with city practice, petitioner could rely on the 
2. The city's decision includes the following rele-
vant conditions "1 The applicant shall dedicate 
to the City as Greenway all portions of the site 
that fall within the existing 100-year floodplain 
[of Fanno Creek] (i e , all portions of the property 
below elevation 150 0) and all property 15 feet 
above (to the east of) the 150.0 foot floodplain 
boundary The building shall be designed so as 
not to intrude into the greenway area " App to 
Pet for Cert G-43 
3. CDC § 18 134 050 contains the following crite-
ria whereby the decisionmaking authority can 
approve, approve with modifications, or deny a 
vanance request 
"(1) The proposed variance will not be material-
ly detrimental to the purposes of this tide, be in 
conflict with the policies of the comprehensive 
plan, to any other applicable policies and stan-
dedicated property to meet the 15% open 
space and landscaping requirement mandat-
ed by the city's zoning scheme. App. to Pet. 
for Cert. &-28 to G-29. The city would bear 
the cost of maintaining a landscaped buffer 
between the dedicated area and the new 
store. Id., at G-44 to G-45. 
Petitioner requested vanances from the 
CDC standards. Vanances are granted only 
where it can be shown that, owing to special 
circumstances related to a specific piece of 
the land, the literal interpretation of the ap-
plicable zoning provisions would cause "an 
undue or unnecessary hardship" unless the 
variance is granted. CDC § 18.134.010, App. 
to Brief for Respondent B-47.3 Rather than 
posing alternative^! mitigating measures to 
offset the expected impacts of her proposed 
development, as allowed under the CDC, pe-
titioner simply argued that her proposed de-
velopment would not conflict with the policies 
of the comprehensive plan. Id., at E-&. The 
Commission denied the request. 
The Commission made a senes of findings 
concerning the relationship between the dedi-
cated conditions and the projected impacts of 
petitioner's project. First, the Commission 
noted that "[i]t is reasonable to assume that 
customers and employees of the future uses 
of this site could utilize a pedestrian/bicycle 
pathway adjacent to this development for 
their transportation and recreational needs." 
dards, and to other properties in the same zoning 
district or vicinity, 
"(2) There are special circumstances that exist 
which are peculiar to the lot size or shape topog-
raphy or other circumstances over which the 
applicant has no control, and which are not 
applicable to other properties in the same zoning 
district, 
"(3) The use proposed will be the same as per-
mitted under this title and City standards will be 
maintained to the greatest extent possible, while 
permitting some economic use of the land, 
"(4) Existing physical and natural systems, such 
as but not limited to traffic, drainage, dramatic 
land forms, or parks will not be adversely affect-
ed any more than would occur if the develop-
ment were located as specified in the title, and 
"(5) The hardship is not self-imposed and the 
variance requested is the minimum variance 
which would alleviate the hardship " App to 
Brief for Respondent B-49 to B-50 
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City of Tigard Planning Commission Final 
Order No. 91-09 PC, App. to Pet for Cert. 
G-24. The Commission noted that the site 
plan has provided for bicycle parking in a 
rack in front of the proposed building and 
"[i]t is reasonable to expect that some of thev 
users of the bicycle parking provided for by 
the site plan will use the pathway adjacent to 
Fanno Creek if it is constructed." Ibid, In 
addition, the Commission found that creation 
of a convenient, safe pedestrian/bicycle path-
way system as an alternative means of traits-: 
portation "could |382offset some of the traffic 
demand on [nearby] streets and lessen the 
increase in traffic congestion." Ibid, 
The Commission went on to note that the 
required floodplain dedication would be rea-
sonably related to petitioner's request to in-
tensify the use of the site given the increase 
in the impervious surface. The Commission 
stated that the "anticipated increased storm 
water flow from the subject property to an 
already strained creek and drainage' basin 
can only add to the public need to manage 
the stream channel and floodplain for drain-
age purposes." Id,, at G-37. Based on this 
anticipated increased storm water flow, the 
Commission concluded that "the requirement 
of dedication of the floodplain area on the 
site is related to the applicant's plan to inten-
sify development on the site." Ibid, The 
Tigard City Council approved the Commis-
sion's final order, subject to one minor modi-
fication; the city council reassigned the re-
sponsibility for surveying and marking the 
floodplain area from petitioner to the city's 
engineering department. Id., at G-7. 
Petitioner appealed to the Land Use Board 
of Appeals (LUBA) on the ground that the 
city's dedication requirements were not relat-
ed to the proposed development, and, there-
fore, those requirements constituted an un-
compensated taking of her property under 
the Fifth Amendment. In evaluating the 
federal taking claim, LUBA assumed that 
the city's findings about the impacts of the 
proposed development were supported by 
4. The Supreme Court of Oregon did not address 
the consequences of petitioner's failure to pro-
vide alternative mitigation measures in her vari-
substantial evidence. Dolan v. Tigard, 
LUBA 91-161 (Jan. 7, 1992), reprinted at 
App. to Pet. for Cert. D-15, n. 9. Given the 
undisputed fact that the proposed larger 
building and paved parking area would in-
crease the amount of impervious surfaces 
and the runoff into Fanno Creek, LUBA 
concluded that "there is a 'reasonable rela-
tionship' between the proposed development 
and the requirement to dedicate land along 
Fanno Creek for a greenway." Id., at D-16. 
With respect to the pedestrian/bicycle path-
way, LUBA noted the Commission's finding 
that a signifjcantly383 larger retail sales build-
ing and parking lot would attract larger num-
bers of customers and employees and their 
vehicles. It again found a "reasonable rela-
tionship" between alleviating the impacts of 
increased traffic from the development and 
facilitating the provision of a pedestrian/bicy-
cle pathway as an alternative means of trans-
portation. Ibid. 
The Oregon Court of Appeals affirmed, 
rejecting petitioner's contention that in Nol-
lan v. California Coastal Comm'n, 483 U.S. 
825, 107 S.Ct. 3141, 97 L.Ed.2d 677 (1987), 
we had abandoned the "reasonable relation-
ship" test in favor of a stricter "essential 
nexus" test. 113 OreApp. 162, 832 P.2d 853 
(1992). The Oregon Supreme Court af-
firmed. 317 Ore. 110, 854 P.2d 437 (1993). 
The court also disagreed with petitioner's 
contention that the Nollan Court abandoned 
the "reasonably related" test. 317 Ore., at 
118, 854 P.2d, at 442. Instead, the court 
read Nollan to mean that an "exaction is 
reasonably related to an impact if the exac-
tion serves the same purpose that a denial of 
the permit would serve." 317 Ore., at 120, 
854 P.2d, at 443. The court decided that 
both the pedestrian/bicycle pathway condi-
tion and the storm drainage dedication had 
an essential nexus to the development of the 
proposed site. Id., at 121, 854 P.2d, at 443, 
Therefore, the court found the conditions to 
be reasonably related to the impact of the 
expansion of petitioner's business. Ibid} 
ance application and we take the case as it 
comes to us. Accordingly, we do not pass on the 
constitutionality of the city's variance provisions 
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We granted certiorari, 510 U.S. 989, 114 
S.Ct. 544, 126 L.Ed.2d 446 (1993), because of 
an alleged conflict between the Oregon Su-
preme Courts decision and our decision in 
Nollan, supra. 
II 
[1] The Takings Clause of the Fifth 
Amendment of the United State^ Constitu-
tion, made applicable to the States^tljrough 
the Fourteenth Amendment, Chicago, 5. & 
Q.R. Co. v. Chfyago,m 166 U.S. 226, 239, 17 
S.Ct. 581, 585, 41 L.Ed. 979 (1897), provides: 
"[N]or shall private property be taken for 
public use, without just compensation."5 
One of the principal purposes of the Takings 
Clause is "to bar Government from forcing 
some people alone to bear public burdens 
which, in all fairness and justice, should be 
borne by the public as a whole." Armstrong 
v. United States, 364 U.S. 40, 49, 80 S.Ct. 
1563, 1569, 4 L.Ed.2d 1554 (1960). Without 
question, had the city simply required peti-
tioner to dedicate a strip of land along Fanno 
Creek for public use, rather than condition-
ing the grant of her permit to redevelop her 
property on such a dedication, a taking would 
have occurred. Nollan, supra, 483 U.S., at 
831, 107 S.Ct., at 3145. Such public access 
would deprive petitioner of the right to ex-
clude others, "one of the most essential sticks 
in the bundle of rights that are commonly 
characterized as property." Kaiser Aetna v. 
5. Justice STEVENS' dissent suggests that this 
case is actually grounded in "substantive" due 
process, rather than in the view that the Takings 
Clause of the Fifth Amendment was made appli-
cable to the States by the Fourteenth Amend-
ment. But there is no doubt that later cases 
have held that the Fourteenth Amendment does 
make the Takings Clause of the Fifth Amendment 
applicable to the States, see Penn Central Transp. 
Co. v. New York City, 438 U.S. 104, 122, 98 S.Ct. 
2646, 2658, 57 L.Ed.2d 631 (1978); Nollan v. 
California Coastal Comm'n, 483 U.S. 825, 827, 
107 S.Ct. 3141, 3143, 97 L.Ed.2d 677 (1987). 
Nor is there any doubt that these cases have 
relied upon Chicago, B. & Q.R. Co. v. Chicago, 
166 U.S. 226, 17 S.Ct. 581, 41 L.Ed. 979 (1897), 
to reach that result. See, e.g., Penn Central, 
supra, 438 U.S., at 122, 98 S.Ct., at 2658 ("The 
issu[e] presented . . . [is] whether the restrictions 
imposed by New York City's law upon appel-
United States, 444 U.S. 164, 176, 100 S.Ct. 
383, 391, 62 L.Ed.2d 332 (1979). 
[2] On the other side of the ledger, the 
authority of state and local governments to 
engage in land use planning has been sus-
tained against constitutional challenge as 
long ago as our decision in Village of Euclid 
v. Ambler Realty Co., 272 U.S. 365, 47 S.Ct. 
114, 71 L.Ed. 303 (1926). "Government 
hardly could go on if to some extent values 
incident to property could not be diminished 
l385without paying for every such change in 
the general law." Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. 
Mahon, 260 U.S. 393, 413, 43 S.Ct. 158, 159, 
67 L.Ed. 322 (1922). A land use regulation 
does not effect a taking if it "substantially 
advance[s] legitimate state interests" and 
does not "den[yl an owner economically via-
ble use of his land." Agins v. City of Tibu-
ron, 447 U.S. 255, 260, 100 S.Ct. 2138, 2141, 
65 L.Ed.2d 106 (1980).6 
[3] The sort of land use regulations dis-
cussed in the cases just cited, however, differ 
in two relevant particulars from the present 
case. First, they involved essentially legisla-
tive determinations classifying entire areas of 
. the city, whereas here the city made an 
adjudicative decision to condition petitioner's 
application for a building permit on an indi-
vidual parcel. Second, the conditions im-
posed were not simply a limitation on the use 
petitioner might make of her own parcel, but 
a requirement that she deed portions of the 
property to the city. In Nollan, supra, we 
lants' exploitation of the Terminal site effect a 
'taking' of appellants' property for a public use 
within the meaning of the Fifth Amendment, 
which of course is made applicable to the States 
through the Fourteenth Amendment, see Chica-
go, B. & Q.R. Co. v. Chicago, 166 U.S. 226, 239, 
17 S.Ct. 581, 585, 41 L.Ed. 979 (1897)"). ' .i 
" 3 » 
6. There can be no argument that the permit 
conditions would deprive petitioner of "economi-
cally beneficial us[e]" of her property as^sh? 
currently operates a retail store on the lot. Peti-^  
tioner assuredly is able to derive some econprai^ 
use from her property. See, e.g., Lucas v., South? 
Carolina Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003, 101$ 
112 S.Ct. 2886, 2895, 120 L.Ed.2d 798 (19%^ 
Kaiser Aetna v. United States, 444 U.S. 164, 175^  
100 S.Ct. 383, 390, 62 L.Ed.2d 332 (1979); Pen% 
Central Transp. Co. v. New York City, supra! l43$> 
U.S., at 124, 98 S.Ct., at 2659. 
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held that governmental authority to exact 
such a condition was circumscribed by the 
Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments. Under 
the well-settled doctrine of "unconstitutional 
conditions," the government may not require 
a person to give up a constitutional right— 
here the right to receive just compensation 
when property is taken for a public use—in 
exchange for a discretionary benefit con-
ferred by the government where the benefit 
sought has little or no relationship to .the 
property. See Perry v. Sindermann, 4t)8 
U.S. 593, 92 S.Ct. 2694, 33 L.Ed.2d 570 
(1972); Pickering v. Board of Ed. of Town-
ship High School Dist 205, Will Cty., 391 
U.S. 563, 568, 88 S.Ct. 1731,1734, 20 L.Ed.2d 
811 (1968). 
Petitioner contends that the city has forced 
her to choose between the building permit 
and her right under the FifthJ^sAmendment 
to just compensation for the public ease-
ments. Petitioner does not quarrel with the 
city's authority to exact some forms of dedi-
cation as a condition for the grant of a build-
ing permit, but challenges the showing made 
by the city to justify these exactions. She 
argues that the city has identified "no special 
benefits" conferred on her, and has not iden-
tified any "special quantifiable burdens" cre-
ated by her new store that would justify the 
particular dedications required from her 
which are not required from the public at 
large. 
Ill 
[4] In evaluating petitioner's claim, we 
must first determine whether the "essential 
nexus" exists between the "legitimate state 
interest" and the permit condition exacted by 
The city. Nollan, 483 U.S., at 837, 107 S.Ct., 
jat 3148. If we find that a nexus exists, we 
must then decide the required degree ' of 
"connection between the exactions and the 
projected impact of the proposed develop-
ment. We were not required to reach this 
"question in Nollan, because we concluded 
that the connection did not meet even the 
loosest standard. Id., at 838, 107 S.Ct., at 
t "3149. Here, however, we must decide this 
"question. 
[5] We addressed the essential nexus 
question in Nollan. The California Coastal 
Commission demanded a lateral public ease-
ment across the Nollans' beachfront lot in 
exchange for a permit to demolish an exist-
ing bungalow and replace it with a three-
bedroom house. Id, at 828, 107 S.Ct., at 
3144. The public easement was designed to 
connect two public beaches that were sepa-
rated by the Nollan's property. The^  Coastal 
Commission had asserted that the public 
easement condition was imposed to promote 
the legitimate state interest of diminishing 
the "blockage of the view of the ocean" 
caused by construction of the larger house. 
We agreed that the Coastal Commission's 
concern with protecting visual access to the 
ocean constituted a legitimate ^public inter-
est. Id, at 835, 107 S.Ct., at 3148. We also 
agreed that the permit condition would have 
been constitutional "even if it consisted of the 
requirement that the Nollans provide a view-
ing spot on their property for passersby with 
whose sighting of the ocean their new house 
would interfere." Id, at 836, 107 S.Ct., at 
3148. We resolved, however, that the Coast-
al Commission's regulatory authority was set 
completely adrift from its constitutional 
moorings when it claimed that a nexus exist-
ed between visual access to the ocean and a 
permit condition requiring lateral public ac-
cess along the Nollans' beachfront lot. Id., 
at 837, 107 S.Ct, at 3148. How enhancing 
the public's ability to "traverse to and along 
the shorefront" served the same governmen-
tal purpose of "visual access to the ocean" 
from the roadway was beyond our ability to 
countenance. The absence of a nexus left 
the Coastal Commission in the position of 
simply trying to obtain an easement through 
gimmickry, which converted a valid regula-
tion of land use into " 'an out-and-out plan of 
extortion.'" Ibid, quoting J E.D Associ-
ates, Inc. v. Atkinson, 121 N.H. 581, 584, 432 
A.2d 12,14-15 (1981). 
No such gimmicks are associated with the 
permit conditions imposed by the city in this 
case. Undoubtedly, the prevention of flood-
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ing along Fanno Creek and the reduction of 
traffic congestion in the Central Business 
District qualify as the type of legitimate pub-
lic purposes we have upheld. Agins, 447 
U.S., at 260-262, 100 S.Ct., at 2141-2142. It. 
seems equally obvious that a nexus exists 
between preventing flooding along Tanno 
Creek and limiting development within the 
creek's 100-year floodplain. Petitioner pro-
poses to double the size of her retail store 
and to pave her now-gravel parkingMpt, 
thereby expanding the impervious surface onN 
the property and increasing the amount of 
storm water runoff into Fanno Creek. •' 
The same may be said for the city's at-
tempt to reduce traffic congestion by provid-
ing for alternative means of transportation. 
In theory, a pedestrian/bicycle pathway pro-
vides a useful alternative means of transpor-
tation for workers and shoppers: "Pedestri-
ans and bicyclists occupying dedicated 
I ^ spaces for walking and/or bicycling . . . 
remove potential vehicles from streets, re-
sulting in an .overall improvement in total 
transportation system flow." A. Nelson, 
Public Provision of Pedestrian and Bicycle 
Access Ways: Public Policy Rationale and 
the Nature of Private Benefits 11, Center for 
Planning Development, Georgia Institute of 
Technology, Working Paper Series (Jan. 
1994). See also Intermodal Surface Trans-
portation Efficiency Act of 1991, Pub.L. 102-
240, 105 Stat.1914 (recognizing pedestrian 
and bicycle facilities as necessary compo-
nents of any strategy to reduce traffic con-
gestion). 
B 
The second part of our analysis requires 
us to determine whether the degree of the 
exactions demanded by the city's permit con-
ditions bears the required relationship to the 
projected impact of petitioner's proposed .de-
velopment. Nollan, supra, 483 U.S., at 834, 
107 S.Ct., at 3147, quoting Penn Central 
Transp. Co. v. New York City, 438 U.S. 104, 
127, 98 S.Ct. 2646, 2660, 57 L.Ed.2d, 631 
(1978) (" '[A] use restriction may constitute a 
"taking" if not reasonably necessary to the 
effectuation of a substantial government pur-
pose'"). Here the Oregon Supreme Court 
deferred to what it termed the "city's un-
challenged factual findings" supporting the 
dedication conditions and found them to be 
reasonably related to the impact of the ex-
pansion of petitioner's business. 317 Ore., at 
120-121, 854 P.2d, at 443. 
The city required that petitioner dedicate 
"to the City as Greenway all portions of the 
site that fall within the existing 100-year 
floodplain [of Fanno Creek] . . . and all prop-
erty 15 feet above [the floodplain] boundary." 
JcL, at 113, n. 3, 854 P.2d, at 439, n. 3. In 
addition, the city demanded that the retail 
store be designed so as not to intrude into 
the greenway area. The city relies on the 
Commission's rather tentative findings that 
increased storm water flow from petitioner's 
property "can only add to the public need to 
manage the [floodplain] for drainage pur-
poses" to support its conclusion that the "re-
quirement of dedication of the floodplain area 
onj389the site is related to the applicant's 
plan to intensify development on the site." 
City of Tigard Planning Commission Final 
Order No. 91-09 PC, App. to Pet. for Cert. 
G-37. 
The city made the following specific find-
ings relevant to the pedestrian/bicycle path-
way: 
"In addition, the proposed expanded use of 
this site is anticipated to generate addi-
tional vehicular traffic thereby increasing 
congestion on nearby collector and arterial 
streets. Creation of a convenient, safe 
pedestrian/bicycle pathway system as an 
alternative means of transportation could 
offset some of the traffic demand on these 
nearby streets and lessen the increase in 
traffic congestion." Id., at G-24. 
The question for us is whether these find-
ings are constitutionally sufficient to justify 
the conditions .imposed by the city on peti-
tioner's building permit. Since state courts 
have been dealing with this question a good 
deal longer than we have, we turn to repre-
sentative decisions made by them. 
In some States, very generalized state-
ments as to the necessary connection be-
tween the required dedication and the pro-
posed development seem to suffice. See, e.g., 
Billings Properties, Inc. v. Yellowstone 
County, 144 Mont. 25, 394 P.2d 182 (1964); 
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Jenad, Inc. v. Scarsdale, 18 N.Y.2d 78, 271 
N.Y.S.2d 955, 218 N.E.2d 673 (1966). We 
think this standard is too lax to adequately 
protect petitioner's right to just compensa-
tion if her property is taken for a^public 
purpose. 
Other state courts require a very exacting 
correspondence, described as the "specific] 
and uniquely attributable" test. The Su-
preme Court of Illinois first developed this 
test in Pioneer Trust & Savings Bank v. 
Mount Prospect, 22 I11.2d 375, 380, 176 
N.E.2d 799, 802 (1961).7 Under this stan-
da rd j^ i f the local government cannot dem-
onstrate that its exaction is directly propor-
tional to the specifically created need, the 
exaction becomes "a veiled exercise of the 
power of eminent domain and a confiscation 
of private property .behind the defense of 
police regulations." Id, at 381, 176 N.E.2d, 
at 802. We do not think the Federal Consti-
tution requires such exacting scrutiny, given 
the nature of the interests involved. 
A number of state courts have taken an 
intermediate position, requiring1 the munici-
pality to show a "reasonable relationship" 
between the required dedication and the im-
pact of the proposed development. Typical 
is the Supreme Court of Nebraska's opinion 
in Simpson v. North Platte, 206 Neb. 240, 
245, 292 N.W.2d 297, 301 (1980), where that 
court stated: 
"The distinction, therefore, which must 
be made between an appropriate exercise 
of the police power and an improper exer-
cise of eminent domain is whether the 
requirement has some reasonable relation-
ship or nexus to the use to which the 
property is being made or is merely being 
used as an excuse for taking property sim-
ply because at that particular moment the 
landowner is asking the city for some li-
cense or permit." 
Thus, the court held that a city may not 
require a property owner to dedicate private 
7. The "specifically and uniquely attributable" 
test has now been adopted by a minority of other 
courts. See, e.g., J.E.D. Associates, Inc. v. Atkin-
son, 121 N.H. 581, 585, 432 A.2d 12, 15 (1981); 
Divan Builders, Inc. v. Planning Bd. of Twp. of 
property for some future public use as a 
condition of obtaining a building permit when 
such future use is not "occasioned by the 
construction sought to be permitted." Id, at 
248, 292 N.W.2d, at 3v02. 
Some form of the reasonable relationship 
test has been adopted in many other jurisdic-
tions. See, e.g., Jordan v. Menomonee Falls, 
28 Wis.2d 608, 137 N.W.2d 442 (1965); Collis 
v. Bloomington, 310 Minn. 5, 246 N.W.2d 19 
(1976) (requiring a showing of a reasonable 
relationship between 1391 the planned subdivi-
sion and the municipality's need for land); 
College Station v. Turtle Rock Corp., 680 
S.W.2d 802, 807 (Tex.1984); Call v. West 
Jordan, 606 P.2d 217, 220 (Utah 1979) (af-
firming use of the reasonable relation test). 
Despite any semantical differences, general 
agreement exists among the courts "that the 
dedication should have some reasonable rela-
tionship to the needs created by the [devel-
opment]." Ibid. See generally Note " 'Take' 
My Beach Please!": Nollan v. California 
Coastal Commission and a Rational-Nexus 
Constitutional Analysis of Development Ex-
actions, 69 B.U.L.Rev. 823 (1989); see also 
Parks v. Watson, 716 F.2d 646, 651-653 (CA9 
1983). 
[6] We think the "reasonable relation-
ship" test adopted by a majority of the state 
courts is closer to the federal constitutional 
norm than either of those previously dis-
cussed. But we do not adopt it as such, 
partly because the term "reasonable relation-
ship" seems confusingly similar to the term 
"rational basis" which describes the minimal 
level of scrutiny under the Equal Protection 
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. We 
think a term such as "rough proportionality" 
best encapsulates what we hold to be the 
requirement of the Fifth Amendment. No 
precise mathematical calculation is required, 
but the city must make some sort of individu-
alized determination that the required dedi-
Wayne, 66 N.J. 582, 600-601, 334 A 2d 30, 40 
(1975); McKaxn v. Toledo City Plan Comm'n, 26 
Ohio App.2d 171, 176, 270 N.E.2d 370, 374 
(1971); Frank Ansuini, Inc. v. Cranston, 107 R.I 
63, 69, 264 A.2d 910, 913(1970) 
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cation is related both in nature and extent to 
the impact of the proposed development.8 
[7] |392Justice STEVENS7 dissent relies 
upon a law review article for the proposition 
that the city's conditional demands for part 
of petitioner's property are "a species of 
business regulation that heretofore warrant-
ed a strong presumption of constitutional 
validity." Post, at 2325. But simply denom-
inating a governmental measure as a l^ousi-
ness regulation" does not immunize it from 
constitutional challenge on the ground that it 
violates a provision of the Bill of Rights. In 
Marshall v. Barlow's, Inc., 436 U.S. 307, 98 
S.Ct. 1816, 56 L.Ed.2d 305 (1978), we held 
that a statute authorizing a warrantless 
search of business premises in order- to de-
tect OSHA violations violated the Fourth 
Amendment. See also Air Pollution Vari-
ance Bd., of Colo. v. Western Alfalfa Corp., 
416 U.S. 861, 94 S.Ct. 2114, 40 L.Ed.2d 607 
(1974); New York v. Burger, 482 U.S. 691, 
107 S.Ct. 2636, 96 L.Ed.2d 601 (1987). And 
in Central Hudson Gas & Elec, * Corp.' v. 
Public Serv. Comm'n of N.Y., 447^U.S. 557, 
100 S.Ct. 2343, 65 L.Ed.2d 341 (1980), we 
held that an order of the New York Public 
Service Commission, designed to cut down 
the use of electricity because of a fuel short-
age, violated the First Amendment insofar as 
it prohibited advertising by a utility .company 
to promote the use of electricity. We see no 
reason why the Takings Clause of the Fifth 
Amendment, as much a part of the Bill of 
Rights as the First Amendment or Fourth 
Amendment, should be relegated to the sta-
tus of a poor relation in these comparable 
circumstances. We turn now to analysis of 
whether the findings relied upon by the city 
8. Justice STEVENS' dissent takes us to task'for 
placing the burden on the city to-justify the 
required dedication. He is correct in .arguing 
that in evaluating most generally applicable zon-
ing regulations, the burden properly "rests on the 
party challenging the regulation to prove that it 
constitutes an arbitrary regulation of property 
rights. See, e.g., Village of Euclid v. Ambler 
Realty Co., 272 U.S. 365, 47 S.Ct. 114, 71 L:Ed. 
303 (1926). Here, by contrast, the city made an 
adjudicative decision to condition petitioner's ap-
plication for a building permit on an individual 
parcel. In this situation, the burden properly 
here, first with respect to the floodplain ease-
ment, and second with respect to the pedes-
trian/bicycle path, satisfied these require-
ments. 
[8] It is axiomatic that increasing the 
amount of impervious surface will increase 
the quantity and rate of storm water flow 
from petitioner's property. Record, Doc. No. 
F, ch. 4, |393p. 4-29. Therefore, keeping the 
floodplain open and free from development 
would likely confine the pressures on Fanno 
Creek created by petitioner's development. 
In fact, because petitioner's property lies 
within the Central Business District, the 
CDC already required that petitioner leave 
15% of it as open space and the undeveloped 
floodplain would have nearly satisfied that 
requirement. App. to Pet. for Ceil. G-16 to 
G-17. But the city demanded more—it not 
only wanted petitioner not to build in the 
floodplain, but it also wanted petitioner's 
property along Fanno Creek for its green-
way system. The city has never said why a 
public greenway, as opposed to a private one, 
was required in the interest of flood control. 
The difference to petitioner, of course, is 
the loss of her ability .to exclude others. As 
we have noted, this right to exclude others is 
"one of the most essential sticks in the bun-
dle of rights that are commonly characterized 
as property." Kaiser Aetna, 444 U.S., at 
176, 100 S.Ct., at 391. It is difficult to see 
why recreational visitors trampling along pe-
titioner's floodplain easement are sufficiently 
related to the city's legitimate interest in 
reducing flooding problems along Fanno 
Creek, and the city has not attempted to 
rests on the city. See Nollan, 483 U.S., at 836, 
107 S.Ct., at 3148. This conclusion is not, as he, 
suggests, undermined by our decision in Moore v. 
East Cleveland, 431 U.S 494, 97 S.Ct. 1932, 52 
L.Ed.2d 531 (1977), in which we struck down a 
housing ordinance that limited occupancy of a 
dwelling unit to members of a single family as" 
violating the Due Process Clause of the Four-
teenth Amendment. The ordinance at issue in 
Moore intruded on choices concerning family 
living arrangements, an area in which the usual 
deference to the legislature was found to be 
inappropriate. Id., at 499, 97 S.Ct., at 1935.> 
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make any individualized determination to 
support this part of its request. 
The city contends that the recreational 
easement along the greenway is only ancil-
lary to the city's chief purpose in controlling 
flood hazards. It further asserts,that unlike 
the residential property at issue in Nollan, 
petitioner's property is commercial in charac-
ter, and therefore, her right to exclude oth-
ers is compromised. Brief for Respondent 
41, quoting United States v. Orito, 413VU.S. 
139, 142, 93 S.Ct. 2674, 2677, 37 L.Ed.2d 513 
(1973) ("The Constitution extends special 
safeguards to the privacy of the home'"). 
The city maintains that "[t]here is nothing to 
suggest that preventing [petitioner] from 
prohibiting [the easements] will unreasonably 
impair the value of [her] property as a [retail 
store]." PruneYard Shopping Center v. 
Robins, 447 U.S. 74, 83, 100 S.Ct. 2035, 2042, 
64 L.Ed.2d 741 (1980). 
|394Admittedly, petitioner wants to build a 
bigger store to attract members of the public 
to her property. She also wants, however, to 
be able to control the time and manner in 
which they enter. The recreational ease-
ment on the greenway is different in charac-
ter from the exercise of state-protected 
rights of free expression and petition that we 
permitted in PruneYard. In PruneYard, we 
held that a major private shopping center 
that attracted more than 25,000 daily patrons 
had to provide access to persons exercising 
'their state constitutional rights to distribute 
'pamphlets and ask passers-by to sign their 
petitions. IcL, at 85, 100 S.Ct., at'2042. We 
'based our decision, in part, on the fact that 
the shopping center "may restrict expressive 
activity by adopting time, place, and manner 
regulations that will minimize any interfer-
ence with its commercial functions/' Id, at 
83, 100 S.Ct., at 2042. By contrast, the city 
wants to impose a permanent recreational 
easement upon petitioner's property that 
borders Fanno Creek. Petitioner would lose 
all rights to regulate the time in which the 
public entered onto the greenway, regardless 
of any interference it might pose with her 
9. The city uses a weekday average trip rate of 
53.21 trips per 1,000 square feet. Additional 
retail store. Her right to exclude would n< 
be regulated, it would be eviscerated. 
If petitionees proposed development ha 
somehow encroached on existing greenwa; 
space in the city, it would have been reason 
able to require petitioner to provide som< 
alternative greenway space for the public 
either on her property or elsewhere. See 
Nollan, 483 U.S., at 836, 107 S.Ct, at 314S 
("Although such a requirement, constituting 
a permanent grant of continuous access to 
the property, would have to be considered a 
taking if it were not attached to a develop-
ment permit, the Commission's assumed 
power to forbid construction of the house in 
order to protect the public's view of the 
beach must surely include the power to con-
dition construction upon some concession by 
the owner, even a concession of property 
rights, that serves the same end"). But that 
is not the case here. We conclude that the 
findings upon which the city rejlies395 do not 
show the required reasonable relationship 
between the floodplain easement and the pe-
titioner's proposed new building. 
[9,10] With respect to the pedestrian/bi-
cycle pathway, we have no doubt that the city 
was correct in finding that the larger retail 
sales facility proposed by petitioner will in-
crease traffic on the streets of the Central 
Business District. The city estimates that 
the proposed development would generate 
roughly 435 additional trips per day.9 Dedi-
cations for streets, sidewalks, and other pub-
lic ways are generally reasonable exactions 
to avoid excessive congestion from a pro-
posed property use. But on the record be-
fore us, the city has not met'its burden of 
demonstrating that the additional number of 
vehicle and bicycle trips generated by peti-
tioner's development reasonably relate to the 
city's requirement for a dedication of the 
pedestrian/bicycle pathway easement. The 
city simply found that the creation of the 
pathway "could offset some of the traffic 
Trips Generated = 53 21 X (17,600-9,720) App 
to Pet. for Cert. G-l 5. 
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demand . . . and lessen the increase in traffic 
congestion." 10 
As Justice Peterson of the Supreme Court 
of Oregon explained in his dissenting opinion, 
however, "[t]he findings of fact that the bicy-
cle pathway system 'could offset some of the 
traffic demand' is a far cry from a finding 
that the bicycle pathway system mil, or is 
likely to, offset some of the traffic demand." 
317 Ore, at 127, 854 P.2d, at 447 (emphasis^ 
in original). No precise mathematical calcu-
lation is required, but the city must make 
some effort to quantify its findings in 
l^support of the dedication for the pedestri-
an/bicycle pathway beyond the conclusory 
statement that it could offset some of the 
traffic demand generated. 
IV 
Cities have long engaged in the commend-
able task of land use planning, made neces-
sary by increasing urbanization, particularly 
in metropolitan areas such as Portland. The 
city's goals of reducing flooding hazards and 
traffic congestion, and providing for public 
greenways, are laudable, but there are outer 
limits to how this may be done. "A strong 
public desire to improve the public condition 
[will not] warrant achieving the desire by a 
shorter cut than the constitutional way of 
paying for the change." Pennsylvania Coaly 
260 U.S., at 416, 43 S.Ct., at 160, 
The judgment of the Supreme Court of 
Oregon is reversed, and the case is remanded 
for further proceedings not inconsistent with 
this opinion. 
It is so ordered. 
Justice STEVENS, with whom Justice 
BLACKMUN and Justice GINSBURG join, 
dissenting. 
The record does not tell us the dollar value 
of petitioner Florence Dolan's interest in ex-
cluding the public from the greenway adja-
10. In rejecting petitioner's request for a variance 
from the pathway dedication condition, the city 
stated that omitting the planned section of the 
pathway across petitioner's property would con-
flict with its adopted policy of providing a contin-
cent to her hardware business. The moun-
tain of briefs that the case has generated 
nevertheless makes it obvious that the pecu-
niary value of her victory is far less impor-
tant than the rule of law that this case has 
been used to establish. It is unquestionably 
an important case. 
Certain propositions are not in dispute. 
The enlargement of the Tigard unit in Do-
lan's chain of hardware stores will have an 
adverse impact on the city's legitimate and 
substantial interests in controlling drainage 
in Fanno Creek and minimizing traffic con-
gestion in Tigard's business district. That 
impact is sufficient to justify an outright 
denial of her application for approval of the 
expansion. The city has ne\jertheless397 
agreed to grant Dolan's application if she will 
comply with two conditions, each of which 
admittedly will mitigate the adverse effects 
of her proposed development. The disputed 
question is whether the city has violated the 
Fourteenth Amendment to the Federal Con-
stitution by refusing to allow Dolan's planned 
construction to proceed unless those condi-
tions are met. 
The Court is correct in concluding that the 
city may not attach arbitrary conditions to a 
building permit or to a variance even when it 
can rightfully deny the application outright. 
I also agree that state court decisions dealing 
with ordinances that govern municipal devel-
opment plans provide useful guidance in a 
case of this kind. Yet the Court's description 
of the doctrinal underpinnings of its decision, 
the phrasing of its fledgling test of "rough 
proportionality," and the application of that 
test to this case run contrary to the tradition-
al treatment of these cases and break consid-
erable and unpropitious new ground. 
I 
Candidly acknowledging the lack of federal 
precedent for its exercise in rulemaking, the 
Court purports to find guidance in 12 "repre-
uous pathway system But the Takings Clause 
requires the city to implement its policy by con-
demnation unless the required relationship be-
tween petitioner's development and added traffic 
is shown. 
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sentative" state court decisions. To do so is 
certainly appropriate.1 The state cases the 
Court consults, however, either fail to sup-
port or decidedly undermine the Court's con-
clusions in key respects. 
First, although discussion of the state 
cases permeates the Court's analysis of the 
appropriate test to apply in this case, the test 
on which the Court settles is not^  naturally 
derived from those courts' decisions^ The 
Court recognizes as an initial matter that" the 
city's conditions satisfy the "essential nexus" 
requirement announced in Nollan v. Califor-
nia Coastal Comm'n, 483 U.S. 825, 107 S.Ct. 
3141, 97 L.Ed.2d 677 (1987), because they 
serve the legitimate interests in minimizing 
floods and traffic confeestions.398 Ante, at 
2317-2318.2 The Court goes on, however, to 
erect a new constitutional hurdle in the path 
of these conditions. In addition to showing a 
rational nexus to a public purpose that would 
justify an outright denial of the permit, the 
city must also demonstrate "rough' propor-
tionality" between the harm caused by the 
new land use and the benefit obtained by the 
condition. Ante, at 2319. The Court also 
decides for the first time that the city has the 
burden of establishing the constitutionality of 
its conditions by making an "individualized 
determination" that the condition in question 
satisfies the proportionality requirement. 
See Ibid. '• ''•' 
Not one of the state cases cited by the 
Court announces anything akin to a'"rough 
proportionality" requirement. For the'.most 
part, moreover, those cases that invalidated 
municipal ordinances did so on state law or 
unspecified grounds roughly equivalent to 
1. Cf. Moore v. East Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494, 513-
521, 97 S.Ct. 1932, 52 L.Ed.2d 531 (1977) (STE-
VENS, J., concurring in judgment). 
2. In Nollan the Court recognized that a state 
agency may condition the grant of a land use 
permit on the dedication of a property interest, if 
the dedication serves a legitimate police-power 
purpose that would justify a refusal to issue the 
permit. For the first time, however, it held that 
such a condition is unconstitutional if tjie condi-
tion "utterly fails" to further a goal that would 
justify the refusal. 483 U.S., at 837,107 SiCt., at 
3148. In the Nollan Court's view, a condition 
Nollan's ."essential nexus" requirement. 
See, e.g., Simpson v. North Platte, 206 Neb. 
240, 245-248, 292 N.W.2d 297, 301-302 (1980) 
(ordinance lacking "reasonable relationship" 
or "rational nexus" to property's use violated 
Nebraska Constitution); J.E.D. Associates, 
Inc. v. Atkinson, 121 N.H. 581, 583-585, 432 
A.2d 12, 14-15 (1981) (state constitutional 
grounds). One case pur|porting399 to apply 
the strict "specifically and uniquely attribut-
able" test established by Pioneer Trust & 
Savings Bank v. Mount Prospect, 22 IU.2d 
375, 176 N.E.2d 799 (1961), nevertheless 
found that test was satisfied because the 
legislature had decided that the subdivision 
at issue created the need for a park or parks. 
Billings Properties, Inc. v. Yellowstone 
County, 144 Mont. 25, 33-36, 394 P.2d 182, 
187-188 (1964). In only one of the seven 
cases upholding a land use regulation did the 
losing property owner petition this Court for 
certiorari. See Jordan v. Menomonee Falls, 
28 Wis.2d 608, 137 N.W.2d 442 (1965), appeal 
dism'd, 385 U.S. 4, 87 S.Ct. 36, 17 L.Ed.2d 3 
(1966) (want of substantial federal question). 
Although 4 of the 12 opinions mention the 
Federal Constitution—2 of those only in 
passing—it is quite obvious that neither the 
courts nor the litigants imagined they might 
be participating in the development of a new 
rule of federal law. Thus,, although these 
state cases?: do lend support to the Court's 
reaffirmance of Nollan's reasonable nexus 
requirement, the role the Court accords them 
in the announcement of its newly minted 
second phase of the constitutional inquiry is 
remarkably inventive. 
would be constitutional even if it required the 
Noilans to provide a viewing spot for passers-by 
whose view of the ocean was obstructed by their 
new house. Id., at 836, 107 S.Ct., at 3148. 
"Although such a requirement, constituting a 
permanent grant of continuous access to the 
property, would have to be considered a taking if 
it were not attached to a development permit, the 
Commission's assumed power to forbid construc-
tion of the house in order to protect the public's 
view of the beach must surely include the power 
to condition construction upon some concession 
by the owner, even a concession of property 
rights, that serves the same end." Ibid. 
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In addition, the Court ignores the state 
courts' willingness to consider what the prop-
erty owner gains from the exchange in ques-
tion. The Supreme Court of Wisconsin, for 
example, found it significant that the village's 
approval of a proposed subdivision plat "en-
ables the subdivider to profit financially by 
selling the subdivision lots as home-building 
sites and thus realizing a greater price than 
could have been obtained if he ha<^  sold his 
property as unplatted lands." JordakvKMe-
nomonee Falls, 28 Wis.2d, at 6;9-620,V 1?7 
N.W.2d, at 448. The required dedication as 
a condition of that approval was permissible 
"[i]n return for this benefit." Ibid. See also 
Collis v. Bloomington, 310 Minn,,5, 1>1-13, 
246 N.W.2d 19, 23-24 (1976) (citing Jordan); 
College Station v. Turtle Rock Corp., 680 
S.W.2d 802, 806 (Tex.1984) (dedication re-
quirement only triggered when developer 
chooses |4ooto develop land). In this case, 
moreover, Dolan's acceptance of the permit, 
with its attached conditions, would provide 
her with benefits that may well go beyond 
any advantage she gets from expanding her 
business. As the United States pointed out 
at oral argument, the improvement that the 
city's drainage plan contemplates would wid-
en the channel and reinforce the slopes to 
increase the carrying capacity during serious 
floods, "conferring] considerable benefits'on 
the property owners immediately adjacent to 
the creek." Tr. of Oral Arg. 41-42.'--** 
The state court decisions also. $ret enlight-
ening in the extent to which they required 
that the entire parcel be given controlling 
importance. All but one of the cases involve 
challenges to provisions in municipal ordi-
nances requiring developers to dedicate ei-
ther a percentage of the entire parcel {usual-
ly 7 or 10 percent of the platted subdivision) 
or an equivalent value in cash (usually a 
certain dollar amount per lot) to help finance 
the construction of roads, utilities, schools, 
parks, and playgrounds. In assessing j:he 
legality of the conditions, the courts gave.no 
3. Similarly, in Keystone Bituminous Coal Assn. v. 
DeBenedwtis, 480 U.S. 470, 493-^99, 107 S.Ct. 
1232, 1249, 94 L.Ed.2d 472 (1987), we conclud-
ed that "[t]he 27 million tons of coal do not 
indication that the transfer of an interest in 
realty was any more objectionable than a 
cash payment. See, e.g., Jenad, Inc. v. 
Scarsdale, 18 N.Y.2d 78, 271 N.Y.S.2d 955, 
218 N.E.2d 673 (1966); Jordan u Menomo-
nee Falls, 28 Wis.2d 608, 137 N.W.2d 442 
(1965); Collis v. Bloomington, 310 Minn. 5, 
246 N.W.2d 19 (1976). None of the decisions 
identified the surrender of the fee owner's 
"power to exclude" as having any special 
significance. Instead, the courts uniformly 
examined the character of the entire econom-
ic transaction. 
II 
It is not merely state cases, but our own 
cases as well, that require the analysis to 
focus on the impact of the city's action on the 
entire parcel of private property. In Penn 
Central Transp. Co. v. New York City, 438 
U.S. 104, 98 S.Ct. 2646, 57 L.Ed.2d 631 
(1978), we stated that takings jurisprudence 
"does not divide a single parcel Uoiinto dis-
crete segments and attempt to determine 
whether rights in a particular segment have 
been entirely abrogated." Id, at 130-131, 98 
S.Ct, at 2662. Instead, this Court focuses 
"both on the character of the action and on 
the nature and extent of the interference 
with rights in the parcel as a whole." Ibid. 
Andrus v. Allard, 444 U.S. 51, 100 S.Ct. 318, 
62 L.Ed.2d 210 (1979), reaffirmed the nondi-
visibility principle outlined in Penn Central, 
stating that "[a]t least where an owner pos-
sesses a full 'bundle' of property rights, the 
destruction of one strand' of the bundle is 
not a taking, because the aggregate must be 
viewed in its entirety." 444 U.S., at 65-66, 
100 S.Ct., at 327.3 As recently as last Term, 
we approved the principle again. See Con-
crete Pipe & Products of CaL, Inc. v. Con-
struction Laborers Pension Trust for South-
ern CaL, 508 U.S. 602, 644, 113 S.Ct. 2264, 
2290, 124 L.Ed.2d 539 (1993) (explaining that 
"a claimant's parcel of property [cannot] first 
be divided into what was taken and what was, 
left" to demonstrate a compensable taking).* 
Although limitation of the right to exclude 
others undoubtedly constitutes a significant 
constitute a separate segment of property for 
takings law purposes" and that "[tjhere is no 
basis for treating the less than 2% of petitioners'-' 
coal as a separate parcel of property " 
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infringement upon property ownership, Kai-
ser Aetna u United States, 444 U.S. 164, 
179-180, 100 S.Ct. 383, 393, 62 L.Ed.2d 332 
(1979), restrictions on that right do not alone 
constitute a taking, and do not do so in any *, 
event unless they "unreasonably impair the 
value or use" of the property. PruneYard 
Shopping Center u Robins, 447 U.S. 74, 82-
84,100 S.Ct. 2035, 2041-2042, 64 L.Ed.2d 741 
(1980). 
The Court's narrow focus on one strand i h \ 
the property owner's bundle of rights is par-
ticularly misguided in a case involving the 
development of commercial property. As 
Professor Johnston has noted: 
"The subdivider is a manufacturer, pro-
cesser, and marketer of a product; land is 
but one of his raw materials. In subdivi-
sion control disputes, the developer is 
|402not defending hearth and home against 
the king's intrusion, but simply attempting 
to maximize his profits from the sale of a 
finished product. As applied to him, sub-
division control exactions are actually busi-
ness regulations." Johnston, Constitution-
ality of Subdivision Control Exactions: 
The Quest for A Rationale, 52 Cornell L.Q. 
871, 923 (1967).4 
The exactions associated with the' develop-
ment of a retail business are likewise a spe-
cies of business regulation that heretofore 
warranted a strong presumption of constitu-
tional validity. 
In Johnston's view, "if the municipality can 
demonstrate that its assessment of financial 
burdens against subdividers is rational, im-
partial, and conducive to fulfillment of autho-
rized planning objectives, its action need be 
invalidated only in those extreme and pre-
sumably rare cases where the burden of 
4. Johnston's article also sets forth a fair sum-
mary of the state cases fiom which the Court 
purports to derive its "rough proportionality" 
test. See 52 Cornell L.Q., at 917. Like the 
r.Court, Johnston observed that cases requiring a 
^"rational nexus" between exactions and public 
needs created by the new subdivision—especially 
'^Jordan v. Menomonee Falls, 28 Wis.2d 608, 137 
11
 N.W.2d 442 (1965)—"steefr] a moderate course" 
between the "judicial obstructionism" of Pioneer 
Trust & Savings Bank v, Mount Prospect, 22 Ill.2d 
375, 176 N.E.2d 799 (1961), and the "excessive 
compliance is sufficiently great to deter the 
owner from proceeding with his planned de-
velopment." Id., at 917. The city of Tigard 
has demonstrated that its plan is rational 
and impartial and that the conditions at issue 
are "conducive to fulfillment of authorized 
planning objectives." Dolan, on the other 
hand, has offered no evidence that her bur-
den of compliance has any impact at all on 
the value or profitability of her planned de-
velopment. Following the teaching of the 
cases on which it purports to rely, the Court 
should not isolate the burden associated with 
the loss of the power to exjclude^ from an 
evaluation of the benefit to be derived from 
the permit to enlarge the store and the park-
ing lot. 
The Court's assurances that its "rough 
proportionality" test leaves ample room foi 
cities to pursue the "commendable task uf 
land use planning," ante, at 2322—even twice 
avowing that "[n]o precise mathematical cal-
culation is required," ante, at 2319, 2322—are 
wanting given the result that test compels 
here. Under the Court's approach, a city 
must not only "quantify its findings," ante, at 
2322, and make "individualized determina-
tion[s]" .with respect t^o the nature and the 
extent of the relationship between the condi-
tions and the impact, ante, at 2319, 2320, but 
also demonstrate "proportionality." The cor-
rect inquiry should instead concentrate on 
whether the required nexus is present and 
venture beyond considerations .of a condi-
tion's nature or germaneness only, if the de-
veloper establishes that a concededly gQi-
mane condition is so grossly disproportionate 
to the proposed development's adverse ef-
fects that it manifests motives .other than 
land use regulation on the part of the city.5 
deference" of Billings Properties, Inc v 'Yellow-
stone County, 144 Mont. 25, 394 P 2d 182 (1964; 
52 Cornell L.Q., at 917. 
5. Dolan's attorney overstated the danger when 
he suggested at oral argument that without some 
requirement for proportionality, "[t]he City could 
have found that Mrs. Dolan's new store would 
have increased traffic by one additional vehicle 
trip per day [and] could have required her to 
dedicate 75, 95 percent of her land for a widen-
ing of Main Street." Tr. of Oral Arg 52-53 
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The heightened requirement the Court im-
poses on cities is even more unjustified when 
all the tools needed to resolve the questions 
presented by this case can be garnered from 
our existing case law. 
6. See, e.g., Ferguson v. Skrupa, 111 U.S. 726, 83 
confining the city's condition in a manner this 
Court would accept, her failure to seek that 
narrower form of relief at any stage of the 
state administrative and judicial proceedings 
clearly should preclude that relief in this 
Court now. 
S.Ct. 1028, 10 L.Ed.2d 93 (1963) 
III 
Applying its new standard, the Court finds 
two defects in the city's case. First, while 
the record would adequately support^ re-
quirement that Dolan maintain the portion^of 
the floodplain on her property as undevel-
oped open space, it • does not support the 
additional requirement that the floodplain be 
dedicated to the city. Ante, at 2320-2322. 
Second, l^while the city adequately estab-
lished the traffic increase that the proposed 
development would generate, it failed to 
quantify the offsetting decrease in automo-
bile traffic that the bike path will produce. 
Ante, at 2321-2322. Even under the Court's 
new rule, both defects are, at most, nothing 
more than harmless error. 
In her objections to the floodplain condi-
tion, Dolan made no effort to demonstrate 
that the dedication of that portion of her 
property would be any more onerous than a 
simple prohibition against any develppment 
on that portion of her property. ' Given the 
commercial character of both tHe existing 
and the proposed use of the property as a 
retail store, it seems likely that potential 
customers "trampling' along petitioner's 
floodplain," ante, at 2320, are' more valuable 
than a useless parcel of vacant land. More-
over, the duty to pay taxes and the responsi-
bility for potential tort liability may well 
make ownership of the fee interest in useless 
land a liability rather than an asset. That 
may explain why Dolan never conceded that 
she could be prevented from building on the 
floodplain. The city attorney. also pointed 
out that absent a dedication, property owners 
would be required to "build on their own 
land" and "with their own money" a storage 
facility for the water runoff. Tr. of Oral Arg. 
30-31. Dolan apparently "did have that op-
tion," but chose not to seek it. Id, at 3i. If 
Dolan might have been entitled to a variance 
The Court's rejection of the bike path con-
dition amounts to nothing more than a play 
on words. Everyone agrees that the bike 
path "could" offset some of the increased 
traffic flow that the larger store will gener-
ate, but the findings do not unequivocally 
state that it mill do so, or tell us just how 
many cyclists will replace motorists. Predic-
tions on such matters are inherently nothing 
more than estimates. Cerfcainly s^ the as-
sumption that there will be an offsetting 
benefit here is entirely reasonable and should 
suffice whether it amounts to 100 percent, 35 
percent, or only 5 percent of the increase in 
automobile traffic that would otherwise oc-
cur. If the Court proposes to have the fed-
eral judiciary micro-manage state decisions 
of this kind, it is indeed extending its wel-
come mat to a significant new class of liti-
gants. Although there is no reason to be-
lieve that state courts have failed to rise to 
the task, property owners have surely found 
a new friend today. 
IV 
The Court has made a serious eiror by 
abandoning the traditional presumption of 
constitutionality and imposing a novel burden 
of proof on a city implementing an admitted-
ly valid comprehensive land use plan. Even 
more consequential than its incorrect disposi-
tion of this case, however, is the Court's 
resurrection of a species of substantive due 
process analysis that it firmly rejected dec-
ades ago.6 
The Court begins its constitutional analysis 
by citing Chicago, B. & Q.R. Co. v. Chicago, 
166 U.S. 226, 239, 17 S.Ct. 581, 585, 41 L.Ed. 
979 (1897), for the proposition that the Tak-
ings Clause of the Fifth Amendment is "ap-
plicable to the States through the Fourteenth 
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Amendment." Ante, at 2316. That opinion, 
however, contains no mention of either the 
Takings Clause or the Fifth Amendment;7 it 
held that the protection afforded by the Due 
Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amende 
ment extends to matters of substance as well 
as procedure,8 and that the subjstance406 of 
"the due process of law enjoined by the 
Fourteenth Amendment requires compensa-
tion to be made or adequately secured-tp the 
owner of private property taken for pubH<^  
use under the authority of a State." 166 
U.S., at 235, 236-241, 17 S.Ct, at 584, 584-
586. It applied the same kind of substantive 
due process analysis more frequently identi-
fied with a better known case that accorded 
similar substantive protection to a baker's 
liberty interest in working 60 hours a week 
and 10 hours a day. See Lochner v. New 
York, 198 U.S. 45, 25 S.Ct. 539, 49 L.Ed. 937 
(1905).y 
Later cases have interpreted the Four-
teenth Amendment's substantive protection 
against uncompensated deprivations of pri-
vate property by the States as though it' 
incorporated the text of the Fifth Amend-
ment's Takings Clause. See, e.g., Keystone 
Bituminous Coal Assn. v. DeBenedictis, 480 
U.S. 470, 481, n. 10, 107 S.Ct. 1232, 1240, n. 
10, 94 L.Ed.2d 472 (1987). There was noth-
ing problematic about that interpretation in 
cases enforcing the Fourteenth Amendment 
against state action that involved the actual 
physical invasion of private property. See 
7. An earlier case deemed it "well settled" that 
the Takings Clause "is a limitation on the power 
of the Federal government, and not on the 
States." Pumpelly v Green Bay Co., 13 Wall. 
166, 177, 20 L.Ed. 557 (1872). 
8. The Court held that a State "may not, by any of 
its agencies, disregard the prohibitions of the 
Fourteenth Amendment. Its judicial authorities 
may keep within the letter of the statute prescrib-
ing forms of procedure in the courts and give the 
parties interested the fullest opportunity to be 
heard, and yet it might be that its final action 
would be inconsistent with that amendment. In 
determining what is due process of law regard 
must be had to substance, not to form." Chica-
go, B. & Q.R. Co. v. Chicago, 166 U.S. 226, 234-
235, 17 S.Ct. 581, 584, 41 L.Ed. 979 (1897). 
Loretto v. Teleprompter Manhattan CATV 
Corp., 458 U.S. 419, 427-433, 102 S.Ct. 3164, 
3172-3175, 73 L.Ed.2d 868 (1982); Kaiser 
Aetna v. United States, 444 U.S., at 178-180, 
100 S.Ct., at 392-393. Justice Holmes chart-
ed a significant new course, however, when 
he opined that a state law making it "com-
mercially impracticable to mine certain coal" 
had <4very nearly the same effect for constitu-
tional purposes as appropriating or destroy-
ing it." Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon, 
260 U.S. 393, 414, 43 S.Ct. 158, 159, 67 L.Ed. 
322 (1922). The so-called "regulatory 
407takings" doctrine that the Holmes dic-
tum10 kindled has an obvious kinship with 
the line of substantive due process cases that 
Lochner exemplified. Besides having similar 
ancestry, both doctrines are potentially open-
ended sources of judicial power to invalidate 
state economic regulations that Members of 
this Court view as unwise or unfair. 
This case inaugurates an even more recent 
judicial innovation than the regulatory tak-
ings doctrine: the application of the "uncon-
stitutional conditions" label to a mutually 
beneficial transaction between a property 
owner and a city. The Court tells us that the 
city's refusal to grant Dolan a discretionary 
benefit infringes her right to receive just 
compensation for the property interests that 
she has refused to dedicate to the city 
"where the property sought has little or no 
relationship to the benefit." n Although it is 
9. The Lochner Court refused to presume that 
there was a reasonable connection between the 
regulation and the state interest in protecting the 
public health. 198 U.S , at 60-61, 25 S.Ct., at 
544. A similar refusal to identify a sufficient 
nexus between an enlarged building with a newly 
paved parking lot and the state interests in mini-
mizing the risks of flooding and traffic conges-
tion proves fatal to the city's permit conditions in 
this case under the Court's novel approach. 
10. See Keystone Bituminous Coal Assn. v. DeBen-
edictis, 480 U.S., at 484, 107 S.Ct., at 1241 
(explaining why this portion of the opinion was 
merely "advisory"). 
11. Ante, at 2317. The Court's entire explanation 
reads: "Under the well-settled doctrine of 'un-
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well settled that a government cannot deny a 
benefit on a basis that infringes constitution-
ally protected interests—"especially [one's] 
interest in freedom of speech," Perry v. Sin-
dermann, 408 U.S. 593, 597, 92 S.Ct. 2694, 
2697, 33 L.Ed.2d 570 (1972)—the "unconsti-
tutional conditions" doctrine provides,an in-
adequate framework in which to analyze this 
case.12 
I^Dolan has no right to be compensated 
for a taking unless the city acquires the 
property interests that she has refused to 
surrender. Since no taking has yet occurred, 
there has not been any infringement of her 
constitutional right to compensation. See' 
Preseault v. ICC, 494 U.S. 1, 11-17, llO'S.Ct: 
914, 921-924, 108 L.Ed.2d 1 -<1990) (finding 
takings claim premature because property 
owner had not yet sought compensation un-
der Tucker Act); Model v. Virginia Surface. 
Mining & Reclamation Assn., Inc., 452 U.S. 
264, 294-295, 101 S.Ct. 2352, 2370,', 69 
L.Ed.2d 1 (1981) (no taking where no one 
"identified any property . . . that has alleged-
ly been taken"). 
Even if Dolan should accept the city's con-
ditions in exchange for the benefit that she 
seeks, it would not necessarily follow that she 
had been denied "just compensation" since it 
would be appropriate to consider the receipt 
constitutional conditions/ the government' may 
not require a person to give up a constitutional 
right—here the right to receive just compensa-
tion when property is taken for a pubjic use—in 
exchange for a discretionary benefit conferred by 
the government where the benefit sought has 
little or no relationship to the property." 
12. Although it has a long history, see Home Ins 
Co v Morse, 20 Wall 445, 451, 22 L.Ed. 365 
(1874), the "unconstitutional conditions" 'doc-
trine has for just as long suffered from notorious-
ly inconsistent application; it has never been-an 
overarching principle of constitutional law' that 
operates with equal force regardless of. the na-
ture of the rights and powers in question:.' • See, 
e.g., Sunstein, Why the Unconstitutional Condi-
tions Doctrine is an Anachronism, 70 B.U.L.Rev. 
593, 620 (1990) (doctrine is "too crude and too 
general to provide help in contested cases"); 
Sullivan, Unconstitutional Conditions, 102-Harv. 
L.Rev. 1415, 1416 (1989) (doctrine is "riven with 
inconsistencies"); Hale, Unconstitutional Condi-
tions and Constitutional Rights, 35 Colum.L.Rev. 
321, 322 (1935) ("The Supreme Court has sus-
tained many such exertions of power even after 
of that benefit in any calculation of "just 
compensation." See Pennsylvania Coal Co. 
v. Mahon, 260 U.S., at 415, 43 S.Ct., at 160 
(noting that an "average reciprocity of advan-
vtage" was deemed to justify many laws); 
Hodel v. Irving, 481 U.S. 704, 715, 107 S.Ct. 
2076, 2082, 95 L.Ed.2d 668 (1987) (such 
" 'reciprocity of advantage' " weighed in favor 
of a statute's constitutionality).^ Particu-
larly in the absence of any evidence on the 
jpoint, we should not presume that the discre-
tionary benefit the city has offered is less 
valuable than the property interests that Do-
lan can retain or surrender at her option. 
But even if that discretionary benefit were so 
trifling that it could not be considered just 
compensation when it has "little or no rela-
tionship" to the property, the Court fails to 
explain why the same value would suffice 
when the required nexus is present. In this 
respect, the Court's reliance on the "uncon-
stitutional conditions" doctrine is assuredly 
novel, and arguably incoherent. The city's 
conditions are by no means immune from 
constitutional scrutiny. The level of scruti-
ny, however, does not approximate the kind 
of review that would apply if the city had 
insisted on a surrender of Dolan's First 
Amendment rights in exchange for a building 
announcing the broad doctrine that would invali-
date them"). As the majority's case citations 
suggest, ante, at 2316, modern decisions invoking 
the doctrine have most frequently involved First 
Amendment liberties, see also, e g, Connick v 
Myers, 461 U.S. 138, 143-144, 103 S.Ct. 1684, 
1688, 75 L.Ed.2d 708 (1983), Elrod v Burns, 
All U.S. 347, 361-363, 96 S.Ct. 2673, 2684, 49 
LEd.2d 547 (1976) (plurality opinion), Sherbert 
v Verner, 374 U.S 398, 404, 83 S Ct 1790, 1794, 
10 L.Ed.2d 965 (1963); Speiser v Randall, 357 
U.S. 513, 518-519, 78 S.Ct. 1332, 1338, 2 
L.Ed.2d 1460 (1958). But see Posadas de Puerto 
Rico Associates v. Tourism Co. of P.R., 478 U.S. 
328, 345-346, 106 S.Ct. 2968, 2979, 92 L.Ed.2c? 
266 (1986) ("[T]ne greater power to completely 
ban casino gambling necessarily includes the 
lesser power to ban advertising of casino gam-
bling"). The necessary and traditional breadth 
of municipalities' power to regulate property de-
velopment, together with the absence here of 
fragile and easily "chilled" constitutional rights 
such as that of free speech, make it quite clear 
that the Court is really writing on a clean slate 
rather than merely applying "well-settled" doc-
trine. Ante, at 2316. 
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permit. One can only hope that the Court's 
reliance today on First Amendment cases, 
see ante, at 2317 (citing Perry v. Svfider-
mann, supra, and Picketing v. Board of Ed. 
of Toivnship High School Dist. 205, Will 
Cty., 391 U.S. 563, 568, 88 S.Ct. 173;, 1734, 
20 L.Ed.2d 811 (1968)), and its' candid disa-
vowal of the term ."rational basis" -to describe 
its new standard of review, see ante, at 2319, 
do not signify a reassertion of the kin^ of 
superlegislative power the Court exercised 
during the Lochner era. 
The Court has decided to apply its height-
ened scrutiny to a single strand—the'power 
to exclude—in the bundle of rights that en-
ables a commercial enterprise to flourish in 
an urban environment. That intangible in-
terest is undoubtedly worthy of constitutional 
protection—much like the grandmother's in-
terest in deciding which of her relatives njay 
share her home in Moore v. East Cleveland, 
431 U.S. 494, 97 S.Ct. 1932, 52 L,Ed.2d 531 
(1977). Both interests are. protected:&9m 
arbitrary state action by. the Due Pro<;es$ 
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment..nJt is, 
however, a curious irony that Members of 
the majority in this case would impose -an 
almost insurmountable burden of proof on 
the property owner in the Moore ..case 
J4iowhile saddling the city with a heightened 
burden in this case.13 
In its application of what is essentially the 
doctrine of substantive due process, the 
Court confuses the past with the*' present. 
On November 13, 1922, the village of Euclid, 
Ohio, adopted a zoning ordinance that effec-
tively confiscated 75 percent of the value of 
property owned by the Ambler Realty' Com-
13. The author of today's opinion joined Justice 
Stewart's dissent in Moore v. East Cleveland, 431 
U.S. 494, 97 S.Ct. 1932, 52 L.Ed.2d 531' (1977)? 
There the dissenters found it sufficient, in re-
sponse to my argument that the zoning ordi-
nance was an arbitrary regulation of property 
rights, that "if the ordinance is a rational attempt 
to promote 'the city's interest in preserving the 
character of its neighborhoods,' Young v. Ameri-
can Mini Theatres (Inc J 427 U.S. 50, 71 [96 
S.Ct. 2440, 2452, 49 L.Ed.2d 310 (1976)] (opin-
ion of STEVENS, J.), it is . . . a permissible 
restriction on the use of private property under 
Euclid v. Ambler Really Co., Ill U.S. 365 [47 
.S.Ct. 114, 71 L.Ed. 303 (1926)], and Nectow v. 
pany. Despite its recognition that such an 
ordinance *!would have been rejected as arbi-
trary and oppressive" at an earlier date, the 
Court (over the dissent of Justices Van De-
vanter, McReynolds, and Butler) upheld the 
ordinance. Today's majority should heed the 
words of Justice Sutherland: 
"Such regulations are sustained, under the 
complex conditions of our day, for reason* 
analogous to those which justify traffic 
regulations, which, before the advent of 
automobiles and rapid transit street rail-
ways, would have been condemned as fatal-
ly arbitrary and unreasonable And in this 
there is no inconsistency, for while the 
meaning of constitutional guaranties never 
varies, the scope of their application must 
expand or contract 141 ito meet the new and 
different conditions which are constantly 
coming within the field of their operation. 
In a changing world, it is impossible that it 
should be .otherwise." Village of Euclid v 
Ambler Realty Co., 272 U.S. 365, 387, 47 
S.Ct U4,118, 71 L.Ed. 303 (1926). 
In pur changing world one thing is certain 
uncertainty will characterize predictions 
about the impact of new urban developments 
on, the risks of floods, earthquakes, traffic 
congestion, or environmental harms. When 
there is doubt concerning the magnitude oi 
those impacts, the public interest in averting 
them must outweigh the private interest of 
the commercial entrepreneur. If the govern-
ment can demonstrate that the conditions it 
has imposed in a land use permit are ration-
al, impartial and conducive to fulfilling the 
aims of a valid land use plan, a strong pre-
Cambridge, 277 U.S. 183 [48 S.Ct. 447, 72 L.Ed 
842 (1928)]." Id., 431 U.S., at 540, n. 10, 97 
S.Ct,, at 1956, n. 10. The dissent went oa to 
state that my calling the city to task for failing tu 
explain the need for enacting the ordinance: 
"placefd] the burden on the wrong pany " Ibid 
(emphasis added). Recently, two other Member 
of today's majority severely criticized the holding 
in Moore. See United States v. Carlton, 512 U S 
26, 40-42, 114 S.Ct. 2018, 2027, 129 L Ed 2 J 22 
(1994) (SCALIA, J., concurring in judgment; btc 
also id., at 39, 114 S.Ct at 2020 (SCALIA, J 
concurring in judgment) (calling the docttine oi 
substantive due process "an oxymoron"). 
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sumption of validity should attach to those 
conditions. The burden of demonstrating 
that those conditions have unreasonably im-
paired the economic value of the proposed 
improvement belongs squarely on the shoul-
ders of the party challenging the state ac-
tion's constitutionality. That allocation of 
burdens has served us well in the past. The 
Court has stumbled badly today by reversing 
it. 
I respectfully dissent. 
Justice SOUTER, dissenting. 
This case, like Nollan v. California Coast-
al Comm% 483 U.S. 825, 107 S.Ct. 3141, 97 
L.Ed.2d 677 (1987), invites the Court to ex-
amine the relationship between conditions 
imposed by development permits, requiring 
landowners to dedicate portions of their land 
for use by the public, and governmental in-
terests in mitigating the adverse effects of 
such development. Nollan declared the need 
for a nexus between the nature 'of an exac-
tion of an interest in land (a beach* easement) 
and the nature of governmental interests. 
The Court treats this case as raising a fur-
ther question, not about the nature, but 
about the degree, of connection1 required be-
tween such an exaction and the |4i2adverse 
effects of development. The Court's opinion 
announces a test to address this question, but 
as I read the opinion, the Court does not 
apply that test to these facts, which do not 
raise the question the Court addresses. 
First, as to the floodplain and greenway, 
the Court acknowledges that an easement of 
this land for open space (and presumably 
including the five feet required for needed 
creek channel improvements) is reasonably 
related to flood control, see ante, at 2317-
2318, 2320, but argues that the "permanent 
recreational easement" for the public on the 
greenway is not so related, see ante, at 2320-
2321. If that is so, it is not because of any 
lack of proportionality between permit condi-
tion and adverse effect, but because of a lack 
of any rational connection at all between 
exaction of a public recreational area and the 
governmental interest in providing for the 
effect of increased water runoff. That is 
merely an application of Nollan's nexus 
analysis. As the Court notes, "[i]f petition-
er's proposed development had somehow en-
croached on existing greenway space in the 
city, it would have been reasonable to require 
petitioner to provide some alternative green-
way space for the public." Ante, at 2321. 
But that, of course, was not the fact, and the 
city of Tigard never sought to justify the 
public access portion of the dedication as 
related to flood control. It merely argued 
that whatever recreational uses were made of 
the bicycle path and the 1-foot edge on ei-
ther side were incidental to the permit condi-
tion requiring dedication of the 15-foot ease-
ment for an 8-foot-wide bicycle path and for 
flood control, including open space require-
ments and relocation of the bank of the river 
by some 5 feet. It seems to me such inciden-
tal recreational use can stand or fall with the 
bicycle path, which the city justified by refer-
ence to traffic congestion. As to the rela-
tionship the Court examines, between the 
recreational easement and a purpose never 
put forth as a justification by the city, the 
Court unsurprisingly finds a recreation area 
to be unrelated to flood control. 
_|4i3Second, as to the bicycle path, the Court 
again acknowledges the "theoretically]" rea-
sonable relationship between "the city's at-
tempt to reduce traffic congestion by provid-
ing [a bicycle path] for alternative means of 
transportation," ante, at 2318, and the "cor-J 
rect" finding of the city that "the larger 
retail sales facility proposed by petitioner, 
will increase traffic on the streets of the 
Central Business District," ante, at 2321, 
The Court only faults the city for saying that 
the bicycle path "could" rather than "would" 
offset the increased traffic from the store, 
ante, at 2322. That again, as far as I can 
tell, is an application of Nollan, for the Court 
holds that the stated connection ("could off-
set") between traffic congestion and bicycle 
paths is too tenuous; only if the bicycle path 
"would" offset the increased traffic by some 
amount could the bicycle path be said to be 
related to the city's legitimate interest in 
reducing traffic congestion. 
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I cannot agree that the application of Nol-
lan is a sound one here, since it appears that 
the Court has placed the burden of producing 
evidence of relationship on the city, despite 
the usual rule in cases involving the police 
power that the government is presumed to 
have acted constitutionally.* Having, thus 
assigned the burden, the Court concludes 
that the city loses based on one word 
("could" instead of "would"), and despite the 
fact that this record shows the connection thex 
Court looks for. Dolan has put forward no 
evidence that Uuthe burden of granting a 
dedication for the bicycle path is unrelated in 
kind to the anticipated increase in traffic 
congestion, nor, if there exists a requirement 
that the relationship be related in degree, 
has Dolan shown that the exaction fails any 
such test. The city, by contrast, calculated 
the increased traffic flow that would result 
from Dolan's proposed development to be 435 
trips per day, and its Comprehensive Plan, 
applied here, relied on studies showing the 
link between alternative modes of transporta-
tion, including bicycle paths, and reduced 
street traffic congestion. See, e.g., App. to 
Brief for Respondent A-5, quoting City of 
Tigard's Comprehensive Plan (" 'Bicycle and 
pedestrian pathway systems will resultr in 
some reduction of automobile trips within the 
community'"). Nollan, therefore, is satis-
fied, and on that assumption the city's condi-
tions should not be held to fail
 {a further 
rough proportionality test or any other that 
might be devised to give meaning to the 
constitutional limits. As Members of this 
Court have said before, "the common zoning 
regulations requiting subdividers to . . . dedi-
cate certain areas to public streets, are in 
accord with our constitutional traditions be-
cause the proposed property use would oth-
erwise be the cause of excessive congestion." 
* See, e.g, Goldblatt v Hempstead, 369 U.S. 590, 
594-596, 82 S.Ct. 987, 990,, 8 L.Ed.2d 130 
(1962); United States v. Sperry Corp., 493 U.S. 
52, 60, 110 S.Ct. 387, 393-394, 107 L.Ed.2d 290 
(1989). The majority characterizes this case as 
involving an "adjudicative decision" to impose 
permit conditions, ante, at 2390, n. 8, but the 
permit conditions were imposed pursuant to Ti-
gard's Community Development Code. See, e.g., 
§ 18.84.040, App. to Brief for Respondent B-26. 
PenneU v. San Jose, 485 U.S. 1, 20, 108 S.Ct. 
849, 862, 99 L.Ed.2d 1 (1988) (SCALIA, J., 
concurring in part and dissenting in part). 
The bicycle path permit condition is funda-
\ mentally no different from these. 
In any event, on my reading, the Court's 
conclusions about the city's vulnerability car-
ry the Court no further than Nollan has 
gone already, and I do not view this case as a 
suitable vehicle for taking the law beyond 
\ that point. The right case for the enunci-
ation of takings doctrine seems hard to spot. 
See Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Coun-
cil, 505 U.S. 1003, 1076, 112 S.Ct. 2886, 2925, 
120 L.Ed.2d 798 (1992) (statement of SOUT-
ER, J.). 
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Products liability action was brought 
against manufacturer of all-terrain vehicle 
(ATV), to recover for injuries suffered in 
accident. The Oregon Circuit Court entered 
judgment on jury verdict awarding plaintiff 
compensatory damages and $5 million in pu-
nitive damages, and manufacturer appealed. 
The adjudication here was of Dolan's requested 
variance from the permit conditions otherwise 
required to be imposed by the Code This case 
raises no question about discriminatory, or "re-
verse spot," zoning, which "singles out a particu-
lar parcel for different, less favorable treatment 
than the neighboring ones." Penn Central 
Transp. Co. v. New York City, 438 U.S. 104, 132, 
98 S.Ct. 2646, 2663, 57 L.Ed.2d 631 (1978). 
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evidence, in my view, of market value in 
this case. Even if it be conceded that the 
plaintiff's out-of-court statement as to the 
value of the well is sufficient to establish 
the value of the well, the testimony falls far 
short of providing a reasonable basis for 
determining market value of the whole par-
cel without a working well. Surely in this 
case such evidence would not have been 
hard to come by. The point cannot be 
avoided by the general principle that someN 
uncertainty in evidence of damage is to be 
expected. That principle has especial appli-
cation in cases dealing with lost profits 
because of lost sales, see Winsness v. M. J. 
Conoco Distributors, Inc., Utah, 593 P.2d 
1303 (1979); loss of good will; losses occa-
sioned by inability to reduce unit costs; etc. 
These types of losses inevitably are bur-
dened with considerable uncertainty be-
cause of the nature of the factors which 
must be considered. Market value, as a 
measure of damages, may give rise to con-
flicting testimony, but the basic factors to 
be considered are not so difficult to evalu-
ate. In any event, there must be some 
evidence of market value, and there is none. 
HOWE, J., concurs in the dissenting opin-
ion of STEWART, J. 
BANBERRY DEVELOPMENT CORPO-
RATION, McKean Construction Compa-
ny, Midwest Realty and Finance, Inc., a 
Utah corporation, Plaintiffs and Re-
spondents, 
v. 
SOUTH JORDAN CITY, a municipal cor-
poration, Defendant and Appellant. 
No. 16872. 
Supreme Court of Utah. 
June 3, 1981. 
Subdividers brought suit against city to 
challenge the validity of water connection 
and park improvement fees imposed as a 
condition to connection to the city water 
main and as a condition to final approval of 
the subdividers* plat. The Third District 
Court, Salt Lake County, Dean E. Conder, 
v. SOUTH JORDAN CITY Utah 899 
631 P.2d899 
J., sustained validity of the park improve-
ment fee, and granted city's motion to dis-
miss as to it and held the advance collection 
of water connection fee contrary to statuto-
ry law and granted subdividers' motion for 
summary judgment and both sides appeal-
ed. The Supreme Court, Oaks, J., held that 
advance collection of water connection fee 
from subdivider and a park improvement 
fee designed to raise funds to enlarge and 
-ximprove sewer and water systems and rec-
reational opportunities would be valid pro-
vided they were reasonable. 
Reversed and remanded. 
Howe, J., filed separate opinion concur-
ring in part and dissenting in part in which 
Maughan, C. J., joined. 
1. Waters and Water Courses <3=*203(6) 
Advance collection of water connection 
fee from subdivider and a park improve-
ment fee designed to raise funds to enlarge 
and improve sewer and water systems and 
recreational opportunities would be valid 
provided they were reasonable. 
2. Municipal Corporations <&=»712 
Waters and Water Courses <^203(6) 
To comply with standard of reasonable-
ness, a municipal fee related to services like 
water and sewer must not require newly 
developed properties to bear more than 
their equitable share of the capital costs in 
relation to benefits conferred. 
3. Municipal Corporations <s=»458 
To determine equitable share of the 
capital costs to be borne by newly devel-
oped properties, a municipality should de-
termine the relative burdens previously 
borne and yet to be borne by those proper-
ties in comparison with the other properties 
in the municipality as a whole and impor-
tant factors to consider include: (1) the cost 
of existing capital facilities; (2) manner of 
financing existing capital facilities; (3) rel-
ative extent to which newly developed 
properties and other properties in munici-
pality have already contributed to cost of 
existing capital facilities; (4) relative ex-
tent to which newly developed properties 
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and other properties in municipality will 
contribute to cost of existing capital facili-
ties in the future; (5) extent to which mu-
nicipality is requiring new developers or 
owners to provide common facilities that 
have been provided by municipality and fi-
nanced through general taxation or other 
means; (6) extraordinary costs in servicing 
newly developed properties; and (7) time-
price differential inherent in fair compari-
sons of amounts paid at different times. 
4. Municipal Corporations <3=>458 
In determining reasonableness of a fee 
for municipal services, courts must concede 
municipalities the flexibility necessary to 
deal realistically with questions not suscep-
tible of exact measurement and precise 
mathematical equality is neither feasible 
nor constitutionally vital. 
5. Municipal Corporations <3=*167 
Municipal officials must have legal 
power to deal creatively with extraordinary 
or unforeseen circumstances in provision of 
municipal services. 
6. Municipal Corporations <s=> 122(2) 
A municipality's exercise of its legisla-
tive powers is entitled to a presumption of 
constitutionality. 
7. Water and Water Courses <s=>203(12) 
Zoning and Planning <s=>685 
As the information that must be used to 
assure that sudivision fees are within the 
standard of reasonableness is most accessible 
to the municipality, that body should disclose 
the basis of its calculations to whoever 
challenges the reasonableness of its subdivi-
sion or water hookup fees. 
8. Water and Water Courses <s=*203(12) 
Zoning and Planning <s=»685 
Once the municipality has disclosed the 
basis of its calculations for its subdivision or 
water hookup fees to those who challenge 
the reasonableness of the fees, the burden of 
showing failure to comply with constitution-
al standard of reasonableness is on the 
challengers. 
9. Municipal Corporations @=*458 
Park improvement fees should be fixed 
so as to be equitable in light of relative 
benefits conferred on, as well as relative 
burdens previously borne and yet to be 
borne by, newly developed properties in 
comparison with the other properties in mu-
nicipality as a whole and fees should not 
exceed^amount sufficient to equalize the 
relevant benefits and burdens of newly de-
veloped and other properties. 
Michael J. Mazuran, Salt Lake City, for 
defendant and appellant. 
John H. McDonald, Craig S. Cook, Salt 
Lake City, for plaintiffs and respondents. 
OAKS, Justice: 
This is a suit by three subdividers against 
a city to challenge the validity of water 
connection and park improvement fees im-
posed as a condition to connection to the 
city water main and as a condition to final 
approval of the subdividers' plat. At issue 
in this appeal are the legality of any such 
fees, and, if they are legal, the criteria for 
judging their reasonableness. 
The procedure for charging the park im-
provement fee does not appear in the rec-
ord. City Ordinance 13-1-5, which the sub-
dividers concede was lawfully enacted and 
constitutional, requires a subdivider who 
desires to connect to the city water system 
to enter into an agreement "specifying the 
terms and conditions under which the water 
extensions and connection shall be made 
and the payment that shall be required." 
Paragraph 10 of the agreement form adopt-
ed by the city and required of all subdivid-
ers before plat approval obligates the subdi-
viders to pay the entire cost of all water 
lines required to service the subdivision, 
including extensions from existing water 
mains and all connecting lines within the 
subdivision. It also provides that "the City 
shall charge the Applicant a connection fee 
in the amount of $ for each individu-
al dwelling unit to be served within the 
subdivision, which sum shall be payable in 
full to the City before the subdivision sys-
tem is connected to any existing City water 
mains." The required connection fee was 
$800 for a 3/i-inch line and $1,000 for a 
1-inch line. 
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Objecting that the collection of the water 
connection fees in advance from the devel-
oper constituted an unlawful tax and an 
unconstitutional taking of property without 
due process, the subdividers sought injunc-
tive relief. They challenged the city's park 
improvement fee of $235 per lot on the 
same basis. They also attacked both fees as 
discriminatory. 
On motions in advance of trial, the^dis-
trict court (1) sustained the validity of the. 
park improvement fee and granted the 
city's motion to dismiss as to it, and (2) held 
the advance collection of the water connec-
tion fee contrary to statutory law, granted 
the subdividers' motion for summary judg-
ment, and permanently enjoined the city 
from its enforcement. Both the city and 
the subdividers have appealed. 
I. 
THE VALIDITY OF WATER 
CONNECTION AND PARK 
IMPROVEMENT FEES 
[1] The district court ruled that the ad-
vance collection of the water connection fee 
was rendered illegal by the combined effect 
of U.C.A., 1953, § 10-8-38 and § 17-6-22. 
Section 10-8-38 empowers the city, for the 
purpose of defraying costs of construction 
or operation of a sewer system, to require 
mandatory hookup and payment of charges 
when a sewer is available and within 300 
feet of any property containing a building 
used for human occupancy. Section 17-6-
22 provides that a municipal corporation 
which contracts with an improvement dis-
trict for sewage services shall have authori-
ty to make service charges to parties who 
connect to its sewer system. If the munici-
pality also operates a waterworks system, 
the section provides that these charges 
"may be combined with the charge made 
for water furnished by the water system 
and may be collected and the collection 
thereof secured in the same manner as that 
specified in Section 10-8-38, Utah Code An-
notated 1953." 
Because § 10-8-38 does not authorize the 
charging of a sewer connection fee in the 
case of vacant lots, and because § 17-6-22 
provides that the city may collect water 
fees in the same manner as § 10-8-38 au-
thorizes for the collection of sewer fees, the 
combination of these two statutes is urged 
to forbid cities from collecting water fees in 
circumstances not authorized for sewer 
fees. This does not follow. Section 17-6-
22 is permissive, not mandatory. It poses 
no statutory prohibition against the collec-
tion of a water connection fee from a subdi-
vider for each lot in a subdivision at the 
time the subdivision is hooked up to the city 
. water system. 
The validity of a sewer connection fee to 
raise money to enlarge and improve a sewer 
system was sustained by this Court in 
Home Builders Ass'n v. Provo City, 28 Utah 
2d 402, 503 P.2d 451 (1972), discussed here-
after. In a decision issued after the trial 
court acted in this case, we sustained a 
municipality's power to withhold the privi-
lege of city water service until a landowner 
had paid a valid municipal sewer connection 
fee. Rupp v. Grantsville City, Utah, 610 
P.2d 338 (1980). In two other decisions 
issued after the trial court acted in this 
case, we sustained a municipality's require-
ment that subdividers dedicate a portion of 
subdivision land for recreational purposes 
(or pay cash in lieu) as a condition of final 
approval of their plat. Call v. City of West 
Jordan, Utah, 606 P.2d 217 (1979). On 
rehearing in this same case, we held that 
the reasonableness of the dedication or cash 
requirement in a particular case was a ques-
tion of fact that must be resolved at trial. 
Call v. City of West Jordan, Utah, 614 P.2d 
1257 (1980). 
These four decisions have resolved the 
legality of water connection and park im-
provement fees designed to raise funds to 
enlarge and improve sewer and water sys-
tems and recreational opportunities, as well 
as the legality of conditioning water hook-
ups or plat approval on their collection. 
However, these decisions leave open the 
question of the reasonableness of any indi-
vidual fee charged or land dedication re-
quired. This question of reasonableness 
must be resolved on the facts in each partic-
ular case. We therefore reverse both judg-
ments and remand the entire case for trial 
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on the reasonableness of the fees the city 
has imposed in this case. 
Because this case is being remanded for 
trial, it is appropriate for this Court to 
elaborate on the constitutional standards of 
reasonableness that should govern the va-
lidity of subdivision charges such as these. 
II. 
THE REASONABLENESS OF SUBDIVI-
SION FEES IN GENERAL 
Like so many other municipalities in this 
state, the City of South Jordan confronts 
the problems of providing a fast-growing 
city with adequate services for water, sew-
er, recreation, and other common needs. In 
1978, the city had to deal with the develop-
ment of about 600 lots (including the 400 in 
subdividers' development), up from about 
65 in prior years. Such growth puts a 
severe strain on the financial and personnel 
resources of a small municipality, and if not 
properly managed could well overburden 
common facilities like water and sewer to 
the point where their service would deterio-
rate severely for the existing occupants and 
be inadequate for the new ones. An appro-
priate way to provide adequately for such 
services is by advance planning and financ-
ing. 
The conventional means of financing mu-
nicipal facilities are tax revenues, special 
assessments, and bonding. In addition, in 
recent years many local governmental units 
in this country have employed subdivision 
plat controls to require fees, such as the 
water and park fees involved in this case, 
that force developers to contribute to the 
centralized capital costs of municipal serv-
ices in addition to the concededly valid 
localized costs applicable solely to their de-
velopment. The courts of this state and 
others have approved the legality of such 
fees, but are still struggling to define the 
limits of reasonableness that must be im-
posed upon their amount.1 Without legal 
limits—imposed by statute or constitution— 
subdivision charges could easily be used to 
avoid statutory requirements for bonding 
1. J. Johnson, "Constitutionality of Subdivision 
Control Exactions: The Quest for a Rationale," 
52 Cornell L.Q. 871 (1967); Heyman & Gilhool, 
"The Constitutionality of Imposing Increased 
Community Costs on New Suburban Residents 
municipal improvements, statutory limits 
on municipal taxation, and legal limits on 
restrictive or exclusionary zoning. 
The subdividers argue that the water and 
park fees far exceed the city's costs in 
respect to these matters and that the excess 
would be used in the city's general operat-
ing fund. The city maintains in its brief in 
this Court that the water connection fees 
would be used to enlarge water lines and 
storage and pumping facilities, and the 
park improvement fees would be used to 
enlarge and develop city parks. The parties 
differ on whether such an intent was se-
cured by enforceable restriction, such as 
deposit to a separate fund. These conten-
tions, all relevant to reasonableness, are 
matters for consideration at trial. 
The subdividers also argue that the water 
connection fee cannot be imposed on the 
developer, but must be deferred for imposi-
tion on the lot owner or homeowner at the 
time of hookup. We find this argument 
unpersuasive. .This is not a case where the 
party burdened with the exaction will de-
rive no benefit from it.2 When the subdivi-
sion is connected to the city's water and 
sewer systems, the city must be prepared to 
perform its services on demand, and from 
that fact the subdividers .derive immediate 
benefit. The provision of standby capacity 
to a subdivision requires the commitment of 
substantial capital. The city does not have 
to wait until someone turns on a tap or 
flushes a toilet before it requires participa-
tion in the cost of providing its services. 
Subject to the requirements of reasonable-
ness discussed below, a hookup fee that 
requires a subdivider to make advance pay-
ment of some portion of the common capital 
costs attributable to committing service to 
the lots in the subdivision is valid. The 
same is true of the park improvement fee. 
The proceedings on remand in this case 
will be governed by two leading decisions of 
this Court, one dealing with a municipal 
service that employs an expensive central 
Through Subdivision Exactions," 73 Yale L.J. 
1119 (1964). 
2. City and County of Denver v. Greenspoon, 
140 Colo. 402, 344 P.2d 679 (1959). 
BANBERRY DEV. CORP. v. SOUTH JORDAN CITY Utah 903 
Cite as, Utah, 631 P.2d 899 
facility like water or sewer, and the other 
with a municipal service that employs dis-
persed resources like recreational land. 
Though the standards of reasonableness in 
these two circumstances are essentially the 
same, their application is somewhat differ-
ent. The two different types of charges 
will therefore be discussed separately. 
III. 
REASONABLENESS OF WATER 
CONNECTION FEE 
[2] Home Builders Ass'n v. Provo City, 
28 Utah 2d 402, 503 P.2d 451 (1972), sus-
tained the validity of a sewer connection 
fee (in addition to the monthly sewer 
charge) for each living unit of newly con-
structed buildings connected to an existing 
sewer system. The fee was imposed in 
order to improve and enlarge the sewer 
system. It was not a revenue measure or 
an assessment, the court found, but "a rea-
sonable charge for the use thereof," as au-
thorized by U.C.A., 1953, § 10-8-38. Sig-
nificantly, the $100-per-lot charge was de-
rived by dividing the total number of sewer 
connections in the municipality into the net 
value of the sewer system, and the funds 
obtained were to be restricted to the en-
largement, improvement, and operation of 
the sewer system and to the retirement of 
indebtedness incurred in its construction. 
In approving the sewer connection fee in 
Home Builders, this Court relied on Airwick 
Industries, Inc. v. Carlstadt Sewerage Au-
thority, 57 N.J. 107, 270 A.2d 18 (1970). 
That case approved a connection fee ar-
rangement by which the capital and inter-
est costs of a new central sewage system, 
although met initially by the actual users, 
would ultimately be borne by all properties 
benefited, including lands that were unim-
proved when the central expenditures were 
originally made. The municipality did this 
by including as part of its connection fee 
what our Court characterized as "a sum of 
money which would represent a fair contri-
bution by the connecting party toward the 
expense theretofore met by others." 3 
3s Home Builders Ass'n v. Provo City, 28 Utah 
2d at 405, 503 P.2d at 453. 
The Home Builders case established the 
principle upon which the reasonableness of 
the water connection fee in this case should 
be judged. The "fair contribution" of the 
connecting party should not exceed "the 
expense thereof met by others." Or, as the 
New Jersey Supreme Court held in a subse-
quent case, the rules governing the alloca-
tion of improvement costs between city and 
developer 
would ideally have been such as to insure, 
to the greatest extent practicable^ that 
the cost of extending a municipal water 
facility would fall equitably upon those 
who are similarly situated and in a just 
proportion to benefits conferred. They 
should be sufficiently flexible to permit 
consideration to be given to the facts and 
circumstances of each particular case. 
Deerfield Estates, Inc. v. Township of E 
Brunswick, 60 N.J. 115, 286 A.2d 498, 505 
(1972). Therefore, where the fee charged a 
new subdivision or a new property hookup 
exceeds the direct costs incident thereto (as 
a means of sharing the costs of common 
facilities), the excess must survive measure 
against the standard that the total costs 
"fall equitably upon those who are similarly 
situated and in a just proportion to benefits 
conferred." Stated otherwise, to comply 
with the standard of reasonableness, a mu-
nicipal fee related to services like water and 
sewer must not require newly developed 
properties to bear more than their equitable 
share of the capital costs in relation to 
benefits conferred. 
[3] To determine the equitable share of 
the capital costs to be borne by newly de-
veloped properties, a municipality should 
determine the relative burdens previously 
borne and yet to be borne by those proper-
ties in comparison with the other properties 
in the municipality as a whole; the fee in 
question should not exceed the amount suf-
ficient to equalize the relative burdens of 
newly developed and other properties. 
Among the most important factors the 
municipality should consider in determining 
the relative burden already borne and yet 
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to be borne by newly developed properties 
and other properties are the following, sug-
gested by the well-reasoned authorities cit-
ed below: (1) the cost of existing capital 
facilities; (2) the manner of financing exist-
ing capital facilities (such as user charges, 
special assessments, bonded indebtedness, 
general taxes, or federal grants); (3) the 
relative extent to which the newly devel-
oped properties and the other properties in 
the municipality have already contributed 
to the cost of existing capital facilities (by 
such means as user charges, special assess-
ments, or payment from the proceeds of 
general taxes); (4) the relative extent to 
which the newly developed properties and 
the other properties in the municipality will 
contribute to the cost of existing capital 
facilities in the future; (5) the extent to 
which the newly developed properties are 
entitled to a credit because the municipality 
is requiring their developers or owners (by 
contractual arrangement or otherwise) to 
provide common facilities (inside or outside 
the proposed development) that have been 
provided by the municipality and financed 
through general taxation or other means 
(apart from user charges) in other parts of 
the municipality; (6) extraordinary costs, if 
any, in servicing the newly developed prop-
erties; and (7) the time-price differential 
inherent in fair comparisons of amounts 
paid at different times. Home Builders v. 
Provo City, supra; Rose v. Plymouth Town, 
110 Utah 358, 173 P.2d 285 (1946); Airwick 
Industries, Inc. v. Carlstadt Sewerage Au-
thority, supra; Deerfield Estates, Inc. v. 
Township of E. Brunswick, supra; West 
Park Ave., Inc. v. Township of Ocean, 48 
N.J. 122, 224 A.2d 1 (1966); Rutan Estates, 
Inc. v. Town of Belleville, 56 NJ.Super. 330, 
152 A.2d 853 (App.Div.1959); Zehman Con-
struction Co. v. City of Eastlake, 92 Ohio 
Law Abst. 364, 195 N.E.2d 361 (CtApp. 
1962); Strahan v. City of Aurora, 38 Ohio 
Misc. 37, 311 N.E.2d 876 (Ct.Com.Pleas, 
1973); R. Ellickson, "Suburban Growth 
Controls: An Economic and Legal Analy-
sis," 86 Yale L.J. 385, 467-89 (1977); F. 
Michelman & T. Sandalow, Government in 
Urban Areas, 533-36 (1970). 
[4, 5] In adjudicating the validity of any 
individual application of this standard of 
reasonableness, the courts must concede 
municipalities the flexibility necessary to 
deal realistically with questions not suscep-
tible of exact measurement. Precise math-
ematical equality "is neither feasible nor 
constitutionally vital." Airwick Industries, 
Inc. v. Carlstadt Sewerage Authority, su-
pra, 270 A.2d at 26. Similarly, municipal 
officials must also have the legal power to 
.vdeal creatively with extraordinary or un-
foreseen circumstances in the provision of 
municipal services. Rose v. Plymouth 
Town, 110 Utah 358, 173 P.2d 285 (1946). 
We agree with and adopt the New Jersey 
court's ruling in Deerfield Estates, Inc. v. 
Township of E. Brunswick, supra, 286 A.2d 
at 507-508: 
The rule we lay down must be given a 
pragmatic application. Complete equali-
ty of treatment may sometimes be impos-
sible, especially where a municipality has 
followed no set pattern with respect to 
past extensions. Nor should a municipal-
ity be denied the right to modify an es-
tablished pattern where altered circum-
stances reasonably so dictate. Equality 
of treatment may upon occasion be forced 
to give way before some supervening 
public interest. But insofar as such 
equality can reasonably be achieved this 
must be done. 
[6-8] The required flexibility will be im-
plemented by the presumption of constitu-
tionality incident to a municipality's exer-
cise of its legislative powers. Call v. City of 
West Jordan, Utah, 614 P.2d 1257, 1258 
(1980); Crestview-Holladay Homeowners 
Assfn, Inc. v. Engh Floral Co., Utah, 545 
P.2d 1150 (1976); Dowse v. Salt Lake City 
Corp., 123 Utah 107, 255 P.2d 723 (1953). 
Since the information that must be used to 
assure that subdivision fees are within the 
standard of reasonableness is most accessi-
ble to the municipality, that body should 
disclose the basis of its calculations to who-
ever challenges the reasonableness of its 
subdivision or hookup fees. Once that is 
done, the burden of showing failure to com-
ply with the constitutional standard of rea-
sonableness in this matter is on the chal-
lengers. Home Builders Ass'n of Greater 
BANBERRY DEV. CORP. 
Cite as, Utah, 
Kansas City v. City of Kansas Cityt Mo., 555 
S.W.2d 832 (1977). 
IV. 
REASONABLENESS OF PARK 
IMPROVEMENT FEE 
[9] In Call v. City of West Jordan, Utah, 
606 P.2d 217 (1979), opinion on rehearing, 
614 P.2d 1257 (1980), this Court upheld the 
validity of a city ordinance that required 
subdividers, as a condition of plat^tpproval, 
to dedicate certain proposed subdivision 
land to the city (or pay cash in lieu) for 
flood control and/or park and recreation 
facilities. In remanding the case for trial 
on the constitutionality of the ordinance as 
applied (i. e., the requirement that seven 
percent of the subdivision land be dedicat-
ed), this Court ruled that "the dedication 
should have some reasonable relationship to 
the need created by the subdivision." Id. at 
1258. The Court quoted the following from 
Home Builders Ass'n of Greater Kansas 
City v. City of Kansas City, Mo., 555 S.W.2d 
832, 835 (1977): 
[I]f the burden cast upon the subdivider 
is reasonably attributable to his activity, 
then the requirement [of dedication or 
fees in lieu thereof] is permissible; if not, 
it is forbidden and amounts to a confisca-
tion of private property in contravention 
of the constitutional prohibitions rather 
than a reasonable regulation under the 
police power.4 
Reasonableness obviously holds the munici-
pality to a higher standard of rationality 
than the requirement that its actions not be 
arbitrary or capricious. 
Under the reasonableness test in Call v. 
City of West Jordan, supra, the benefits 
derived from the exaction need not accrue 
solely to the subdivision (614 P.2d at 1259); 
flood control and recreation are needs that 
cannot be treated in isolation from the rest 
of the municipality. At the same time, the 
benefits derived from the exaction must be 
of "demonstrable benefit" to the subdivi-
sion (Id. at 1259). 
As with water connection fees, the 
amount of such exactions or fees should be 
such that the burden of providing these 
v. SOUTH JORDAN CITY Utah 905 
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municipal services "falls equitably upon 
those who are similarly situated and in a 
just proportion to benefits conferred." 
Deerfield Estates, Inc. v. Township of E. 
Brunswick, 60 N.J. 115, 286 A.2d 498, 505 
(1971). The measurement of "benefits con-
ferred" may have a more significant impact 
on the reasonableness of park fees than on 
water connection fees. The central facili-
ties that support water and sewer service 
would generally confer the same benefits in 
every part of the municipality, but the ben-
efits conferred by recreational, flood con-
trol, or other dispersed resources may be 
measurably different in different parts of 
the municipality. Park improvement fees 
should therefore be fixed so as to be equita-
ble in light of the relative benefits con-
ferred on, as well as the relative burdens 
previously borne and yet to be borne by the 
newly developed properties in comparison 
with the other properties in the municipali-
ty as a whole. The fees in question should 
not exceed the amount sufficient to equal-
ize the relative benefits and burdens of 
newly developed and other properties. 
The factors to be considered in the deter-
mination of relative burden are similar to 
the factors discussed in Part III in connec-
tion with water connection fees. The flexi-
bility to be tolerated within the presump-
tion of regularity and the disclosure of the 
basis of calculation specified in Part III is 
also applicable to this type of subdivision 
charge. 
The judgments of the trial court are re-
versed in the appeal and the cross-appeal, 
and the cause is remanded for proceedings 
consistent with this opinion. No costs 
awarded. 
HALL and STEWART, JJ., concur. 
HOWE, Justice (concurring and dissent-
ing): 
I concur that the defendant city may 
lawfully require water connection fees to be 
paid at the time the main line running 
through the subdivision is connected to the 
city system and water is brought to the 
edge of each lot. I arrive at this conclusion 
4. Call v City of West Jordan, 614 P.2d at 1259. 
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in view of the authority invested in cities 
and towns to "construct, maintain and oper-
ate waterworks," § 10-8-14 U.C.A.1953; to 
"fix the rates to be paid for the water use," 
§ 10-8-22; and to "enact ordinances, rules 
and regulations for the management and 
conduct of the waterworks system owned or 
controlled by it," § 10-7-14. It is not un-
reasonable to require payment of the con-
nection fee when the water is turned into 
the main line coursing through the subdivi-
sion because at that time the defendant city 
is obligated to furnish water to each and 
every lot as requested. In order to prepare 
to do this, the defendant city had to make 
capital expenditures to enlarge its capacity 
so that it could meet the new demands to be 
imposed upon it. I concur that § 10-8-38 is 
not a prohibition against advance collection. 
I also concur with the criteria of reasona-
bleness contained in Parts III and IV of the 
majority opinion. 
I dissent, however, from the holding in 
the majority opinion that the city may law-
fully impose park improvement fees. I con-
cur with the reasoning of Justice Wilkins in 
his dissenting opinion in Call v. City of 
West Jordan, Utah, 606 P.2d 217 (1979). 
The imposition of the park improvement 
fees is even more offensive in this case 
since the city conditioned the furnishing of 
water service to the subdivision upon their 
payment. To me the two subjects are en-
tirely separate and I believe it to be an 
abuse of the city's authority to own and 
operate a waterworks system (a proprietary 
operation) to use the furnishing of water as 
leverage to collect fees for other unrelated 
purposes. Section 10—8-38 authorizes cities 
and towns to discontinue water service to 
premises where the sewer service charges 
have not been paid, but I find no authoriza-
tion to also deny service until park improve-
ment fees have been paid. 
MAUGHAN, C. J., concurs in the opinion 
of HOWE, J. 
( o I KEY NUMBER SYSTEM^ 
Betty Harper CULBERTSON, Executrix 
of the Estate of Joyce K. Culbertson, 
and as an individual, Plaintiff and Re-
spondent, 
v. 
CONTINENTAL ASSURANCE COMPA-
NY, a Tennessee corporation, Chicago 
Bridge and Iron Company Profit-Shar-
ing Plan Trust, an Illinois Trust, Beth 
Rowley Culbertson Conrad, an individu-
al, Loretta Culbertson, an individual, 
Richard Culbertson, an individual, 
Chrystella Culbertson, an individual, and 
Elizabeth Culbertson, an individual, De-
fendants and Appellants. 
No. 17148. 
Supreme Court of Utah. 
June 4, 1981. 
Decedent's second wife brought action 
as executrix to have proceeds of a profit-
sharing plan and certain insurance policies 
awarded to decedent's estate rather than to 
decedent's first wife as his designated bene-
ficiary. The Third District Court, Salt 
Lake County, Bryant H. Croft, J., awarded 
plaintiff proceeds of profit-sharing plan and 
defendant proceeds of insurance policies, 
and defendant appealed and plaintiff cross 
appealed. The Supreme Court, Maughan, 
C. J., held that; (1) defendant was entitled 
as decedent's first wife to proceeds of prof-
it-sharing plan, interest to which vested in 
her on decedent's death, where decedent 
neither changed designated beneficiary not 
as moving party in divorce action sought 
explicit relinquishment of defendant's ex-
pectancy, and there were no broad, compre-
hensive provisions in decree of divorce 
which could reasonably be construed as a 
relinquishment or waiver of any or all ex-
pectancies, and (2) where decree of divorce 
between defendant and decedent as her 
first husband did not by its terms expressly 
terminate defendant's status as a benefi-
APPENDIX #5 
SALT LAKE COUNTY "highway-abutting" Ordinance 
15.28.010 Dedication and improvement required. Page 1 of 1 
Title 15 BUILDINGS AND CONSTRUCTION 
Chapter 15.28 HIGHWAY DEDICATION 
15.28.010 Dedication and improvement required. 
Except as otherwise provided in Section 15.28.020, no building or structure shall be erected, 
reconstructed, structurally altered or enlarged, and no building permit shall be issued therefor, on 
any lot or parcel of land which abuts a major or secondary highway, as shown on the map 
entitled, "The County Transportation Improvement Plan," on file with the planning and 
development services division and made part of this chapter by reference, or other public street 
which does not conform to current county width standards, unless the portion of such lot or parcel 
within the right-of-way of the highway to be widened or additional required street width has been 
dedicated to the county and improved. The dedication and improvements shall meet the 
standards for such highway or street as provided in Section 15.28.060. (Ord. 1473 (part), 2001: 
Ord. 961 § 1 (part), 1986: prior code § 2-6-1) 
http://ordlink.com/codes/saltlkco/_DATA/TITLE 15/Chapter_l 5_28_HIGHWAY DEDI... 10/21 /2004 
APPENDIX #6 
Section 63-90a-l et seq, Utah Code 
CHAPTER 90a 
CONSTITUTIONAL TAKING ISSUES 
Section 
63-90a-l. Definitions. 
63-90a-2. Applicability of chapter. 
63*90a-3. Political subdivisions to adopt guidelines. 
§3-90a-4. Appeals of decisions. 
63-90a«l. Definit ions. 
As used in this chapter: 
(1) "Constitutional taking issues" means actions in-
volving the physical taking or exaction of private real 
property by a political subdivision that might require 
compensation to a private real property owner because of: 
(a) the Fifth or Fourteenth Amendment of the 
Constitution of the United States; 
(b) Article I, Section 22 of the Utah Constitution; 
or 
(c) any recent court rulings governing the physical 
taking or exaction of private real property by a 
government entity. 
(2) "Political subdivision" means a county, municipal-
ity, special district, school district, or other local govern-
ment entity. 1994 
63-90a-2. Appl icabi l i ty of chap te r . 
This chapter does not apply when a political subdivision 
formally exercises its power of eminent domain. 1994 
63-90a-3. Political subdivisions to adopt guidelines. 
(1) Each political subdivision shall enact an ordinance 
establishing guidelines to assist them in identifying actions 
involving the physical taking or exaction of private real 
property that may have constitutional taking issues. 
(2) Each political subdivision shall consider the guidelines 
required by this section when taking any action that might 
result in the physical taking or exaction of private real 
property. 
(3) (a) The guidelines adopted under the authority of this 
section are advisory. 
(b) A court may not impose liability upon a political 
subdivision for failure to comply with the guidelines 
required by this section. 
(c) The guidelines neither expand nor limit the scope of 
any political subdivision's liability for a constitutional 
taking. 1994 
63-90a-4. Appeals of decisions. 
(1) Each political subdivision shall enact an ordinance that: 
(a) establishes a procedure for review of actions that 
may have constitutional taking issues; and 
(b) meets the requirements of this section. 
(2) (a) (i) Any owner of private property whose interest in 
the property is subject to a physical taking or exac-
tion by a political subdivision may appeal the political 
subdivision's decision within 30 days after the deci-
sion is made. 
(ii) The legislative body of the political subdivision, 
or an individual or body designated by them, shall 
hear and approve or reject the appeal within 14 days 
after it is submitted. 
(iii) If the legislative body of the political subdivi-
sion fails to hear and decide the appeal within 14 
days, the decision is presumed to be approved. 
(b) The private property owner need not file the appeal 
authorized by this section before bringing an action in any 
court to adjudicate claims that are eligible for appeal. 
(c) A property owner's failure to appeal the action of a 
political subdivision does not constitute, and may not be 
interpreted as constituting, a failure to exhaust available 
administrative remedies or as a bar to brineine- Wal 
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DAVID E. YOCOM 
Salt Lake County District Attorney 
By: JOHN P. SOLTIS (#3040) 
Attorneys for Salt Lake County Defendants 
2001 South State Street #S3400 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84190-3000 
Telephone: (801) 468-2661 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
DISTRICT OF UTAH, CENTRAL DIVISION 
B.A.M. DEVELOPMENT, 
Plaintiff, 
-vs-
SALT LAKE COUNTY, 
Defendant, 
PARTIAL ANSWER OF PLAINTIFF'S 
FIRST SET OF INTERROGATORIES AND 
PRODUCTION OF DOCUMENTS 
Civil No. 980908157CD 
Judge Hanson 
The above-named Defendant, Salt Lake County, by and through Deputy Salt Lake County 
District Attorney John P. Soltis, in partial answer to Plaintiffs First Set of Interrogatories and 
Production of documents: 
INTERROGATORY No. 1. Identify and fully describe the need (or in your opinion th< 
claimed need created by the development of subject subdivision) for roadway improvements to 3 501 
South Street in excess of the 33 - foot "half-width". 
INTERROGATORY No. 8. Identify and fully describe the development, platting, 
approval and recordation of the development and/or issuance of a development approval for the 
Westridge Meadows subdivision development. 
ANSWER: This Interrogatory will be answered in the Supplemental Answers to 
Interrogatories. 
I INTERROGATORY No. 9. Identify and fully describe: 
I A. The COUNTY'S "individualized determination", if any, concerning the public roadway I 
I needs created by development of the subject subdivision and/or evidencing or supporting the I 
I conclusion there is a "rough proportionality" between the dedication from the Plaintiff and the I 
I corresponding needs created by the development of the subject subdivision. I 
I B. The calculations indicating that the COUNTY has made "some sort of individualized I 
I determination that the required dedication is related both in nature and extent to the impact of the | 
I proposed development." I 
I C. The calculations indicating that the County has made "some effort to quantify its I 
I findings" in support of the required dedication and improvement of the widened 3500 South Street I 
I public roadway "half-width". I 
I ANSWER: See Exhibit 11. I 
pMiiniii ii " iii id i mini i f f l i m v i m i i ^ 
INTERROGATORY No. 10. Identify and fully describe thepreparation, promulgation, ' 
adoption and/or implementation of an "official map" or "major street plan", including but not limited 
to the resolutions or other documentation of the governing body of the COUNTY confirming such 
"adoption" of the "official map" or "major street plan". 
5 
RESPONSE: This Production Request will be answered in the Supplemental 
Answers to Interrogatories. 
REQUEST FOR PRODUCTION OF DOCUMENTS No. 18. Produce all documents 
you intend to introduce as evidence in the trial of this case. 
RESPONSE: Attached. 
REQUEST FOR PRODUCTION OF DOCUMENTS # 19. Produce all documents 
identified or referred to in your answers to PLAINTIFF'S FIRST SET OF INTERROGATORIES 
TO DEFENDANT SALT LAKE COUNTY. 
RESPONSE: Attached. 
DATED this 29th day of January, 2001 
'^iz. LL 
7, M 
Andrea Pullos 
Salt Lake County Transportation Engineer; 
HOTAKY 
UART1N S. KMAPHU8 
2001 So. State 9L #K3800 
SaitUkuCfty.urfrriW 
My Commkttiofi Expira* 
February a, 2804 
tTATlEbrUTAM 
SUBSCRIBED and SWORN to before me this 29lh day of January, 2001. 
bfoTARY PUBLIC 
Residing in Salt Lake G6unty 
DAVID E. YOCOM 
Salt Lake District Attorney 
^jpH^ip.^oi/fis 
/ ^ "Depu ty District Attorney 
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